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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the essential requirements of 
heritable estates, which are known as tarikah in Arabic, from the perspective of Islamic 
law. As a comparative study, this research attempts to explore the extent to which the 
concept of tarikah in Islamic law is currently implemented in the practice of estate 
administration in Malaysia. Establishing what constitutes the estate is often complex, as 
the deceased may own assets such as interest bearing bank accounts and conventional 
securities that do not comply with Syari ah law. Insurance and pension fund entitlements 
introduce further complications. All financial obligations have to be settled before 
probate can be granted, including mortgages on property, business loans and guarantees 
provided by the deceased. The situation is further complicated by the application of 
Malaysian Federal and State laws, as well as Syari ah law, and the jurisdictional conflict 
between the High Court and the Syariah Court. The estates of Muslims should of course 
be distributed as decreed by Syaricah law, but the interface between this and the Federal 
and State laws can cause confusion and complications. Other means of property disposal 
such as waciyyah and hibah should be fully and carefully utilized alongside the 
inheritance law as Syari ah compliant estate planning mechanisms, in order for estates to 
be smoothly managed on death, and to avoid family disputes over inheritance, which are 
a common occurrence. This study involved an examination of the definitions of tarikah 
available in the Islamic treatises, as well as interviews with Syaricah scholars with 
expertise in this area, and analyses of Malaysian court rulings regarding the estates of 
Muslims where disputes have arisen. The investigation sought the opinions of the 
Syaricah scholars on these issues, as well as on the current workings of the Federal and 
State laws of Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the Research 
The Islamic law of succession is enacted in the Syari ah, which forms the Islamic 
religious laws' that are considered by Muslim jurisprudence as a manifestation of God's 
revelation. 2 The law forms a vital and integral part of the Islamic law of personal status 
i. e. Islamic family law. 3 As a religion-based law, Muslims are under a religious duty to 
apply the Islamic law of succession regarding the disposition of their estates upon death. 
This means that ignoring the principles of Islamic law regarding the administration and 
distribution of an estate as laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunnah without good reason 
amounts to a grave sin. 4 
In this respect, in response to a question regarding the significance of the performance of 
this religious obligation, particularly by those who live in countries where this law is not 
generally applicable Muzammil H. Siddiqi stated, therefore, suggests that: 
"It is very important that Muslims in America (and the West in general) 
prepare their wills before their death. The reason is that in America (and 
1 Wilson, Rodney, Economics, Ethics and Religion, Jewish, Christian and Muslim Economic Thought, New 
York: New York University Press, 1997, p. 118. 
2 Powers, David S., The Islamic Inheritance System, A Socio-Historical Approach, A. L. Q., 8(1993), p. 13. 
3 Coulson, N. J., Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence, London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1971, p. 8. 
4 The Qur'anic verses al-Nisii' (4): 13 and 14 state: "Those are limits set by Allah, those who obey Allah 
and His Messenger will be admitted to Gardens with rivers flowing beneath, to abide therein (forever) and 
that will be the supreme achievement. But those who disobey Allah and His Messenger and transgress His 
limits will be admitted to a fire, to abide therein, and they shall have humiliating punishment. "The 
translation of the Qur'anic verses throughout the research is based on the translation by `Ali, `Abdulläh 
Yüsuf, The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an, new edition with revised translation and commentary, Maryland: 
Amana Corporation, 1992. 
the Western countries), the Islamic laws of inheritance are not recognized. 
If a Muslim dies intestate, i. e. without having made a will, then his/her 
wealth most probably will be distributed according to the state laws where 
he or she lived, not according to Alläh's laws. A Muslim in this case may 
be held responsible on the Day of Judgment because of his/her negligence 
in a very important matter. s5 
In Malaysia, Islamic law is recognized by the legal system. It was regularly implemented 
before the coming of British colonial power. The Majallah Ahkam and the Hanafite Code 
of Qadri Pasha, which were applied in Turkey and Egypt respectively were translated 
and applied in the State of Johore. 6 In the states of Malacca, Pahang and Terengganu, 
Islamic laws were implemented by statute before the coming of the British. 7 In the case 
of Shaik Abdul Latif and others v Shaik Elias Bux, 8 Edmonds J. C stated that during the 
British intervention, the Mohammedan law which was modified by local customs was the 
only law applicable to Malays. 9 
In fact, the British did not interfere in the application of Islamic personal law, which 
includes the law of succession, during its colonization of the Malay States. Even though 
the implementation of Islamic law was gradually replaced with English common law 
through the British system of indirect rule and the establishment of a secular system, the 
S Dr. Muzammil H. Siddiqi is a former President of the Islamic Society of North America. See Siddiqi, 
Muzammil H., Inheritance and Will, [online], 20th June 2002. Available from: http: //www. islamonline. com 
Jaccessed 6th April 2005]. 
Musa, Shafaai, The Conditions of the Countervalues of the Contract of Sale under Islamic Law with 
Occasional Comparison with English Law, Ph. D Thesis, Glasgow Caledonian University, 2000, p. 1. The 
Majallah Ahkam was translated and known as Majallah Ahkam Johore whereas the Hanafite Code of Qadri 
Pasha was translated and known as Ahkam Shariyyah Johore. 
7 Ibrahim, Ahmad and Joned, Ahilemah, The Malaysian Legal System, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa Dan 
Pustaka, 1987, pp. 53-54. 
8 (1915) 1 F. M. S. L. R. 204. 
9 Ibid, p. 214. R. J. Wilkinson stated: "There can be no doubt the Muslim Law would have ended by 
becoming the law of Malaya had not British law stepped in to check it. " See Wilkinson, R. J., Papers on 
Malay Subject, Kuala Lumpur: Federated Malay States Government Press, 1971, p. 49. 
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Islamic laws relating to family and inheritance were maintained. 10 Indeed, the present 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia statutorily recognizes the application of the law, as it is 
included in its State List of the Ninth Schedule. This sets out clearly that the Islamic 
personal and family laws, including the laws relating to succession (testate and intestate), 
of those professing the religion of Islam are within the jurisdiction of the states to enact. 
However, observing the present scenario regarding the implementation of the Islamic law 
of succession in Malaysia, it appears that it is far from satisfactory. There is no statute 
enacted by the legislative body to implement the Islamic law of succession. " The 
administration of Muslim estates follows the same statutes that regulate the 
administration of non-Muslim estates. 12 
Apart from this, the application of the law also encounters legal problems particularly 
relating to jurisdictional conflict. 13 Even though Malaysia currently practices a dual court 
system and it is clearly enumerated in the Federal Constitution that the Islamic law of 
succession is a matter for the states and should be adjudicated by the Syariah courts, the 
civil courts maintain that they have jurisdiction. 
10 Hooker, M. B., Islamic Law in South-East Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 17. 
"For non-Muslims, there is a statute regulating testacy and intestacy cases. For testacy, the relevant Act is 
the Wills Act 1959 (Act 346) and for intestacy, the relevant Act is the Distribution Act 1958 (Act 300). As 
it is a Muslim personal law, the full implementation of the law is legislatively recognized in Muslim 
countries. Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Iraq, Jordan and Algeria are examples of Muslim countries that 
implement the law through legislation. See Nasir, Jamal J., The Islamic Law of Personal Status, London: 
Graham & Trotman, p. 200-201. 
12The Acts governing the administration of the estates of both Muslims and non-Muslims are the Probate 
and Administration Act 1959 (Act 97) and the Small Estates (Distribution) Act 1955 (Act 98). 
13 The conflict of jurisdiction still occurs even though there is an amendment to article 121 of the Federal 
Constitution, which gives exclusive jurisdiction regarding Syari ah matters to the Syariah court. After the 
amendment, article 121 now reads ... 
1(A) The courts referred to in clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. 
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Although the Islamic law of succession is prescribed in detail by the Qur'an14 and the 
Sunnah, there are some areas that need further analysis. Despite the details of revealed 
clarification on the subject, due to the considerable changes affecting the economic and 
commercial conditions in the present world, as compared to the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, there is a need for analytical research to be conducted in relation to aspects 
that are not expressly mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. It is therefore a challenge 
for contemporary Muslim scholars to interpret Muslim belief in a modern context. 15 
Rather than focusing merely on one particular school of law, such research should take 
into account the opinions of other schools of legal thought as long as these opinions are 
based on the principles as correctly deduced from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This is 
based on the contention that the primary references of Islamic law are the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah, not the opinions of any particular school. Besides this, the present situation, 
which certainly affects the effectiveness of the implementation of the Islamic law of 
succession, should also be considered. The emergence of different schools of law and the 
presence of divergent opinions (ikhtiläj) among Muslim scholars should be regarded as a 
kind of juristic discourse. 
Based on these facts, many Muslims in Malaysia believe that the implementation of 
Islamic personal law, in particular the Islamic law of succession, is still not satisfactory. 
The present situation arises perhaps due to a lack of understanding and awareness among 
the Muslims in Malaysia of how the law can be implemented. This is further related to 
the legal barriers established by the statutory provisions, which were historically adapted 
14 Wilson, Rodney, Economic Development in the Middle East, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 104. 
15 Wilson, Economics, Ethics and Religion Jewish, Christian and Muslim Economic Thought, p. 116. 
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from the English laws. It is clear that reforms to the related laws are necessary in order to 
enable the full implementation of the Islamic law of succession. To make the laws viable 
and effective, such reforms must take into consideration local factors such as religious, 
cultural and social values as well as the political and economic environment of the 
Malaysian community. 
Furthermore, the issue of tarikah, the Islamic equivalent of `estate', is also related to 
Islamic estate planning. Estate planning in the Islamic context is extremely important 
because it determines the smoothness of the distribution process and to whom one's 
wealth devolves upon death. This can avoid resentment, distress and dissatisfaction 
among family members and furthermore, can secure the life, at least financially, of one 
whom the deceased dearly loved, but who is not among the recipients under inheritance 
law. 
In Malaysia, there is an instrument known as Hibah Harta, which has developed from the 
concept of hibah (gift). This issue is related to the topic because the distribution of one's 
wealth according to the farä'i(l (inheritance) law does not apply unless and until the 
rights, which are attached to the estate have been fully discharged. One of these rights 
and liabilities is the disposition by way of hibah, which is made prior to the death, the 
ownership of the subject matter being completely transferred immediately upon the 
completion of the contract. 
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Here, this research will examine the instrument particularly regarding the issue of 
Syari ah compliance in order to ascertain the validity of the instrument from the Islamic 
perspective. Besides, the issues of government retirement benefits, the proceeds of the 
family tak4ful (mutual cooperation) and conventional life insurance are also important. 
This is based on the notion that ownership is an essential component of the concept of 
heritable estate and hence, this research will identify whether these fall within the 
heritable estate or not. Here, attempts are made to argue the necessity of diversifying the 
means of disposal of property upon death, not just confining them to distribution under 
the farä'id law, because the beauty of Islamic law, particularly with respect to the 
disposition of property upon death, is crystallized upon the application of the whole 
system of distribution, not a particular part thereof. This is the importance of resorting to 
Islamic estate planning by a Muslim. 
This thesis represents a contribution to the debate concerning the rule of the Islamic law 
of succession in Malaysia. After conducting a study on the subject of this law and its 
administration and application in Malaysia, it is concluded that the issue of tarikah, 
which is part and parcel of inheritance, is a vital topic for discussion. To the best 
knowledge of the researcher, no research that deals exclusively with the present topic has 
yet appeared. This is perhaps due to the lack of sources elaborating in detail the topic of 
tarikah by Muslim scholars. What is normally found is a general discussion on the theory 
of tarikah, which simply focuses on its definition as given by the classical Muslim jurists, 
without expanding the concept for modern application. 
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Nowadays, there are many modes of estate distribution that have been created to protect 
the interests of the deceased as well as of his/her family. At the same time, business 
transactions are not limited to the use of money as the medium of exchange, but extend to 
the use of shares, securities and bonds. Commercial contracts can also give rise to 
property rights. These factors are directly related to the issue of tarikah because when a 
Muslim dies, he/she leaves behind his/her wealth, which should be inherited by the legal 
heirs. The books on inheritance law in Malaysia are concerned merely with the 
administration of estates in general. No work has yet appeared elaborating in depth the 
concept of the estate according to the Islamic perspective. This gave the researcher the 
incentive to embark on the study of the concept of tarikah with the hope that it will make 
an invaluable contribution to the implementation of the Islamic law of succession in 
Malaysia. 
The present study is therefore aimed at analyzing the relevant statutes as well as the 
views of classical and contemporary Muslim scholars on the concept of tarikah. The 
opinions of non-Muslim scholars like N. J Coulson, David Pearl and Lucy Carol are also 
examined. The decisions of the courts in Malaysia are examined in order to ascertain to 
what extent the tarikah concept in Islamic law is applied. The position of Islam in 
Malaysia, as well as the issues of jurisdiction between the civil and Syariah courts, cannot 
be dismissed as they are directly related to the success of the implementation of the law. 
This study is therefore not limited to an analysis of the present legislation but rather it is 
of an interdisciplinary nature. 
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1.2. Research Questions 
In this study, the following questions will be discussed: 
1- What are the essential requirements of heritable estates according to Islamic law? 
2- What are the rights and liabilities attached to the tarikah according to Islamic law 
and are these followed under Malaysian laws? 
3- Is the Hibah Harta, an instrument of estate planning, Syari ah compliant? 
4- Are the family takirful, conventional life insurance policies and government 
retirement benefits heritable? 
5- What are the statutory functions of the Syariah courts in the administration of 
Muslim estates in Malaysia? 
1.3. Objectives of the Research 
1. To examine the components of the tarikah and the requirements of heritable estates 
as prescribed by the Muslim scholars of the four Sunni schools of law namely the 
Ijanafis, Mälikis, Syäfiis and Hanbalis. 
2. To analyze and evaluate the relevant statutory provisions relating to the application 
of the tarikah concept in the administration of Muslim estates in Malaysia. 
3. To study the rights and liabilities, which are attached to the tarikah and to examine 
to what extent these rights and liabilities are observed in the administration of 
Muslim estates in Malaysia. 
4. To look in detail at the statutory powers of the Syariah courts and the jurisdictional 
issues regarding the administration of the Islamic law of succession in Malaysia. 
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5. To inquire into some of the practical problems relating to Islamic estate planning in 
Malaysia, particularly the question of Syari ah compliance, and to ascertain the 
importance of diversifying the modes of disposition of estates upon death. 
6. To provide recommendations for possible and viable reforms to overcome the 
existing problems in relation to the concept of tarikah and its administration in 
Malaysia. 
1.4. The Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The central concern of this study is the analysis of the concept of tarikah as developed by 
Muslim scholars, and the application of this concept in the administration of Muslim 
estates in Malaysia. It is therefore a comparative study in nature, with the purpose of 
identifying any consistencies and inconsistencies between the two. An analysis of the 
relevant Qur'anic verses, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and the opinions of 
classical and contemporary Muslim scholars regarding the concept of tarikah, is 
necessary. This research is, however, confined to the opinions of the Muslim scholars of 
the four Sunni schools of laws. This is because the majority of Muslims in Malaysia 
follow the Syäfiis school of law. References to other than the Syäfiis are only made for 
reasons of comparison, and where necessary for making suggestions. 
The relevant Malaysian laws regulating the administration of Muslim estates as well as 
the Malaysian courts' decisions regarding the concept of estate are within the scope of the 
research. Furthermore, jurisdictional issues are also discussed, but the discussion does not 
stretch to unnecessary facts of jurisdictional conflict pertaining to Islamic law in general. 
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Rather, it is confined to the relevant issues of estate administration for the purpose of 
highlighting the problems and to propose necessary reforms. 
It is not the purpose of this study to highlight all the existing issues in Malaysia relating 
to questions of inheritance. For this reason, the study examines in depth only three 
current issues, namely the estate planning instrument of Hibah Harta of the Bumiputra 
Commerce-Trustee Berhad, the Government retirement benefits, the family takäful and 
conventional life insurance distribution. These are selected on the basis of their 
significance in Muslim affairs in Malaysia as well as the complicated and confusing facts 
of their nature, which cause difficulties in solving the question of rights of inheritance. 
1.5. The Methodology and the Sources of the Research 
This study is comparative, as well as descriptive and quasi analytical in nature and is 
mainly based on literature research. Since the study analyses concepts and issues from an 
Islamic perspective, the methodology applied must be one that is consistent with Islamic 
research practices. Hence, this study adopts thorough analysis on the Qur'anic and hadith 
texts, as well as the relevant fiqh literature of the four schools of Islamic law namely 
Hanafis, Mälikis, Syäfiis and I; ianbalis. In studying the concept of tarikah in the Islamic 
law of succession, the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which constitute the primary 
sources of the law, are heavily relied upon. This is in line with a hadith narrated by 
Mu`ädh Ibn Jabal that when the Prophet sent him to Yemen, he asked: 
"What will you do if a matter is referred to you for judgment? Mu`ädh 
said: I will judge according to the Book of Allah. The Prophet asked: 
What if you find no solution in the Book of Allah? Mu%dh said: Then I 
will judge by the Sunnah of the Prophet. The Prophet asked: And what if 
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you do not find it in the Sunnah of the Prophet? Mu°ädh said: Then I will 
make ijtihäd to formulate my own judgment. The Prophet patted Mu`ädh 
chest and said: Praise be to Allah who has guided the messenger of His 
Prophet to that which pleases Him and His Messenger. s16 
Comparative study entails the study using more or less identical methods of two 
contrasting case. It embodies the logic of comparison in that it implies that we can 
understand social phenomena better when they are compared in relation to two or more 
meaningfully contrasting cases or situations. 17 With regard to legal research, Lepaulle 
pointed out that comparative law method is the best way for anyone to analyse his own 
system and in fact there is no other better way for any hypothesis or theory to be upheld 
than in the light of comparison. 18 
As this study includes a comparative study of the four well-known Sunni schools of law, 
it is therefore based on the analysis of the views of the classical Muslim scholars of the 
four schools, namely the Hanafis, Mälikis, Syäfiis and Iilanbalis. The benefit of this is to 
enable the researcher to propose the expansion of the application of the Islamic Law of 
Succession in Malaysia and to avoid the rigidity and the extreme idea of strict adherence 
to the Syäfiis. This is based on the arguments that the primary sources of Islamic law is 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and the opinions of Muslims jurists of those schools are 
based on their understanding in interpreting the vague revealed texts. In other words, 
their opinions should be treated as means in understanding and developing the texts of the 
16 Al-Alwani, Taha Jabir, Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence, Washington: The International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, 2003,3`d. edition, p. 9. 
7 Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, P. edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 53. 
ý Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 Harv. LR, 1922, p. 853, cited in Malik, Nora Abdul, 
Islamic Arbitration (Tahklm) and Mediation in Resolving Family Disputes- A Comparative Study under 
Malaysian and English Law, Ph. D Thesis, Glasgow Caledonian University, 2002, p. 15. 
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Qur'an and the Sunnah. Comparative analysis provides such an opportunity in 
attempting to find a solution among many different arguments by comparing and 
contrasting how such historical views can be applied to the modern problems. 
In such study, the opinions that represent each schools of law were obtained by studying 
the books written by the authors of each school. This is for the purpose of understanding 
the methods applied by each school of law to solving a particular problem. Among the 
books referred to are the Hanafis' Rad al-Mukhtär `alä Dur al-Mukhtär (1404H) by Ibn 
CAbidin, the Mälikis' Bidayah al-Mujtahid wa Nihäyah al-Mugtasid (1981) by Ibn 
Rusyd, the Syäfiis' al-Muhadhdhab (n. d. ) by al-Syiräzi, Mughni al-Muhtäj ((1958) by 
al-Syarbini, the Hanbalis' al-Mughni wa al-Syarh al-Kabir (1992) by Ibn Qudämah and 
Kasyäfal-Qinac calä Main al-Ignif (1981) by al Bahüti. 
In some cases, there are several different opinions available from the same Sunni school 
of law on one particular issue, and hence it is challenging to discuss all the opinions. To 
address this, the study selects the most dominant view of each school to represent the 
view of the school as a whole. A study of this nature is necessary in order to acquire a 
proper understanding of the Syari iah rulings. By analyzing the legal thoughts of classical 
Muslim jurists, it is possible to comprehend their methodology in deducing legal rulings 
as well as the reasoning behind a particular ruling. In addition, it enables an 
understanding of the legal arguments and principles formulated by them. All this helps in 
the examination of the present position of Muslim estates administration in Malaysia. 
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The works of contemporary Muslim and non-Muslim scholars were also consulted. This 
is significant taking into account the rapid changes occurring in a developing society. 
Such changes certainly affect the law applicable in such a society, which must develop in 
order to suit the changing local needs and requirements and Islamic law is no exception 
to such a requirement. The views of contemporary Muslim scholars were therefore 
consulted. The books referred to are the Majmac al-Fatawä (1989), Zuhayli's al-Fiqh al- 
Islämi wa Adillatuhü (1987), Khafif's al-Milkiyyah ji al-Syari ah al-Islämiyyah ma`a al- 
Mugäranah bi al-Syarä'r' al-Wac[iyyah (1990), al-Zargä"s al-Madkhal ilä Nazariyyah 
al-Iltizäm al-`Ämmah (n. d), Pearl's A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law (1987), 
Coulson's Succession in the Muslim Family (1969) and Nasir's The Islamic Law of 
Personal Status (n. d). 
With respect to the administration of the Muslim estates in Malaysia, references are made 
to the relevant statutory laws. Legislation pertaining to deceased Muslim estates 
administration includes the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, the Rules of the High Court 
1980, the Probate and Administration Act, 1959, and the Small Estates (Distribution) Act 
1953. The relevant statutory provisions regarding the administration of Muslim estates 
are also examined, and comparisons made with the Islamic law of succession in order to 
identify to what extent the Islamic law is being practiced. In addition, relevant reported 
cases of the Malaysian civil and Syariah courts are also studied. This is vital for the 
purpose of looking into the facts of the cases as well as the opinions of the civil and 
Syariah court judges. 
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Furthermore, references are made to books on inheritance law in Malaysia namely The 
Islamic law of successions in Malaysia (2004) by Pawancheek Marican, Probate and 
Administration in Singapore and Malaysia: Law and Practice (1991) by G Raman and 
The Law of Wills, Probate Administration and Succession in Malaysia and Singapore 
(1997) by Mahinder Singh Sidhu. These books provide valuable information regarding 
estate administration in Malaysia generally. 
According to Moten, the type of analysis to be used in researches depends upon the type 
of the research being conducted. 19 Therefore, since the research is quasi-analytical study, 
the method used in analysing the data is descriptive as well as discursive analysis. This is 
important in order to comprehend and to develop the concepts of tarikah in the Islamic 
Law of Succession as well as the estate as administered in Malaysia. In this quasi- 
analytical research, the researcher developed arguments which were based on evidences 
obtained from the textual analysis of the mentioned epistemological sources of Islamic 
law and the contributions from the mentioned schools of law. Such a quasi analytical 
approach maintained in analysing the material and court cases. 
Interpretation is the process by which the researcher put his own meaning of the text and 
primary data collected and analysed, and compares that meaning with those advanced by 
others. 20 According to Schutt, interpretive social scientists believe that social reality is 
socially constructed and that the goal of social scientists is to understand what meanings 
people give to reality, not to determine how reality works apart from these 
19 Moten, Abdul Rashid, A Guide to Research Proposal and Report Writing, Malaysia: Research Centre 
International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), 1998, p. 17. 
20 Loraine Blaxter, et. al., How To Research, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996, p. 197. 
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interpretations. Taking an interpretative stance can mean that the researcher may come up 
with surprising findings, or at least findings that appear surprising if a largely external 
stance is taken, that is, a position from outside the particular social context being 
studied. 2' Here, as Bryman asserted, the researcher is not simply laying bare how 
members of a social group interpret the world around them, but will almost certainly 
aiming to place interpretations that have been elicited into a social scientific frame. 22 
Hermeneutics is one of the three possible approaches applicable in interpreting 
documents. The other two are qualitative content analysis and semiotics. 23 
The researcher, thus, pursued and applied interpretative analysis in relation to 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is a term that is drawn from theology and that, when 
imported into the social sciences, is concerned with the theory and method of the 
interpretation of human action. 24 According to Bryman, the central idea behind 
hermeneutics is that the analyst of a text must seek to bring out the meanings of a text 
from the perspective of its author. 25 Luckman pointed out that hermeneutic consists of 
systematic interpretations of the meaning of the parts in relation to the meaning of the 
whole, and of the whole in relation to the meaning of the parts always by reference to the 
constitutive characteristics of textual genres and epochs. 26 This approach's appeal to 
qualitative researcher is that it is an approach to the analysis of documents (and indeed 
21 Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, p. 15. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, p. 13. 
25 Ibid, p. 394. 
26 Luckman, Thomas, "Hermeneutics as a Paradigm for Social Sciences? ", in: Brener, Michael, ed., Social 
Method and Social Life, London: Academic Press, 1981, p. 219. 
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other data) that explicitly draws on two central tenets of the qualitative research strategy: 
an emphasis on the point of view of the author of the text and a sensitivity to context. 27 
Semi-structured interviews with Muftis and academics in Malaysia were conducted, 
especially regarding issues that could not be found in the legal texts. The interviews are 
important for obtaining views, suggestions and observations regarding the topic under 
scrutiny, which are important when analyzing the contemporary development of the 
implementation of the concept of tarikah in Malaysia. 
The interview is about the eliciting of information by the interviewer from the 
interviewee and the operation of rules of varying degrees of formality or explicitness 
concerning the conduct of the interview. The aim of social research interview is for the 
interviewer to elicit from the interviewee all manner of information such as interviewee's 
own behaviour or that of others, attitudes, norms, beliefs, and values. The types of 
interviews are structured interview, standardized interview, semi-structured interview, 
unstructured interview, intensive interview, qualitative interview, in-depth interview, 
focused interview, focus group, group interview, oral history interview and life history 
interview. 28 
For this research, the researcher applied the method of semi-structured interview. The 
researcher prepared a series of questions that were in general form of an interview 
schedule but was able to vary sequence of questions. 29 The questions were frequently 
27 Bryman, 395. 
28 Ibid, p. 113. 
29 Ibid. 
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somewhat more general in their frame of reference from that typically found in a 
structured interview schedule. Also, the researcher had some latitude to ask further 
questions in response to what were seen as significant replies. 30 Interviews with Muftis 
and academics in Malaysia were conducted. The reasons for undertaking the interviews 
are especially regarding issues that could not be found in the legal texts. In other words, 
interviews are used to bridge the historical gap in interpreting the historical text and 
attempting to find answers to the contemporary problems. 
In conducting the interviews, the researcher listed down the questions and topics, but the 
questions addressed to the interviewee did not follow exactly in the way outlined in the 
schedule. The researcher also asked questions that were not included in the guide. This is 
to give the interviewees the opportunity to express their thorough views on the questions 
addressed. From this, the researcher would have the chance to gain relevant information 
as mush as possible in order to analyse the issues discussed. However, during the 
interview, the researcher had asked all the questions prepared and had used similar 
wordings. 
The interviews were beneficial in terms of obtaining views, suggestions and observations 
regarding the topic under scrutiny, which are important when analyzing the contemporary 
development of the implementation of the concept of tarikah in Malaysia. From these 
interviews, the researcher was able to gather information regarding the contemporary 
Islamic issues such as the position of the proceeds of the conventional life insurance and 
Family Takaful, the concept of property in Islamic law, and the concept of Hibah Harta 
30 Bryman, p. 113. 
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in Malaysia. The researcher was also able to understand in depth the administration of 
estate in Malaysia in terms of procedural matters, after interviewing the Collector and the 
Executive of Amanah of the Kota Bharu Public Trust Corporation. 
On the issue of Islamic law, interviews were conducted with Dato' Hashim Yahya, the 
former Mufti of the Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur, Dato' Hj. Hasbullah Mohd 
Hassan, the Mufti of the State of Kelantan and Dato' Shukri Muhammad, the Deputy 
Mufti of the State of Kelantan. With regard to the estate-planning instrument of Hibah 
Harta, an interview was held with Mr. Aimi Zulhazmi, the Manager of the Bumiputera- 
Commerce Trustee Berhad (BCT) to gather information regarding its perception of the 
concept. With respect to the administration of estates, interviews were conducted with 
Tuan Haji Mohd Zin, the Head of Assistant Directors and Madam Karimah, the Assistant 
Director, the Division of Small Estates Distribution of the Kota Bharu Land Office, and 
with Cik Maimun Daud, the Executive of Amanah of the Kota Bharu Public Trust 
Corporation. 
To obtain information regarding the contemporary issues of Islamic law such as Syari ah 
compliance, interviews were conducted with academics that are actively participating in 
the process of the development of Islamic law in Malaysia, namely Dr. Mohd. Daud 
Bakar, the former Deputy Rector of the International Islamic University and a member of 
the Central Syari ah Advisory Council of the Central Bank of Malaysia and Securities 
Commission of Malaysia, Dr. Shafai Musa, the former Head of the Department of Islamic 
law, Professor Dr. Razali Nawawi, Dr. Ismail @ Mohamad and Dr. Zulkifli Muda of the 
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Kulliyyah of Laws, the International Islamic University. The information obtained from 
these interviews and discussions are used for the analysis of the effectiveness and 
weakness of the application of the laws and for subsequent suggestions and reforms. 
1.6. The Outline of the Research 
This research focuses primarily on the analysis of the concept of tarikah as developed in 
the Islamic law of succession and the administration of estates in Malaysia. It attempts to 
compare the principles of tarikah as developed by Muslims scholars, the statutory 
provisions, court interpretations and comprehensions of the term `estate' in estate 
administration. Furthermore, the research also embarks on related issues that have an 
impact on the application of the Islamic concept in estate administration as well as on 
necessary suggestions for reform. This research consists of eight chapters including the 
introductory and concluding chapters. 
The current chapter deals with introductory aspects of the research, discussing the general 
background and nature of the study. It also discusses the methodology adopted and the 
sources referred to throughout as well as the research questions, objectives, scope and 
limitations of the study. The chapter provides general information for the reader so that 
they have a clear idea of what the research is all about. 
Chapter Two deals with the background of the Islamic law of succession as well as its 
application in the Malaysian legal system. It discusses in brief the subject of the Islamic 
19 
law of succession and gives an historical sketch of its application in Malaysia, as well as 
its modern application in the Malaysian courts. 
Chapter Three looks at the literal and technical meanings of tarikah, as understood by the 
classical Muslim jurists in their treatises and analyzes the principles they have adopted. In 
connection with this, the chapter examines the components of tarikah according to the 
Islamic law of succession. In this respect, it is necessary to discuss a related issue, namely 
the concept of property in Islamic law. For the purposes of comparative analysis, this 
chapter conducts an inquiry into the meaning of `estate' as stated in the Malaysian 
statutory provisions and in the administration of deceased Muslims' estates. The inquiry 
includes an examination of the meaning, definition and classification of the term `estate'. 
Chapter Four attempts to identify the rights and liabilities that are attached to Muslim 
estates as prescribed by the Qur'an and the Sunnah. There is a particular focus on the 
theoretical framework regarding these rights and liabilities, such as funeral expenses, 
debts, bequests and the rights of the heir. The chapter also deals with the issue of at what 
point the rights of the heir arise. It draws a comparison with the principles adopted in 
Malaysia by analyzing the current legislation as well as the judges' opinions available in 
reported cases. There is also a discussion of the opinions of those directly involved with 
the administration of Muslim estates in Malaysia especially regarding the practical 
aspects. In addition, the chapter examines other related issues, namely the wasiyyah (will) 
and jointly acquired property, which have significant effects on the rights of heirs. 
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Chapter Five examines the estate-planning product (Hibah Harta) of the Bumiputra- 
Commerce Trustee Berhad. There is a detailed analysis of the nature of this product, 
which adopts the mechanism of hibah, including the concepts of `umrä and rugbä. For 
this purpose, the chapter examines the theoretical framework of the general concept of 
hibah in Islamic law as well as the issue of transference of ownership and the legitimacy 
of the °umrä and rugbä conditions from the Islamic law point of view. It is interesting 
that in this chapter, considerable attention is paid to the fatwä (legal Islamic opinion), 
which has been issued by the Fatwä Council of Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 
concerning the validity of the product. The comments of Malaysian Muslim scholars on 
the issue of the legitimacy of this product, including the process of the issuance of the 
fatwä are also highlighted. 
Chapter Six examines the inheritance issues regarding the proceeds of the family tak4ful, 
conventional life insurance and government retirement benefits. The chapter studies the 
nature of monies received under the life takäful and conventional insurance policies as 
well as the objectives of the policies. This is an important area of study due to the fact 
that the legitimacy of the property is an essential of the heritable estate; hence it is 
pertinent to highlight the issue of the validity of conventional life insurance policies from 
the Islamic perspective. With respect to retirement benefits, the discussion focuses on 
their nature and objectives, which includes the pension, the issue of whether the benefits 
constitute an absolute right of the government officer as well as the nature of the contract 
of service. The chapter also analyzes the relevant fatawä and opinions of contemporary 
Muslim scholars on this subject. 
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Chapter Seven deals particularly with jurisdictional issues and the functions of the 
Malaysian Syariah court pertaining to matters of Muslim inheritance. It analyzes the 
relevant statutory provisions in the Malaysian Federal Constitution regarding the position 
of Islamic law as well as the establishment and jurisdiction of the states and the Syariah 
courts particularly regarding the Muslim estate. The chapter also discusses the 
interpretations of civil and Syariah court judges of the relevant statutory provisions and 
the need for reforms to the present status quo. Special attention is given to arguments 
regarding the significance of fully empowering the Syariah courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over Muslim succession. The analysis in this chapter takes into account the 
necessity of the Islamic concept of tarikah being interpreted and adjudicated by the 
appropriate court and by qualified judges. 
Finally, Chapter Eight provides the concluding remarks of the whole thesis and 
suggestions for possible reforms to the current law applicable in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE ISLAMIC LAW OF 
SUCCESSION AND THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN 
MALAYSIA 
2.1. Introduction 
The primary objective of this research is to study the concept of tarikah in the Islamic 
law of succession and its application in the administration of the deceased Muslim's 
estate in Malaysia. In relation to this, it appears important to discuss briefly the general 
concept of the Islamic law of succession and the development of this law in Malaysia. 
This chapter provides an important gateway to the present research, as its deliberate aim 
is to focus on the general outlines of the subject and the applicability of the law from the 
perspective of the Malaysian laws. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first deals with the general concept of the 
Islamic law of succession. It discusses the essential principles of the law and its sources, 
the basis of inheritance, and the ascertainment of the rightful recipients and their 
positions regarding estate distribution. The second part focuses on the historical 
development of this law in Malaysia and its current application. An attempt is made to 
respond to the issue of whether or not the law has been duly recognized and adopted both 
before and after independence. 
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2.2. The General Concept of the Islamic Law of Succession 
2.2.1 The Definition of Fard'i I and the Sources of the Law 
In Arabic, the Islamic law of succession is commonly known as al farä'iti, which literally 
means fixed portions. ' Farada is the root word of farä'icl and has several meanings as 
applied in the Qur'an. However, in relation to the present subject, the term denotes al- 
tagdir, which literally means determination as applied in the Qur'anic verse al-Bagarah 
(2): 237.2 Technically, according to al-Syarbini, the term denotes the quantum of shares 
allotted to the legal heirs as determined by the Syariah. 3 Ibn °Abidin explains that the 
knowledge of fard'id is to do with principles regarding determining the entitled legal 
heirs, their quantum of shares, the impediments and the causes of inheritance, the 
exclusions from inheritance and the classification of the legal heirs. 4 
In the light of the above definitions, it is possible to deduce that the Islamic law of 
succession emphasizes the entitlement of the legal heirs and their respective quantum of 
shares of the estate as fixed by the Syari ah. In relation to this, the Islamic law of 
succession imposes many principles and conditions, such as the principles of double 
shares and priority in succession that must be satisfied in order to realize the entitlement. 
1 Brill, E. J., First Encyclopedia of Islam 1913-1936, New York: Leiden, 1965, vol. iii, p. 783. See also 
Mustafa, Ibrahim, et. al., al-Mu`jam al-Wgsil, Istanbul: Al-Maktabah al-Islamiyyah, n. d., p. 683. 
2 The Qur'an, al-Baqarah (2): 237; "And if you have divorced them before you have touched (had a sexual 
relation with) them, and you have fixed (faratitum) unto them the mahr (bridal-money given by the 
husband to the wife at the time of marriage)... " 
3 Al-Syarbini, Muhammad al-Khallb, Mughni al-Muhtdj, Egypt: Mu%afä al-Bäbi al-IjalabT, 1958, vol. 3, 
2. 
Ibn `Abidºn, Häsyyah Rad al-Mukhtär cold Dur al-Mukhtär, 3rd edition, BAkjistän: Maktabah 
Rasyidiyyah Ku'tah, vol. 5,1404H, p. 534. 
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As a divine law, its primary or epistemological sources are the Qur'an and the Sunnah of 
the Prophet Muhammad. The principles and conditions regarding the devolution of a 
deceased Muslim's estate are deduced from the above sources. The Qur'an and the 
Sunnah prescribe in detail the entitlement and the quantum of shares of each legal heir. 
There are three Qur'anic verses, known as verses of inheritance that elucidate in detail 
matters of inheritance, namely chapter al-Nisä' (4): 11,12 and 176 5 In summary, these 
verses explain and prescribe the entitled legal heirs, their respective portions of shares, 
the principle of the 2: 1 ratio between male and female legal heirs and the need to settle 
the rights attached to the estate prior to the distribution. It is a distinctive feature of this 
branch of Islamic law that in the main, the very detailed explanation and prescription of 
the principles are contained in the Qur'an, as compared to other branches of Islamic law. 
Referring to this subject, Coulson states: "nowhere is the fundamental Islamic ideology 
of law as the manifestation of the divine will more clearly demonstrated than in the laws 
of inheritance. 6 
The Sunnah elaborates further the general inheritance rules, and in some cases introduces 
new principles that are not expressly mentioned in the Qur'an. For instance, the rule of 
priority in succession, 7 the principle of the completion of 2/3 between a daughter and 
5 Powers, The Islamic Inheritance System; A Socio-Historical Approach, p. 20. 
6 Coulson, N. J., Succession in the Muslim Family, London: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 3. 7 The hadith "Gives the farä'i¢(the shares of the inheritance that are prescribed in the Qur'än) to those who 
are entitled to receive it. Then whatever remains, should be given to the closest male relative of the 
deceased. " See $ahih al-Bukhäri, translated by Khan, Muhammad Muhsin, The Translation of the 
Meanings of$ahih al-Bukhari, Riyä4: Dar al-Salim, 1997, vol. 8, p. 385. 
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son's daughters, 8 the entitlement of the maternal grandmother9 and the entitlement of the 
bays al-ma! (the state treasury) to the estate. 1° 
Apart from the Qur'an and Sunnah, the inheritance laws draw its epistemological sources 
from ßmä' or the consensus of Muslim jurists, and individual jtihäds or reasoning. These 
two sources are applicable in situations where no clear injunction is found in the primary 
sources. In this case, Muslim jurists perform Ytihäd , which is clearly based on the 
principles deduced from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, in order to solve newly arising 
problems encountered by Muslims. Some examples are the iUtihäd of `Umar on the 
entitlement of paternal grandmothers, and in the case of al-gharäwayn, the interpretation 
of Abü Bakr on the meaning of al-kaldlah and the principles of al-musydrakah by `Ali, 
Zayd and Ibn °Abbäs. ' l 
It is important to mention here that Coulson suggests that the Syari ah does not legislate a 
new system of inheritance but simply modifies the Arab customary system of succession 
by introducing a new group of legal heirs namely the Qur'anic heirs. 12 The entitlement of 
residuary heirs is maintained but they are subject to the prior rights of the Qur'anic heirs. 
Thus, it can be seen that the Syari ah does not totally abrogate the old customary system 
8 The hadith "The Prophet applied the principle of the completion of the maximum 2/3; daughter is entitled 
to 1/2 and son's daughter is entitled to 1/6. " See Khan, Muhammad Muhsin, Translation of $allill al- 
Bukhäri, vol. 8, p. 387 
9 The hadith "The Prophet gave portion 1/6 to the grandmother in the absence of mother. " See Khan, p. 
378. 
10 The hadith "I am the legal heir of the person who dies without any legal heir". This implies that the 
property would be inherited by the bayt al-mal because the Prophet does not inherit anything for himself 
but for the community of Muslim. See al-Syarbini, Mughni al-MUtäj, p. 4-5. 
" `Aliyyah, Muhammad Abli al-11äj, I? awäbi( al-Irth fi al-Tasyri al-Islämi. 3'a edition, n. p.: Där al- 
Thaqafah al-`Arabiyyah, 1981, p. 26. See also Barräj, Jumu`ah Muhammad, Ahkäm al-Mawärith fi al- 
Sfari ah al-Islämryyah, `Ammän: Dar al-Fikr li al-Nasyr wa al-Tawzi , 1981, pp. 
35. 
Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family Law, p. 30. 
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of succession but instead recognizes many of its principles through its divine revelations. 
Clearly, this concept must stand as a fundamental principle of Islamic law when issuing a 
fatwä pertaining to issues on which a specific ruling is not found in the Qur'an or the 
Sunnah. According to al-Qaradäwi, as long as there is no contradiction with the 
injunctions available in the Qur'an or the Sunnah, all human actions and conduct not 
related to acts of worship are permissible. 13 
However, despite the fact that it is only a modification of law, there are significant 
differences between the Arab customary succession and the Islamic law of succession as 
far as the entitlement of residuary heirs is concerned. Even though in Arab customary 
practices succession is in favour of male heirs, the basic criterion for such entitlement is 
the capability of defending the honour of the family and tribe. 14 As a result, many male 
heirs who are entitled to inherit under the Islamic law of succession, such as minors, the 
elderly and the blind, were previously excluded from inheritance because they were 
unable to meet this basic condition. 
2.2.2. The Essential Requirements of Inheritance 
The entitlement of each recipient to the estate is based on their legitimate relationship 
with the deceased. Islamic law has established specific criteria that must be met for a 
relationship to be legitimate and to enable the survivor to inherit from the deceased. This 
implies that Islamic law does not recognize all relationships as capable of constituting the 
basis of inheritance. 
13 Al-Qaroäwi, Yüsuf, The Lawful and The Prohibited in Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1985, 
pp. 14 -17. 
Pearl, David, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 148-149. 
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From the facts regarding the entitlement of legal heirs, it is understood that primarily, the 
marriage relationship, the blood relationship and the religion-based relationship are the 
relationships that are recognized by Islamic law to be the basis of inheritance. 's These 
relationships are important in determining the legal heirs of the deceased. For instance, a 
divorced wife should not be simply dismissed from inheritance because of the divorce. 
The nature of the divorce, either revocable or irrevocable, should be taken into account 
because this determines whether the marriage relationship remains or has ceased to exist. 
If a husband dies within the period of `iddah (waiting) of his divorced wife, the latter is 
still entitled on the grounds that the marriage relationship between them remains in 
existence, albeit constructively. 
Another example is in the case of a blood relationship; the issue of the legitimacy of birth 
from the perspective of Islamic law is vital and determines the legal paternity of a child. 
This means that a child born within the period of less than 6 months of a marriage 
contract, or of the consummation of the marriage, is not entitled to inherit his or her 
biological father's estate on the grounds that no legitimate blood relationship existed 
between them. 
Regarding the above explanation, it is important to clarify that the Islamic law of 
succession does not recognize relationships based on love, friendship or adoption as a 
's See al-Syarbini, p. 4. Besides the three criteria, there are another two, namely relationships arising from 
the emancipation of a slave and from an oath of allegiance. The former has become irrelevant nowadays, 
whereas the latter is still a practice among the Arabs, but seems irrelevant in Malaysia where no cases have 
been reported. 
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legitimate basis for inheritance. This indicates that the individual has no right to decide 
who will inherit their wealth upon their death. 
A right of inheritance does not arise until and unless one's death and the survival of the 
legal heirs are legally established. These two conditions may seem easy to ascertain, but 
are in fact problematic when dealing with circumstances such as a missing person, 
because the death is not known. The ascertainment of death and the survival of the 
deceased and the legal heirs respectively in a missing person case is extremely important 
because it determines whether any rights of inheritance exist or not. 
In normal circumstances, one's death is established by the testimony of at least two 
trustworthy witnesses who have seen the death. However, in the case of a missing person, 
the appropriate course of action is to refer the matter to a court of law, which after due 
investigation, may pronounce the death. This pronouncement of the court is considered 
valid from the Islamic point of view as long as it is based on the recognised principles. To 
protect the estate, the date of death of a missing person is the date it is pronounced by the 
court. 16 Any legal heir who lives at the time a person is missing, but then dies prior to the 
date of the death as pronounced by the court, is therefore not entitled to inherit the estate. 
The same principle applies to the determination of the survival of legal heirs. The whole 
estate can simply be distributed if there is no uncertainty regarding the death of a missing 
16 Barräj, Ahkäm al-Mawdrith ft al-Syari ah al-Islämryyah, p. 663. See also Rashid, Abdul, Undang- 
Undang Pusaka Dalam Islam: Suatu Kajian Perbandingan Dalam Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Hizbi 
& Al-Hidayah Publisher, 1997, p. 69 and Coulson, p. 200. 
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legal heir. In this case, it is important to establish that the heir is alive at the time of the 
deceased's death in order to realize his right of succession. However, in the absence of 
any legally acceptable evidence of his survival, the pronouncement of his death by the 
court will resolve the problem. In this respect, for the purpose of protecting the right of 
the deceased to his own estate, when the court issues a declaration of an heir's death, it 
corresponds to the date he or she went missing and as a result he or she is certainly not 
entitled to inherit because their death precedes the death of the deceased. 
It should be noted that inheritance does not occur without the existence of an heritable 
estate. The Muslim scholars have placed this aspect in their treatises alongside the 
conditions of the death of the deceased and the survival of legal heirs so as to constitute 
the pillars of inheritance. '? This shows the significance of the existence of the heritable 
estate to the Islamic law of succession. In relation to this, it is extremely important to 
identify the actual components of the estate, which generally consist of both tangible and 
intangible assets including rights and usufructs. In addition, prior to the distribution of the 
estate among the legal heirs, the Syari ah lays down matters that must be duly considered 
for the purpose of freeing the estate from any other legitimate claims. Funeral expenses, 
debts and liabilities and valid bequests of the deceased must be settled prior to 
distribution. 
17 For example, see Barräj, pp. 159-160, `Ajiyyah, pp. 166-167 and al-Jawäd, Al}mad cAbd, Usü! `Ilm a! - Mawdrith, Beirut, Dir al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, p.!. 
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It should be noted that in order to realize a right of inheritance, an heir must be free from 
any impediment of inheritance. '8 Generally, an heir who kills the deceased is 
consequently debarred from the right to inherit the victim's wealth. This is important 
because if a killer is entitled to inherit, killing might be a means to acquire wealth by way 
of succession. This would bring universal chaos into the society. According to Imäm al- 
Rami ,a Syäfii's 
jurist, the purpose of imposing such a rule is to prevent homicide from 
being a means to succeed one's property. 19 
Furthermore, inheritance cannot occur between two persons of different religions. The 
principle here is that, a non-Muslim is not entitled to inherit a Muslim's estate and vice 
versa. The issue of slavery, as outlined by the Muslim scholars as an impediment, appears 
to be rather irrelevant nowadays on the grounds of the abrogation of this practice in the 
modern world. 20 
2.2.3. The Nature of Legal Heirs 
2.2.3.1 The Inner Family 
The 'aýhäb al furuil (Qur'anic heirs) and the `asabah (male agnate relatives) constitute 
the inner family of the deceased. The inner family comprises of heirs whose rights of 
entitlement and shares in the estate are specifically prescribed and fixed by the Syari ah, 
18 Al-Syarbin7, pp. 5-4. See also Ibn Rusyd, Biddyah al-Mujtahid wa Nihäyah al-Mugta. id, Egypt: Syarikah 
Maktabah wa Malba`ah Mu§lafä al-Bäbi al-IIalabi, 1981, vol. 2, pp. 352- 353. 
19 Cited in Khan, Muhanunad Mustafa, Islamic Law of Inheritance; a New Approach, 2°d edition, New 
Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2000, p. 50. 
20 This impediment is irrelevant today due to the fact that the practice is prohibited. In Malaysia, the act of 
slavery is prohibited as stated in article 6(1) of the Federal Constitution, which prohibits the act of holding 
a person in slavery. See also ibid, p. 49. 
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and heirs who have no fixed shares but would exhaust all the remaining estate after being 
taken by the 'ashäb al furücl. 
This family is further divided into three categories. The first consists of the primary heirs 
constituting the sons, husband, wife, father, mother and daughters. The second category 
consists of secondary heirs constituting germane sisters, consanguine sisters, uterine 
sisters and uterine brothers. The third category consists of substitute heirs, namely the 
agnatic grandfather, paternal and maternal grandmothers and agnatic granddaughters. 
The categorization of the inner family is based on the priority of rights among them. The 
primary heirs always get priority in succession in the sense that no heirs from the 
secondary or substitute categories affect their entitlement or their share of the estate. The 
secondary heirs on the other hand are entitled only in the absence of male relatives of the 
primary or secondary heirs. The substitute heirs' right to the estate is subject to the 
absence of the respective heirs of the primary category. 
a) 'Ashab al-Furüd 
The Qur'anic verses al-Nisa' (4): 11,12 and 176 shed light on the entitlements of the 
legal heirs and their specific quantum of shares. The rights of the husband, wife, father, 
mother, daughter, agnatic granddaughter, uterine brother, uterine sister, germane sister 
and consanguine sister are explained in the above verses. These people are known as the 
'a, chäb al furfid or the Qur'anic heirs. However, apart from them, the agnatic grandfather 
and the paternal and the maternal grandmother are also included in the category of 
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Qur'anic heirs even though they are not mentioned in these verses, as their entitlements 
originate from the interpretations of the Qur'anic verses and the Sunnah. 
The agnatic grandfather is included based on the understanding that the term `father' used 
in the above verse denotes also the agnatic grandfather. 21 The paternal and maternal 
grandmothers' inclusion is on the other hand based on the hadith and ßmä` of the 
companions of the Prophet Muhammad. 22 They are named 'ay idb al furüd because they 
are allocated with specific portions of the estate by the Qur'an, the hadth or the SU aC. 
These fixed portions are 1/2,1/3,1/4,1/6 and 1/8. 
b) `Apbali 
Even though a son or male offspring is expressly mentioned in the chapter al-Nisä' 
(4): 12, his specific portion is not pronounced. He is therefore not from the ashäb al furüci 
group but instead he is an `asabah23 or residuary heir. °Aýabah denotes the group of 
agnatic heirs whose blood relationship with the deceased is not from a female relative. 
Their entitlement to the estate falls second after the rights of the Qur'anic heirs are fully 
met. If the estate is completely exhausted by the Qur'anic heirs, the `a, cabah will receive 
nothing. 
21 AI-Zubayl% Wahbah, al-Fiqh al-IslämT wa Adillatuhü, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1987, vol. 8, p. 298. 22 `Ubädah al-$Amit said: The prophet had decreed that the paternal and maternal grandmothers share 
equally the portion 1/6. See al-Naysäbüri, Mu}lammad `Abd al-Ijäkim, al-Mustadrak `ald al-$a/Thayn, 
Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, n. d., p. 376. See also Ibn Rusyd, p. 349 and al-Syarbini, p. 16. 23 This is termed as actual `asabah. There is another kind of `airabah, which is based on the emancipation of 
a slave. According to al-Syarbin% if a freed slave dies, his former master is entitled to inherit only after it 
being taken by 'a, chäb alfurüa. In the presence of actual `aiabah, he is de facto excluded because the 
former exhausts the property. In the order of entitlement, their right comes just after the actual `asabah. 
They have prior rights over the dhawu al-arhäm and the bayt al-mil. See al-Syarbini, p. 20 and Khan, p. 49 
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This principle is known as the golden rule. 24 It is based on the hadith which states: "Give 
the farä'iii (the shares of the inheritance) to those who are entitled to receive it. Whatever 
remains, should be given to the closest male relative of the deceased or the `asabah. "25 
Moreover, the verses also explicitly express the situation of a father who may become 
residuary heirs26 and the possibility of the `asabah group converting their female 
counterparts of the Qur'anic heirs to `asabah. 
`Asabah is further categorized into four classes namely i) the son and his descendants ii) 
the father and his ascendants iii) the descendants of the father iv) the descendants of the 
paternal grandfather and v) the lines of descendants of the great paternal grandfather and 
higher grandfathers in ascending order. 27 `Asabah is generally and was originally made 
up of agnatic male relatives. However, it should be noted that `asabah does not 
necessarily consist merely of male relatives. 
As noted above, it is understood that daughters, agnatic granddaughters, germane sisters 
and consanguine sisters who are Qur'änic heirs could possibly be converted into `asabah 
by their male counterpart of `asabah. Besides this, germane and consanguine sisters, in 
the absence of sons or agnatic grandsons, would be converted by daughter or agnatic 
grandson. In this situation, when their position as ashäb al furu 1 has changed into 
`asabah, their entitlements are as °asabah and consequently, they are no longer 
24 De facto exclusion is different from de jure exclusion. The former is applicable to the golden rule 
whereas the latter is applicable only within the categories of `arabah. 
25 This hadith was narrated by Ibn `Abbas and was reported by al-Bukhäri in his $ahih. See Khan, 
Translation, p. 73. 
26 The verse clearly expresses that in the absence of any son or agnatic grandson, the father will inherit as 
the `asabah, and further, in their absence but with the presence of a daughter or agnatic granddaughter, the 
father will inherit in both the capacity of ashäb al furud and of `a, cabah. 27 Coulson, p. 33 
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guaranteed to receive any specific portion of shares in the estate. They are now subjected 
to de jure and de facto exclusions. 
It is to be noted that the principle of double share between male and female heirs is 
applicable to some heirs in the category of `asabah. This is based on the chapter al-Nisä' 
(4) verses 11,12 and 173. This applies when female legal heirs of the 'ashäb al furüci are 
converted into `asabah by their male counterparts. This principle is commonly known as 
al-ta`sib. 
Daughters, agnatic granddaughters, germane sisters and consanguine sisters are the four 
female legal heirs of 'ashäb al furüd, who are affected by the principle. In the presence 
of a male counterpart, their entitlement is in the capacity of `asabah instead of 'ashäb al- 
furüd and as a result, they have no fixed shares. They will share the remaining estate left 
by the 'ashäb al furüd with their male counterpart following the principle of double 
share, namely the ratio of 2: 1.28 
The difference of shares between male and female legal heirs is due to the nature of the 
burden in terms of the financial responsibility that is borne by the male legal heir. In 
Islamic family law, a woman is only accountable financially to herself. In contrast, a man 
is burdened with the responsibilities of supporting and maintaining others including his 
wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters. In this respect, even though a Muslim woman 
receives less of the estate than a Muslim man, she receives it solely for herself and is 
28 See Khan, Translation of al-Bukhäri, p. 385. 
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under no legal duty to spend it on others, 29 whereas a man is subject to the possibility of 
being summoned to court if he neglects his responsibilities. 30 
2.2.3.2. Table of the Entitlement of the Inner Family 
The Entitlement of Primary Heirs 
Heirs Portions and Positions Situations 
Husband a) 1/2 a) No offspring 
b) 1/4 b) Presence of offspring 
Wife a) 1/4 a) No offspring 
b) 1/8 b) Any offspring 
a) 1/6 a) Presence of male offspring 
Father b) 1/6 + Residue b) Presence of female offspring but no male offspring 
c) Residue c) No male or female offspring 
a) 1/6 a) Presence of any offspring (male or female) or presence 
Mother of two or more collaterals (brothers or sisters or mixture of 
them; germane or consanguine or uterine or mixture of 
them) 
b) 1/3 of the whole estate b) Absence of any offspring or in the presence of only one 
collateral (germane or consanguine or uterine) 
c) 1/3 of the remaining c) This case is known as gharawaynl gharibataynl 
estate `umdr , yatayn. It happens when the only entitled legal heir 
is the husband, wife, father or mother. The father may 
convert the mother into a residuary heir and their shares 
are based on a 2: 1 ratio. 
a) 1/2 a) Alone and absence of male offspring. 
Daughter b) 2/3 b) Two or more daughters and absence of son. They share 
the portion equally. 
c) Residue c) Presence of son; she is converted into a residuary heir 
the by son. She inherits in her capacity of an `a, abah. 
No specific share; he is He is very powerful. He could reduce the shares of the 
Son always an `a, cabah Qur'anic heirs including the spouse and the ascendants and 
could totally exclude the collateral from inheritance. He is 
never excluded from inheritance. 
29 See also a fatwd issued by A Group of Islamic Researchers, Why Male's Share of Inheritance Doubles 
Female's?, [online], 27"' March 2005, available from: http: //www. islamonlitic. com [accessed on 6's April 
2005]. In this fatwä, the researchers put an example: "If a father dies and leaves S30,000 to his children 
(lets say there are 2 sons and 2 daughters). Each son gets $10,000 and each daughter gets $5,000 dollars. 
However, the sons have to support their mothers, their wives, their children, and their sisters (if the sisters 
are not married yet), while the sisters can keep the money to themselves. So, who ends up having more 
money at the end? Of course the girls. " 
30 Al-Zullayl% al-Fiqh al-Isldmi wa Adillatuhü, vol. 4, pp. 25- 26. See also al-Qaraciäwi, Yüsuf, Fahva 
Terkini Wanita & Keluarga, translated into Bahasa Malaysia by H. Mohd. Roihan M. A., Kuala Lumpur: 
Pustaka Shuhada, 1996, p. 177. 
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The Entitlement of Secondary Heirs 
Heirs Portions and Positions Situations 
a) 1/6 a) Alone 
Uterine b) 1/3 b) More than one, either male or female or mixture. 
brother and c) By any offspring of the deceased or any male agnatic 
sister c) Excluded ascendant. 
Germane a) 1/2 a) Alone 
sister b) 2/3 b) More than one 
c) Principle of double share c) Converted by her/their male counterpart i. e germane 
brother 
d) Accompanying residuary d) Converted by daughter or agnatic granddaughter 
e) al-Musyärakah e) Share the portion equally with the uterine brothers and 
sisters in the case of al-hajariyyah. 
f) Excluded f) By son or agnatic grandson, or father (not by agnatic 
grandfather) 
a) 1/2 a) Alone 
Consanguine b) 2/3 b) More than one 
sister c) 1/6 c) Presence of one germane sister; the rule of the 
completion of the maximum 2/3 
d) Principle of double share d) Converted by her/their male counterpart into an `asabah 
e) Accompanying residuary e) Converted by daughter or agnatic granddaughter 
f) Excluded f) By 
i- Son or agnatic grandson 
ii- Father (not agnatic grandfather) 
iii- Two germane sisters because the maximum portion of 
2/3 has been exhausted by the germane sisters 
iv- Germane sister/s who is/are converted into `atcabah by 
daughter or agnatic granddaughter 
v- Germane brother 
Germane No specific shares; they Their rights of inheritance arise only in the absence of a 
and inherit in the capacity of son or agnatic grandson or father. With the presence of any 
consanguine `avabah of them, they are de jure excluded. 
brother 
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The Entitlement of Substitute Heirs 
Heirs Portions and Positions Situations 
The same situations of father apply. However, as a 
Agnatic Portions and positions of substitute heir, he is excluded by father. This is based on 
grand father father the principle of the nearer in degree excludes the more 
remote. 
There are different opinions among Muslim jurists 
pertaining to the issue whether agnatic grandfather may 
exclude collateral as father does. According to Abü Bakr, 
the agnatic grandfather excludes the collaterals whereas 
according to `Ali and Zayd, the principle of exclusion 
does not apply. Both instead, apply the doctrine of al- 
muqasamah and the case is called as the competition 
between agnatic grandfather and the collaterals. Ali and 
Zayd further have different opinions on the method of 
calculation. 
a) 1/6 a) Alone or regardless of the side whether maternal or 
, Sahib grand b) Excluded paternal. 
mother b) By: 
i) Mother (maternal and paternal grandmother) 
ii) Father (paternal grandmother only) 
iii) Principle of the nearer in degree excludes the more 
remote applies. 
a) 1/2 a) Alone in the absence of any daughter and those who 
Agnatic may convert her into an `aýrabah. 
grand b) 2/3 b) More than one in the absence of any daughter and 
daughter those who may convert them into `asabah. 
c) Principle of double share c) Presence of agnatic grandson or her male counterpart, 
she/they become `acabah and inherit in their capacity of 
`asabah, not as Qur'anic heirs. 
d) 1/6 d) Presence of one daughter only and in the absence of 
her/their male counterpart. This is the principle of the 
completion of the maximum portion 2/3 of the female 
offspring. 
e) Excluded e) By: 
i) Son 
ii) In the absence of her/their male counterpart, she/they 
is/are excluded by two or more daughters because the 
maximum portion of 2/3 has been exhausted by the 
daughters. This applies except in the presence of agnatic 
male offspring who are below her/them. The latter will 
convert the former into `a$abah even though he is not 
her/their counterpart. 
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2.2.3.3. The Outer Family and the Bayt al Mal 
There is another group of relatives of the deceased that is the dhawu al-arhäm. Coulson 
names it as the outer family. 31 This denotes relatives who are neither 'avhdb al furücl nor 
`acabah. Like the inner family, the outer family also has a blood relationship with the 
deceased but their entitlement exists only in the absence of any blood relative belonging 
to the inner family. A husband or wife cannot preclude them because the right of 
inheritance of the former is based on the subsisting contract of marriage. 
The Sunni schools of law do not unanimously agree on the entitlement of this group. 
Originally, only the Hanafis and the Hanbalis32 recognized their entitlement based on the 
Qur'anic verse al-Anfal (8): 76, which states the preference of some relatives over others 
and their preference over all believers in matters of inheritance. 33 The Mälikis and the 
Syäfiis however, prioritized the bayt al-mä1 over them in the absence of any blood 
relative of the inner family. This meant that there was no right at all in favour of them. 
However, due to problems of corruption and mismanagement in the bayt al-mäl, later 
scholars of both schools issued a different decree recognizing the entitlement of the outer 
family. 34 
31 Coulson, p. 31. 
32 Ibn `Abidin, p. 540 and Badrän, Abo °Aynayn Badrän, Ahkdm al-Tarikah wa al-Mawärith, 
Iskandariyyah: Mu'assasah Syabäb al-Jämi`ah, 1981, p. 255. 33 "Blood-relations among each other have closer personal ties, in the Decree of Allah, than (the 
Brotherhood of) Believers and Muhajirs. " 
34 Al-Syarbini, vol. 4. p. 630 and Ibn Rusyd, p. 339. 
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2.2.4. The Principles of Exclusion 
It can be seen from the above-mentioned Qur'anic verses, that the entitlement of each 
'ashäb al furüci is dependant upon the presence and absence of other heirs. Hence, their 
shares are subject to the possibility of being reduced. Taking the husband as an example, 
his share is reduced from one-half to one-quarter if his wife dies leaving behind a child. 
Similarly, a wife is originally entitled to one-quarter but if the husband dies and is 
survived by a child, her portion is reduced to one-eighth. A mother's portion of one-third 
is reduced to one-sixth if her son or daughter leaves behind any offspring or collaterals. 
This reduction is known as partial exclusion in the Islamic law of succession. It applies to 
the portions that fathers, mothers, husbands, wives and daughters are entitled to. Because 
they are primary heirs they are never totally excluded from the inheritance. 
On the other hand, total exclusion affects the rights of inheritance of secondary and 
substitute heirs. This total exclusion applies to the situation of an heir who may be totally 
excluded from inheritance and entitled to nothing due to the presence of other heirs. 
According to Coulson, there are two types of total exclusion, namely de facto and de jure 
exclusion. The former is applicable to the golden rule that is the complete satisfaction of 
the fixed portions by the 'ashäb al furücl, which exhausts the estate to the extent of there 
being nothing left for the `asabah. The latter is, on the other hand, applicable to the group 
of `asabah and occurs where one relative is deemed by law to have a superior 
relationship tie with the deceased and thereby excludes others from inheritance. 
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In other words, de jure exclusion is merely applicable to the `asabah. This type of 
exclusion is significant in ascertaining the nearest °asabah to the deceased. The nearest 
heir would totally exclude the more remote, and in this situation, exhaust all the 
remaining estate. There are three rules to be observed in order to determine the nearest 
heir, namely the rule of class, the rule of degree and the rule of the strength of blood-tie. 
The rule of class states that the higher excludes the lower, the rule of degree is that the 
nearer excludes the more remote and the rule of the strength of blood-tie is that the 
stronger blood-tie excludes the more remote. 35 
2.3. The Development of the Law in Malaysia 
2.3.1. Before and After the Advent of Islam 
Before the advent of Islam, the distribution of property among the Malay population was 
based on the adat laws, or tribal customs, of either adat perpatih or adat temenggong 36 
These adats were brought from Sumatera, Indonesia. Adat perpatih is the matriarchal law 
brought by the Malays of Minangkabau who migrated to the State of Negeri Sembilan, 
where it is preserved until today. 37 
On the other hand, the Malays of Palembang brought the Adat Temenggong. This adat 
was originally matriarchal but with the influence of the old Hindu civilization of Java was 
's Anderson, J. N. D., Islamic Law in The Modern World, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1959, p. 61. 
36 Ibrahim, Ahmad, Family Law in Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore: Malayan law Journal Pte. Ltd., 
1984, p. 294. See also Idris, Tan Sri Dato' A Samad Idris, Pembahagian Harta Pusaka Menurut Adat 
Perpatih: Pengalaman Malaysia, in Pentadbiran Harta Menurut Islam, edited by Abdul Monir Yaacob and 
Mohd. Fauzi Mustafa, Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1999, p. 232. 
37 Ibrahim, Ahmad, Family Law in Malaysia and Singapore, p. 294. Wilkinson, R. J., Malay Law, in 
Hooker, M. B., Readings in Malay Adats Laws, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1970, p. 7. 
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entirely abandoned and became patriarchal except in matters of property disposal. 38 The 
Sultanates of Palembang and the Kingdom of Malacca played a significant part in 
spreading the adat to the other Malay states. 39 In other words, the adat perpatih was 
practiced in Negeri Sembilan and this adat has been preserved up to the present day, 4° 
whereas in other Malay States, the applicable adat was the adat temenggong. Despite the 
changes that had occurred to the customary practices of adat temenggong, the distribution 
of property among the Malays remained matriarchal. The devolution of property, such as 
land and houses, upon death was always in favour of women. 41 
With the advent and influence of Islam, prior to the period of British occupation, three 
laws became applicable to the Malays, namely the adat perpatih, the adat temenggong 
and Islamic law. Taylor concludes that the customary laws and the Islamic law were 
really two irreconcilable systems. The customary laws were strictly preserved and as a 
result, part of the Islamic law was superimposed. 42 This resulted in the laws applicable at 
that time being a mixture of Malay customary law and Islamic law. 43 
Taylor suggests that although the Malays were committed to Islamic law, they never 
adopted all its principles 44 In matters of succession, Wilkinson submits that the Malays 
did not adopt the entire Islamic law of succession. 45 Taylor submits that the inheritance 
38 Wilkinson, R. J., Malay Law, p. 7. 
39 Ibrahim, Ahmad and Joncd, Ahilemah, The Malaysian Legal System, p. 32. 
40 Taylor, E. N., Malay Family Law, J. M. B. R. A. S. 15: 1 (1957), p. 3. 
41 Wilkinson, p. 12 and 32. 
42 Taylor, Malay Family Law, p. 4. 43 Hooker,., Islam in South East Asia, 1983, p. 161. 
44 Taylor, p. 4. 
43 Wilkinson, Papers on Malay Subjects, IV, 1908,1-45, p. 37. See also Taylor, E. N., Aspects of 
Customary Inheritance in Negeri Sembilan, in: Hooker, M. B., Readings in Malay Adat Laws, p. 163. 
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laws applicable to the Malays were a mixture of Islamic law and adat laws as stated in 
the rules of succession applied at that time: 
(i) On the death of a peasant, his widow is entitled to a special share in his 
estate, as her share in harta sepencarian unless provision has been made 
for her inter-vivos, as for example by registering land in her name. If the 
deceased had no children and the estate is small she may take the whole 
estate; in other cases she takes a half or less according to circumstances; 
(ii) The residue of the estate is distributed according to Muslim law but in as 
much as the widow's special share is discretionary, her one-eighth, or one- 
quarter share can and should be taken into consideration in assessing the 
special share. 46 
2.3.2. The Islamic Law of Succession during the British Occupation 
As part of the Straits Settlement, English law was introduced as the law of general 
application through the medium of the Charters of Justice in 1807,1826 and 1855. These 
charters provided that English law should be the law of the land applied to the native 
inhabitants in so far as the various religions, manners and customs would permit, over all 
civil, criminal and ecclesiastical matters. 47 
However, it was found that in matters of Muslim inheritance, the principles of English 
law were followed. This is evident in the case of In the Goods of Abdullah48 in which 
46 Taylor, p. 167. See also Hooker, M. B., Adat Laws in Modern Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1972, p. 15. 
47 Sheridan, L. A., Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories, London: Steven Ltd., 1965, p. 14-15. 48 (1835) 2 Ky. Ec. 8. 
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case, the English judge decided against the principles of Islamic law by applying English 
law allowing a will to be executed in excess of one-third of the estate. Benjamin Malkin 
R. held that the 1807 Charter introduced the law of England into Penang and 
consequently a Muslim could, by will, dispose of his entire property, even though such a 
will would be contrary to Muslim law. 9 
It was further held that English law was the law of the land in Penang as stated in the case 
of Fatimah & Ors v. Logan & Ors. 5° In this case, it was contended by the Attorney 
General for the plaintiff that Muslim law must be applied. However, the court objected 
the contention stating that since the lex loci of Penang was English law, the validity of the 
will which was for more than one-third of the Muslim's estate must therefore be decided 
in accordance with English law. 
On the basis of the above illustrations, it can be clearly seen that the principle of Islamic 
law, which prescribes that a deceased Muslim is only allowed to bequeath his property to 
the maximum of one-third of his estate, was simply ignored. Instead, the British 
attempted to introduce English legal principles allowing a Muslim testator to bequeath his 
property exceeding the limit outlined by the Syari ah. 
In the Federated Malay States, under British occupation, with regard to ownership of 
land, the Land Enactment was introduced in about 1880, which was largely based on the 
49 Buang, Salleh, Malaysian Legal History; Cases and Materials, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa clan 
Pustaka, 2002, p. 6. 
50 (1871) 1 Ky. 255. 
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Australian Torrens system of registration of titles' Pertaining to inheritance of land, a 
provision was inserted in the Land Enactment empowering the Collectors i. e. the district 
officers to hear and determine claims regarding succession to the mukim (district) 
registered land of a deceased person. In dealing with these cases, the Collector took no 
account of movable property or issues of debt attached to the deceased Muslim's estate. 52 
Muslims faced problems in following the Islamic laws because the jurisdiction of the 
kathis who administered the Islamic law was restricted to questions of marriage, divorce 
and alimony. In other words, they had no power to distribute property either upon divorce 
or upon death. 53 In 1886, the Perak State Council ordered the land of a major chief to be 
transmitted to the female line. 54 Taylor stated: 
"A great many titles were registered from the first in the names of women- 
a practice obviously not attributable to Muhammadan influence. The 
explanation is that until the close of the nineteenth century the people in 
the Malay States did not have any formal succession to property. In the 
absence of any documents of title of any kind whatsoever the family of a 
deceased peasant simply succeeded to his land by survivorship. If any 
dispute arose it was settled by the elders of the village in accordance with 
ancient custom. If the disputants were not satisfied it is more likely that 
they resorted to the kris than to the kathi. "55 
However, since then, according to Ahmad Ibrahim, the Islamic law of succession has 
been more extensively adopted and the customary laws have only survived in relation to 
the rights of widows and divorcees. 56 It is to be noted that under the British 
51 Taylor, Malay Family Law, p. 5. 
52 Taylor, p. 7. 
53 Ibid p. 4. 
51 Wilkinson, Papers on Malay Subjects, IV, 1908,1-45, p. 37. See also Taylor, Aspects of Customary 
Inheritance in Negeri Sembilan, p. 163. 
55 Taylor, Malay Family Law, p. 9. 
56 Ibrahim, Ahmad, Islamic law in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute 
Ltd. 1965, p. 245. 
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administration, a system of indirect rule had been established in the Malay states. Even 
though the Sultans were the heads of state, they acted on the advice of the British 
residents except in matters of Islamic law and Malay custom. Regarding the applicability 
of the principles of the Islamic law of succession, it appears that they were duly 
recognized by the British. There are several cases that support this suggestion. 
Based upon the decisions of the Collectors and the courts, it is possible to conclude that 
the principles of the Islamic law of succession were frequently adopted. 57 Even though 
they were not written in the form of a statute, the principles were duly adopted by 
referring to either relevant Islamic textbooks or Muslim experts. The Kathi was 
frequently called as a witness on issues of fact. In hearing disputes and as practical 
administrators, the Collectors applied the traditional principle of distribution "according 
to the Muhammadan law as varied by local custom. s58 
In the case of Re Timah binti Abdullah Decd, 59 the Islamic principle regarding the 
exclusion of non-Muslim heirs from inheritance was followed. The Court held that the 
non-Muslim next of kin of the deceased Muslim were not entitled to inherit on the basis 
of the difference in religion. In this case, Gordon Smith J. applied the principle referring 
to the opinions of the Syäfi i school of law contained in the books of Tyabji and Minhäj 
al-Tälibrn. 
S' Ibid, p. 246. 
58 Taylor, Malay Family Law, p. 8. According to Taylor, the Collectors' cases were never reported or 
preserved in any way. 
39 (1941)MLJ51. 
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The Syäfiis school of law holds the view that a will exceeding one-third of the whole 
estate is valid subject to the approval of the legal heirs. In other words, if the legal heirs 
do not approve, the will is valid only up to one-third. This principle was adopted during 
the colonial period in deciding cases pertaining to a Muslim's will in favour of legal heirs 
and in excess of the maximum one-third. 
In the case of Sheikh Abdul Latif & Ors v. Sheikh Elias Bux, 60 the Court decided that the 
will made in excess of one-third was inoperative with respect to such part of the property 
bequeathed to testator's adopted son exceeding one-third of the estate, which was 
permissible for him to leave to a stranger but also inoperative in so far as it deprives 
testator's two brothers and sister of their legal shares as heirs. 
The Islamic principle that a will must not be in favour of an heir was also adopted. This is 
evident in the case of Sill binti Yatim v. Mohamad Nor bin Bujai6' where Burton J. held 
that a will which gave to an heir a larger share than he is entitled to under Islamic law in 
preference over others was wholly invalid as it was not consented by other legal heirs. 
In re Ismail bin Rentah, 62 Raja Musa J firmly stated the applicability of the 
Muhammadan law to Malays. In this case, the Court decided on the issue of nomination 
and held that it was not a conferment of right to take the deceased's estate beneficially 
upon death but instead, the nominee appointed stood as a trustee and hence must 
distribute the estate in accordance with the Islamic inheritance system. 
60 [1915] 1 FMSLR p. 204. 61 (1928) 6 FMSLR 135. 
62 (1940) MLJ 98. 
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2.3.3. The Present Application and the Classification of Estates 
The application of the Islamic law of succession was supposedly secured with the 
inclusion of the law in the Malaysian Federal Constitution. The relevant clause is 
contained in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, which empowers the states' 
governments to enact the Islamic laws relating to succession, testacy and intestacy. 
However, to date no statute on the Islamic law of succession has been legislated by any 
of the state legislative bodies. For the non-Muslim however, there are specific Acts that 
regulate the disposition of estate, testacy and intestacy. The Wills Act, 1958 regulates the 
testate death and the Distribution Act, 1959 regulates intestate death. 
The present jurisdiction on the administration of deceased Muslim estates appears 
problematic. As it is part of Islamic law, the Syariah court which serves as the state court 
is the appropriate forum to decide cases on Muslim inheritance. However, due to the 
conflicting provisions in the Federal Constitution, the civil court firmly believes that it 
has jurisdiction over disputes pertaining to the Islamic law of succession. In the Federal 
List of the Federal Constitution, there is a general clause stating that succession falls 
under the Federal Government. Similar wording is also found in the State List, but this 
specifically refers to Islamic law, empowering the State Legislature to enact the Islamic 
law of succession. 
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2.3.3.1. Jurisdiction of the High Court 
The Federal Constitution, as the supreme law of Malaysia lists the matters that fall within 
the power of the Federal Legislative Assembly, i. e. the Parliament to make laws. Article 
74 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia provides: 
"Without prejudice to any power to make laws conferred on it by any 
other Article, Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in the Federal List or the Concurrent List (that is to say, the 
First or the Third List set out in the Ninth Schedule. " 
With respect to the jurisdiction of the civil courts pertaining to issues of succession and 
inheritance, paragraph 4 (e) (i) of the Federal List in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution clearly provides that in matters of succession, testacy and intestacy as well 
as probate and letters of administration it is within the power of the Federal Legislative 
Assembly to enact laws. Paragraph 4 (e) (i) of the Federal List provides: 
"Subject to paragraph (ii), the following; 
(i) contract, partnership, agency and other special contract; master and 
servant; inns and inn-keepers; actionable wrongs; property and its transfer 
and hypothecation, except land; bona vacantia; equity and trusts; 
marriage, divorce and legitimacy; married woman's property and status; 
interpretation of Federal law; negotiable instruments; statutory 
declarations; arbitration; mercantile law; registration of businesses and 
business names; age of majority; infants and minors; adoption; succession, 
testate and intestate; probate and letters of administration; bankruptcy and 
insolvency; oaths and affirmations; limitation; reciprocal enforcement of 
judgments and orders; the law of evidence; 
Furthermore, section 24 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 provides in very specific 
wording the civil jurisdictions of the High Court. This section states clearly that the High 
Court has the jurisdiction to grant probates of wills and testaments and the letters of 
administration of the estates of deceased persons leaving property within the territorial 
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jurisdiction of the Court and to alter or revoke such grants. The letters of probate and 
letters of administration are also known as letters of representation, which upon being 
granted by the High Court confer powers, duties, obligations and rights on the executor or 
administrator of the deceased's estate. The person or persons to whom such letters are 
granted are in law called the deceased's personal representative. 63 
The Probate and Administration Act 1959, which is the primary Act dealing with the 
administration of the estates of deceased Muslims and non-Muslims, is one of the laws 
enacted by the Parliament following the powers conferred on it by the Federal List of the 
Federal Constitution. It regulates matters pertaining to the administration of the 
deceased's estate in Malaysia. The Act empowers the High Court to issue probate and 
letters of administration appointing the executor or administrator of the estate. If the 
deceased dies with a valid will, upon proper application to the Registrar of the High 
Court, a letter of probate will be granted by the High Court conferring powers on the 
executor appointed by the deceased in his will to administer and distribute the estate 
accordingly. 
The idea of appointing the deceased's representative as executor or administrator and 
vesting the estate including choses in actions" in them is for the purpose of protecting the 
interests of the parties who might become the rightful recipients of the estate left by the 
63 Section 2 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 provides that the personal representative is defined 
as the executor, original or by representation, or administrator for the time being of a deceased person, and 
as regards any liability for the payment of death duties includes any person who takes possession of or 
intermeddles with the property of a deceased person without the authority of the personal representatives or 
the Court. 
64 In Re Abdul Salam, deceased; Abdul Razak v Kasi Mohamad Shirazil Anwar [1938] MLJ 83, the High 
Court held that the right of residuary legatee in residue comprising of undivided immovable property is 
regarded as a chose in action. 
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deceased. 65 For this reason, there are situations whereby the executors appointed by the 
testator through a valid will may not be granted probate. Instead, the Court applies its 
discretionary power by granting probate but with the will annexed to a person whom the 
Court deems the fittest to administer the estate. 66 In doing so, the Court is guided by the 
rule stated in the proviso of the section that the priority of right to the grant depends 
either on who is entitled most to the estate or who is the most rightful recipient of the 
estate. The same applies to the appointment of an administrator. The interest of the 
beneficiaries in the estate becomes the priority in determining who should be the 
administrator. 67 
The distribution of Muslim estates takes place after all debts and liabilities attached to the 
estate are paid off. For non-Muslims, the distribution of estates following intestacy must 
accord with the Distribution Act 1958. However, for the Muslim, there is no such statute 
prescribing in detail the rules and principles as laid down under the farä'i4 law. The 
personal representative must apply to the Syariah court for a certificate of farä'41, which 
65 In protecting interest in the deceased's estate, the High Court allowed beneficiaries to institute actions in 
court even though they had no grant of probate or administration. The reason for such approval was they 
were not suing on behalf of the estate. They were suing in their own capacity as beneficiaries of the estate 
for a declaration to protect the property of the estate and to prevent its sale. Based on this reason, the Court 
further held that they had the locus standi to do so as they had at least an equity in the estate. See Omar Alf 
bin Mohd & Ors v SyedJafaralsadeq bin AbdulkadirAlhadad & Ors [1995] 3 SLR 388. 
66 S. 16 of the Probate and Administration Act provides inter alia the situations where the Court may find it 
unsuitable to grant probate to the executor appointed by the testator. For example, in the situation where the 
executor appointed is legally incapable, perhaps due to minority of age or unsoundness of mind, the grant 
would not be issued to them but instead, to other persons who the Court deems the fittest. 
67 S. 30, ibid. The High Court held in Ree Wee Guan Ho, deceased [ 1940] MLJ 212 that a grant of letters of 
administration with the will annexed can only be made by the High Court or a judge when sitting in open 
court. It further held that a grant of letters of administration in any case cannot be made to a petitioner who 
has no interest in the estate. See also Attorney General v Hajee Abdul Cader (1883) 1 Ky 616. In this case, 
the Court held that where a will provided that on the death of the executors named therein the grandsons of 
the deceased should succeed as executors in point of age, the eldest having the first right, and the Court 
duly appointed the eldest grandson. See also Singh, Mahinder, The Law of Wills Probate Administration 
and Succession in Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, p. 143. 
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specifies the portions and the entitled legal heirs of the deceased. In the light of the 
decided cases previously discussed, it is clear that the judges have often referred to 
treatises and manuals written by Muslim scholars including Minhäj al-Tälibin by al 
Nawäwi, which was translated by E. C. Howard from the French translation of Van Ben 
Berg, Mohammadan Law by Syed Amir Ali, Muhammadan Law by F. B. Tyabji, Outlines 
of Muhammadan Law by A. A. Fyzee and Islamic Law in Malaysia by Ahmad Ibrahim. 
In the case of Amanallah v Hajjah Jamilah, 68 a will was created by the deceased in which 
he bequeathed all his property to the plaintiff. The will was challenged by the defendant 
on the ground that he was entitled to a share in accordance with the Muslim law of 
inheritance. The Court referred to the books of Minhäj al-Ta ibmn and the 4`h edition of 
the Tyabji on Muslim law. It was held that the will was invalid as it disposed of more 
than one-third of the deceased's property and was made in favour of an heir, without 
being consented by other heirs. In Re Mutchilin, 69 the Court referred to Howard's 
translation of the Minhdj al-TälibTn and decided that according to the Syäfi i school of 
law, the theory of radd70 did not apply and therefore the widow of the deceased was 
entitled to one-quarter of the estate. The remaining three-quarters escheated to the Bayt 
al-Mä1. 
68 [1975) 1 MLJ 30. 
69 (1960) 26 MLJ 51. 
70 Radd means return. 
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2.3.3.2. Small Estate Administration 
The small estate is defined in the Small Estate (Distribution) Act, 1955 as an estate of a 
deceased person consisting of wholly or partly immovable property situated in any state 
and not exceeding six hundred thousand ringgits in total value. This means that the 
existence of immovable property such as land is the most significant requirement to 
constitute an estate as a small estate. If a deceased dies without landed property, even 
though the total value of the estate is less than RM600,000, the estate does not fall within 
the above definition. 
The purpose of having small estate distribution departments is merely to expedite the 
process of distributing the deceased's estate. Within the Department of the Director 
General of Land and Mines, there are 36 Small Estate Distribution Units throughout the 
country and each unit has a Collector to deal with the affairs of administration and 
distribution of small estates. 7' 
According to Mr. Mohd. Zin bin Dollah, the Head Assistant Director of the Small Estate 
Distribution Unit of Kelantan, Malaysia, the process of administration and distribution of 
small estates deals with cases that do not involve the death of the entitled legal heirs and 
or issues requiring a decision to be made prior to that made within the last four months. 72 
71 Buku Panduan Permohonan Pembahagian Harta Pusaka Kecil, Seksyen Pembahagian Pusaka, P edition, 
Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Kementerian Tanah dan Pembangunan 
Koperasi, Kuala Lumpur, n. d., p. 1. 72 Dollah, Mohd. Zin, Pentadbiran dan Pengurusan Harta Pusaka Kecil, Kertas Kerja 1, Seminar dan 
Dialog Mengenai Harta Pusaka, Jajahan Tumpat, 8th July 2003, p. 2. 
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By having these departments or units for small estates, the cost of administering and 
distributing the estate may be reduced. In the case of the non-small estate, the court 
proceedings can be costly and time consuming for the parties concerned73 because 
currently there is only one High Court for each state in Malaysia. The High Court has a 
number of jurisdictions amongst which is that pertaining to succession issues. Taking into 
consideration the facilities provided by the offices of Collectors in the districts of each 
state in Malaysia, and the presence of one High Court for each state, it is clear that the 
administration and distribution of small estates is significantly vital taking into account 
the interests of the public. Moreover, cases of small estate administration involve issues 
pertaining to land ownership, and the expertise and vast experience of the Collector in 
such matters is very much appreciated. 74 
It would seem that the Collector has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters 
pertaining to small estate administration and distribution. The High Court has no such 
jurisdiction and hence, any civil suit pertaining to the administration and distribution of a 
small estate that brought before the High Court will not be entertained. The exclusive 
nature of the Collector's jurisdiction can be further argued by pointing to the provision in 
section 4(1) of the Small Estate (Distribution) Act. This section clearly shows that with 
regard to small estates, only grants and orders issued by the Collector are valid and 
effective in vesting any interest of such estates in the entitled beneficiaries. It is therefore 
73 For the process of administration and distribution at the district Collector's office, the total cost normally 
is around RM37. But if a case is referred to the High Court for appeal, the total cost may reach RM1565. 
See Buku Panduan Permohonan Pembahagian Harta Pusaka Kecil, p. 6&7. 
74 Fathimah bin ti Mat Akir v Sharifah binti Haji Ahmad & Ors [1977] MLJ 106. 
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possible to conclude that any letter of representation or order issued by the High Court 
has no effect on such property and hence, is invalid. 
This principle was upheld in Fathimah binti Mat akir & Anor v Sharifah binti Hj Ahmad 
& Ors75. In this case, a settlement officer made an order under the Small Estates 
(Distribution) Ordinance 1955 (as the Act was known before its revision in 1972) for the 
distribution of the estate of one Akil bin Lebai Mat who had a quarter share in a piece of 
land. According to the record of the proceedings kept by the settlement officer, all the 
beneficiaries of the estate present agreed to the distribution. Subsequently it was alleged 
that one of the widows was of unsound mind. Her daughters applied to the High Court to 
set aside or vary the settlement officer's order and for a declaration that a half-share of 
the deceased's interest in the said land be transferred to this widow as `syarikat' property. 
The trial judge dismissed the application. On appeal the Federal Court held that the High 
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the grounds that it related to a small 
estate. The Court further stated that the legislature has expressly provided by s. 4(1) of 
the Small Estate (Distribution) Ordinance that it is not the High Court, but the Collector 
who exclusively has original jurisdiction. 
The above decision was followed in Lokmanaalhakim bin Ramli & Ors v Haji Ismail bin 
Ishak & Ors. 76 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the order of distribution was 
wrongly made by the Collector on the grounds that the he had failed to consider a letter 
of renunciation made by the defendants in which they renounced their share in the estate 
75 [1977] 1 MLJ 106 
76 [ 1992] 2 CLJ 1031. 
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and that the Collector also failed to appoint a guardian for the minor beneficiaries in the 
case. The High Court held that the matters complained of were within the exclusive 
original jurisdiction of the Collector and thus the High Court could not entertain the civil 
suit. 
A similar judgment was held in Ahmad bin Abdul Majid v Habibah bte Abdul Majid & 
Anor. 77 In this case, the plaintiff and the defendants were siblings of the deceased, the 
former being the eldest son. The plaintiff claimed that the order of the Gombak District 
Land Administrator was made in an arbitrary fashion, as it did not follow the procedure 
laid down by the Small Estate (Distribution) Act 1955. The plaintiff, through originating 
a summons, applied for his entitlement to his deceased mother's estate under Islamic 
Law. According to the plaintiff, his name was not included in the list stating the legal 
heirs of the deceased, and moreover, the application to the Gombak District Land 
Administrator for the distribution of the estate was made without his knowledge. The 
High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's application. This 
decision was made on the grounds that the issue in dispute involved a small estate that 
was subject to the provision of the Act and was exclusively within the original 
jurisdiction of the Collector as prescribed in section 4(1) of the Act: 
"Save as in this Act otherwise provided no interest in any small estate 
shall devolve on or rest in any person by virtue of any instrument other 
than an order or grant made under this Act. " 
However, despite the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector in respect of the 
administration and distribution of small estates, there is an exception to the rule. The 
77 [2001] 2 MLJ 245. 
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High Court still has jurisdiction to deal with small estates if the deceased dies with a valid 
will. In this regard, the High Court has the power to issue letters of representation. This 
situation is applicable in both testacy and intestacy cases, which include situations where 
the deceased leaves a will but does not appoint an executor. In other words, it is the High 
Court that has exclusive jurisdiction to grant letters of probate or of representation with a 
will annexed even though the estate is a small estate. The Small Estate (Distribution) Act, 
1955 has no effect on this original exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court by virtue of 
section 5 of the Act, which guarantees its exclusive jurisdiction. 78 
Moreover, the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court is further guaranteed by section 
27(3) of the Act itself. The provision in this section precisely indicates that in cases 
pertaining to small estates, in which letters of administration have been granted by the 
High Court, the Collector shall have no power to deal with such estates even with regard 
to any part of the estate that has not been fully administered. Relying on this authority, it 
is submitted that if the Collector issues an order or grant pertaining to a small estate for 
which the High Court has already issued letters of administration, such an order or grant 
becomes null and void. 
The issue of the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court over small estates was dealt with 
in Chua Eh Swee v Sew Chew Eng & Anor. 79 In this case, a letter of representation was 
78 Section 5(1) of the Act states: "Subject to this section, nothing in this Act shall effect the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the High Court to grant probate of any will or testamentary disposition or letters of 
administration in any case in which the deceased has left a valid will or other valid testamentary disposition 
in respect of a small estate or part thereof and the grant when made shall have effect in all respects as if the 
estate had not been a small estate. " 
79 (1982) 1 MLJ 84. 
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issued by the High Court in respect of the deceased's estate. Subsequently it was found 
that part of the estate had been left without administration. That part was then brought 
before the Collector of Land Revenue (CLR) who issued an order for distribution under 
section 17(3) of the Small Estate (Distribution) Act, 1955. The High Court held that the 
order by the CLR was null and void on the grounds that under section 17(3) of the Act 
the CLR could only hear cases where the grant of letters of administration had been 
granted by an authority other than the High Court. According to the Court, under section 
27(1) and (2), which concerns any estate which is partly administered, any further 
application relating to the same estate may be made to the High Court, whether or not the 
estate is, or has become, a small estate. The Court further held that even though the 
plaintiff was present at the hearing before the CLR, submitted herself to his jurisdiction 
and did not appeal against the distribution order these factors did not vest in the CLR the 
authority to hear the application for distribution. 
It is therefore important to mention here that the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred 
upon the Collector pertaining to small estate succession is with respect only to intestacy 
cases where the deceased dies without a valid will. This is pursuant to section 5(1) of the 
Act, which indicates the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court to issue grants of 
probate and letters of administration with wills annexed. The issuance of probate as well 
as letters of administration with wills annexed is made where the testator has executed a 
valid will. For this reason, it is submitted that with respect to small estates, the only 
jurisdiction conferred upon the Collector is pursuant to a death where there is no will. 
Section 5(1) further stipulates that when the High Court has the jurisdiction to grant 
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letters of representation pertaining to small estates, such grants shall have effect as if the 
estate had not been a small estate. Therefore, where the Collector has original exclusive 
jurisdiction to issue an order or grant pertaining to small estate administration and 
distribution, it is solely with respect to intestacy death. 
With regard to the deceased Muslim's estate, the distribution is normally made in 
accordance with the principles of the Islamic law of succession particularly the Syäfii's 
school of law. 80 However, there are no statutory provisions for the Collector to follow 
when distributing the estate under the farä'i(i system. Section 12(7) of the Act only states 
that the Collector is legally responsible for carrying out the distribution based on the laws 
applicable to the beneficiaries, but does not mention that the Syari ah is the law of the 
benefciaries. 8' In other words, the mode of distribution is dependant upon which law the 
beneficiaries decide to follow. They may choose to avoid distribution under the farä'i4 
system and decide that the distribution be made based on their unanimous agreement that 
all the legal heirs regardless of their gender are entitled to the same proportion of the 
deceased's estate. 
In this regard, the Act states that if any difficult point of Muslim law, Malay custom or 
the native law or customs of Sabah and Sarawak arises, the Collector may refer the matter 
to the Ruler of the State in which the district is situated or to such other person or body of 
persons as the Ruler may direct. In other words, in the case of a dispute arising pertaining 
8° Dollah, Mohd. Zin, Pentadbiran dan Pengurusan Harta Pusaka Kecil, Kertas Kerja 1, p. 5. 81 S. 12(7) states "The Collector shall ascertain, in such manner as may be most appropriate, the law 
applicable to the devolution of the estate of the deceased, and shall decide who in accordance with that law 
are the beneficiaries and the proportions of their respective shares and interests. " 
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to the Muslim law, the reference to the Ruler of the State means the Religious Council of 
the State. For any other matter, the Collector may state a case for the opinion and 
directions of the High Court, which may be heard and disposed of by a judge in 
chambers. 82 In this respect, the Collector is guided by the general principles contained in 
the Islamic texts written by Syäfiis Muslim scholars. There is no specific written 
statutory provision that enumerates in detail the principles of the Islamic law of 
succession. 
Even though the High Court has no original jurisdiction over small estate administration 
pursuant to a death where there is no will, the decision of the Collector is subject to 
appeal to the High Court. This implies that the High Court still has jurisdiction over such 
matters that at first seem to be extensively and exclusively in the Collector's jurisdiction. 
Under section 29 of the Act, the appellate jurisdiction is precisely identified and hence, 
any person aggrieved by an order, decision or act made or done by a Collector under the 
Act, has the right to appeal to the High Court. 83 
According to Rahmah Hussain J in Ahmad bin Abdul Majid v Habibah bte Abdul Majid, 84 
`aggrieved party' refers to any person who has an interest in the estate and is not satisfied 
with the Collector's decision. The presence of such a person at the hearing conducted by 
the Collector is not sufficient to constitute them as an aggrieved party. Hence in this 
82 S. 19. 
83 Section 29(1) of the Act states "Subject to the other provisions of this Act and to subsection (5) any 
person aggrieved by any order, decision or act made or done by a Collector under this Act may appeal to 
the High Court. " 
84 [2001] 2 MLJ 245. 
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case, the Court rejected the argument put forward by the plaintiff that he was an 
aggrieved party as mentioned in regulation 10(1) (c). 
Regulation 10(1) (c) of the Small Estate (Distribution) Regulations 1955 provides that a 
notice of appeal has to be lodged within 14 days from the date wherein the decision of the 
Collector was announced. According to Mr. Dollah, Mohd. Zin, if the 14 days elapses, an 
appeal may be forwarded to the High Court to have the period extended. 85 
However, this opinion does not correspond with the decision of the High Court in Tijah 
bte Hassin v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Alor Gajah & Lain-lain. 86 The plaintiff was not 
satisfied with the order of distribution made by the Collector, she claimed that the land in 
dispute was subject to the Naning customary law and should not have been distributed 
according to the Small Estates (Distribution) Act, 1955. She therefore applied for a 
declaration for a correction to be made at the District and Land Office to the effect that 
she was entitled to 1/3 of the land. Based on the facts of the case, the Court found that the 
plaintiff had agreed that the land be distributed by the Collector according to the Act. The 
order of the Collector was made on 20th August 1986 and the plaintiff brought the action 
five years and six months later. The Court held that such an action was not in accordance 
with the procedure and time limit specified by the Small Estates (Distribution) 
Regulations, 1955. The plaintiff had not exercised her right of appeal within 14 days of 
the date of the order; based on this and pursuant to regulation 10(4), her rights were lost. 
eS Dollah, Mohd. Zin, p. 6. 
86 [ 1994] 3 MLJ 424 
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In Mamat bin Hassan & Anor v Siti Khatijah bte Awang Hamat & Ors87 the plaintiff 
applied for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against the order of the 
Collector of small estates, which was made by virtue of section 13 of the Small Estates 
(Distribution) Act, 1955 on 31 January 1982. The order of the Collector had excluded 
him from entitlement. His application was made on the grounds that he was entitled to the 
estate of the deceased according to the farä'id and that he was unaware of the distribution 
order until 1994. Therefore the issue before the Court was whether it had the power to 
grant such an extension. The Court held that the rules pertaining to appeals under the Act 
were specifically provided for under the Small Estates (Distribution) Regulations 1955 
and since the Regulations contain no provision giving the Court the power to extend the 
14 day appeal period given to the aggrieved party, the extension could not be extended. 
Based on the Regulations, the Court has no power to extend the prescribed 14 days 
period. 
2.4. Conclusion 
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be concluded that the Islamic law of 
succession was applicable in Malaysia, prior to the advent of British rule. The law was 
gradually replaced by the practice of distribution based on the adat laws to the extent 
that, while under British occupation, the British judges occasionally recognized the law 
as the law of the land, as evident in the case of Ramah v. Laton. S8 
[1996] 5 MLJ 529. 
88 (1927) 6 FMSLR 128. 
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Currently, pursuant to the statutory provisions of the Federal Constitution, the 
administration and distribution of estates, Muslim and non-Muslim, are handled by the 
High Court with the assistance of the Collectors of the Land Office. The administration 
of the deceased Muslim's estate falls under the jurisdiction of the High Court and, upon 
the issuance of letters of representation, the responsibility of administering the estate 
passes to the executor or the administrator who acts as the personal representative of the 
deceased. 
Personal representatives are under a duty to administer the estate with prudence and 
diligence. They owe a fiduciary duty towards the beneficiaries of the estate. Acting in the 
capacity of the representative of the deceased, the personal representatives are conferred 
with powers as well as rights which enable them to administer the estate diligently. Those 
powers and rights are conferred upon them primarily by the Probate and Administration 
Act 1959, which becomes the major reference point and provides guidelines for them. 
Based on the discussion pertaining to the jurisdiction of the High Court and its powers, 
and the rights, duties and obligations of the personal representatives as stated primarily in 
the Probate and Administration Act, 1959, it is submitted that the function of the High 
Court is merely to ascertain that the administration of the estate is duly carried out. The 
duty of the High Court is to ensure that the interests of the beneficiaries in the estate are 
well protected. In other words, the High Court plays a supervisory role with regard to the 
administration of the non-small estates of the deceased. 
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With respect to the administration of small estates, even though it seems that it is 
exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Collector who has the expertise in matters pertaining 
to land administration, the actual scenario is that the High Court plays the dominant role. 
The only original exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector pertains to small estates where 
the deceased has left no valid will. However, despite this jurisdiction, the High Court is 
empowered with an appellate jurisdiction to reconsider the Collector's decision upon 
application by an aggrieved party. 
The High Court is also empowered with an original exclusive jurisdiction to deal with 
small estates if the deceased dies with a valid will. In this situation, even though the 
estate is a small estate, its administration is directly under the Probate and Administration 
Act, 1959 and not the Small Estate (Distribution) Act, 1955. Therefore, it is submitted 
that the High Court is statutorily conferred with a broad jurisdiction in the administration 
of estates regardless of whether they are classified as small or non-small estate. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE COMPONENTS OF TARIKAH FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVES OF THE ISLAMIC LAW OF 
SUCCESSION AND THE LAWS APPLICABLE IN 
MALAYSIA 
3.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the estate of the deceased constitutes one of the 
pillars of succession. This implies the significance of the estate, without which succession 
can never take place. As far as the administration of Muslim estates in Malaysia is 
concerned, the statutory provisions of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 and the 
Small Estate Distribution Act 1956 are the major sources of reference. The Islamic law of 
succession constitutes one of the personal laws of Muslims in Malaysia and therefore, 
this law should be fully implemented in order to satisfy the rights and interests of the 
parties concerned, namely the creditor, the legatee and the legal heir of the deceased. 
The abovementioned Acts contain general provisions mostly pertaining to the procedural 
matters. They do not specify the rules applicable under the Islamic Law of Succession. It 
would be in the best interest of Muslims if the distribution of estates is done following the 
Syari ah law. It is a fact that, historically, the distribution of estates of a deceased Muslim 
according to this law has been recognized by the British during its occupation in 
Malaysia. Furthermore, the Federal Constitution specifically enumerates the applicability 
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of the law as clearly stated in the State List of the First Schedule. Thus, the proposal does 
not imply something new, as the historical evidence support this. This however, does not 
imply extending the Islamic law to include non-Muslim citizens. This statement does not 
propose anything for this, as their cases should be treated under the available procedures. 
This chapter will discuss the meaning of tarikah from the perspectives of Islamic law and 
the laws applicable in Malaysia. It will analyze the definitions of tarikah as discussed by 
the Muslim jurists of the four Sunni schools of law and examine the relevant issues such 
as the hadttth relied upon by the jurists as the basis for their tarikah definitions. The 
concepts of mal and milkiyyah in Islamic law and the inheritance of rights, usufruct and 
services will also be discussed. With regard to the Malaysian laws, an examination of the 
relevant statutory provisions of the Malaysian legislation will be undertaken and the 
principles adopted by the courts in decided cases scrutinized. Furthermore, attempts will 
be made to identify the similarities and differences between the two systems of laws and 
the extent to which the Malaysian laws could be harmonized with the Islamic law in this 
matter is discussed. 
3.2. The Definitions of Tarikah from the Perspective of the Islamic Law of 
Succession 
The Arabic word tarikah or tirkah literally denotes things left behind by the deceased. ' It 
also indicates the estate or the heritage left behind by the deceased. 2 The term is derived 
1 Ibn Manpilr, Muhammad, Lisän al-`Arab, Beirut: Dar al-$ädir, 1990, vol. 10, p. 4 and al-Mu jam al- 
Wasit, p. 84. 
2 Ba`albak3, RAT, Al-Mawrid, A Modern Arabic- English Dictionary, 8`' edition, Beirut: Dar al-`Ilm Ii al- 
Maläyin, 1992, p. 311. 
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from the root word taraka, which literally implies to leave behind by way of succession 
or bequest. 3 
However, the Muslim jurists have differed in their attempts to give this term a technical 
definition. To the Hanafis, the technical meaning of tarikah is the property and property 
rights left behind by the deceased, which are free from any attachment of other's rights. 4 
The Mälikis define tarikah as the divisible rights that are the legal entitlement of the 
rightful person after the death of the owners The Syäfiis' definition of tarikah is 
anything left behind by the deceased6 The Hanbalis definition is that tarikah is the rights 
left behind by the deceased. 7 In the light of these definitions, it appears that the 
differences are in fact due to the questions pertaining either to the attachment of other's 
rights to the estate or to whether rights and usufruct constitute the components of the 
estate of the deceased alongside the tangible assets. 
Even though the definitions of tarikah incorporate the rights related to the estate, it is 
sufficient to focus here only on the issues relating to the components of tarikah. This 
stance is taken after considering the fact that a discussion on the components of estate 
would necessarily include the examination of other important issues such as the two 
different versions of hadith, which were referred to by the classical Muslim scholars as 
well as the concept of mä1, or property, according to Islamic law. In other words, it is 
1 Ibid., p. 310. 
° Ibn `Abidin, p. 535. 
S Al-Dusilgi, Muhammad °Arifah, FHnshiyah al-Dusügi `alä Sharh al-Kabir, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, n. d., vol. 4, 
457. 
7 
A1-Syarbini, p. 3. 
Al-Bahüti, Ibn YýInus Ibn Idris, Kashäf al-Qinac `alä Matn al-Ignd, Iskandariyyah: Mu'assasah Syabab 
a1-Jämi`ah, 1981, vol. 4, p. 402. 
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unavoidable that this chapter involves a long discussion in order to reach a conclusion 
regarding what constitutes tarikah according to Islamic law and the laws applicable in 
Malaysia. Having said this, the issues regarding the attachment of rights to the tarikah as 
discussed by the Muslim jurists will be dealt with in detail in a separate chapter. 
To elaborate further these definitions, it is important to study the sources that were 
referred to by the Muslim jurists when constructing their respective definitions. In this 
regard, two different versions of the Prophetic traditions have been identified as forming 
the basis of these definitions. Apart from this, it appears that the issue of the constituents 
of tarikah is closely related to the issue of the concept of property, or mal, in Islamic law, 
and this definitely stretches to the discussion of issues regarding the Syari ah compliance 
of the wealth belonging to or acquired by the deceased. This is because, when looking 
into these definitions, apart from the attachment of rights to the estate, the focus is also on 
the terms mä1 and haq. Furthermore, wealth belonging to the deceased nowadays 
comprises both tangible and intangible assets, such as financial rights and intellectual 
property rights, and this becomes an important issue because in Islamic law, heritable mä1 
might include rights and services which are intangible in nature. Therefore, it is necessary 
to examine the concept of mal to provide a sufficient understanding of the actual 
components of tarikah so that suitable and practicable proposals regarding the 
administration of estates in Malaysia can be put forward. 
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3.2.1 The Hadith Relied upon by the Majority and the Minority 
The difference of opinions among the four Sunni schools of law regarding the 
components of the estate is a result of their reliance on two different versions of the 
hadith of the Prophet. The 1-janafis' definition, which apparently confines the scope of 
tarikah to tangible assets only, is based on the version which states that only mal is 
heritable. This hadith states nothing pertaining to the heritability of rights. On this basis 
the jurists have placed only mal within the definition of tarikah, precluding rights and 
usufruct from inheritance. This version of the hadith reads, "one who leaves the mäl, or 
the property, behind him, it is for his legal heirs". 8 
On the other hand, the majority opinion has relied on the hadith, which states: "one who 
leaves behind the property or the right, it is for his legal heirs". 9 According to this 
opinion, the text of the had th clearly shows that mal and /aq are the components of 
tarikah. Relying on this hadith, the majority have formed their stance that the heritable 
estate of the deceased should include mal (tangible assets) and haq and manfa`ah 
(intangible assets). 
It is evident from the above discussion that the two versions of the hadith are the cause of 
the different views of the four Sunni schools regarding the definitions of tarikah. As a 
consequence of this, they differ regarding the components of tarikah as to whether it 
8 Al-Mubärakfitri, Muhammad bin `Abd al-Ra}lim, Tuhfah al-Ahwadhi bi Shari, Jam( al-Tirmizi n. p. : Där 
al-Fikr, 1974, vol. 6, p. 264. Syawkani states in Nayl al-Awlär that a similar hadith was narrated by al- 
Bukhäri, Muslim, Ahmad from Abü Hurayrah: "Whoever leaves behind property, his `a, abah will inherit, 
and whoever leaves behind debts or nothing, then he is supposed to come to me, because I am his 
guardian. " See al-Syawkäni, Muhammad bin `Ali bin Muhammad, Nay! al-Aw(är, Cairo: Matba`ah Mustafa 
al-Ijalabi, 1250H, vol. 6, p. 57. 
9 Ibn Mäjah, Sunan Ihn Mäjah, Cairo: Malba°ah `Isä al-Ijalabi, n. d., vol. 2, pp. 914- 915. 
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consists of mä1 only or also includes haq and manfa`ah. To the Malik-is, Syafiis and 
Ilanbalis, the tarikah components consist of tangible and intangible assets, whereas to the 
Hanafis only tangible assets are heritable. 
3.2.2. The Concept of Mal (Property) in Islamic Law 
3.2.2.1. The Mal, Tangible and Intangible 
It has been discussed in the previous subsection that to the Mälikis, Syäfiis and Hanbalis, 
the tarikah comprises mä1 and haq, whereas to the I-Ianafis, it consists of mil only. In this 
regard, it is important to examine further the meanings of mal and haq in order to 
ascertain the actual components of tarikah that can be inherited by the legal heir. 
The Arabic word mal, or property, originates from the root word mawala that literally 
means to finance. 10 Ibn Manzür defines mal as things commonly known and that can be 
owned. " Ibn al-Athir defines it as everything that one owns. '2 These definitions take into 
account the customary practice of the Arabs. Originally the Arabs used the term mal to 
refer only to gold and silver, but subsequently its application was extended to include 
things owned physically, including camels. 13 Al-Zuhayli defines mal literally as being 
anything a man owns that is in his actual possession and this includes corporeal and 
usufruct. Gold, silver, animal, plant, money and benefits or usufructs such as the riding of 
vehicles, the wearing of clothes and the residing in houses are regarded as mal. On the 
other hand, birds in the sky, fish in the water, mines deep in the earth and plants in the 
10 Al-Mawrid, p. 1143. 
11 Lisän al-`Arab, vol. 11, p. 635. 
12 AI-Fayrüzabadi, al-Qämüs al-Muhit, Beirut: Dar al-Ihyä' al-Turath al-`Arabi, 1991, vol. 4, p. 70. 13 Ibn al-Athir, al-Nihäyah f Ghartb al-hadieh wa a! - Athär, n. p.: al-Maktabah al-Islämiyyah, n. d., vol. 4, 
p. 373. 
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jungle are not literally mill on the basis that they are not in the actual possession of a 
man. '4 
In their attempts to give a technical meaning to the term mal, Muslim jurists have 
provided various definitions. Their different definitions are due to their understandings of 
what constitutes the basis or foundation of mal. To the Hanafis, mä1 must be something 
that exists physically and is desirable. According to Ibn cAbidin, it is whatever human 
instinct inclines to and also is capable of being stored for the time of necessity. 15 The 
same definition is given by article 126 of the Majallah al-Abkam. By virtue of these 
definitions, it appears that the fundamental elements of mä1 are its storability and 
desirability. Hence, rights and usufruct are not mal according to the Hanafis on the 
grounds that they are not capable of being stored. 
The definitions of the Mälikis, Syäfiis and Hanbalis appear the same as far as the 
foundations upon which a thing can constitute mä1 are concerned. To the Malik-is, as 
stated by a1-Syätibi, mä1 is anything on which ownership is conferred and, which entitles 
the owner complete freedom of enjoying it by preventing others from any kind of 
interference. 16 The Syäfiis define it as constituting things that can give benefit to a 
human being. Imäm al-Suyü states that mal refers to anything that is valuable and 
exchangeable, and in the case of its destruction, the destroyer is liable to pay 
14 Al-Zuhayl% Wahbah, vol. 4, p. 40, Badrdn, Abo `Aynayn, al-Syari ah al-Islämiyyah Tärikhuhd wa 
Naaariyyah al-Milkiyyah wa al-`Uqüd, n. p.: Mu'assasah Syabab al-Jami`ah, p. 286, and Khafif, `AIY, al- 
Milkiyyah fi al-Syari`ah al-Islämryyah ma`a Mugdranatihä bi al-Qawänin al-`Arabiyyah, Beirut: Dar al- 
Nahdah al-`Arabiyyah, 1990, p. 25. 
15 Ibn `Abidin, vol. 4, p. 501. 
16 Al-Syälibi, Abü Iphäq Ibrähim bin Musa al-Gharnati, al-Muwäfagät fi 'U, cül al-Syari ah, Cairo: n. d., vol. 
2, p. 17. 
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compensation. He continues by stating that mal must be something that is desired by a 
human being's inclination, such as money. '7 The Hanbalis define it as constituting things 
that contain a benefit and are capable of being used in normal situations. 18 
From the above definitions, it is possible to conclude that the Mälikis underline the 
ownership, the Syäfiis emphasize the value and the IIanbalis highlight the benefits, as 
being the elements the subject matter must consist of in order to be counted as mal. On 
the basis of this conclusion, it can be seen that mal can be tangible and intangible, or 
corporeal and incorporeal. In other words, the majority view is that usufruct and rights 
are part of mal even though their existence is not physical in nature. The usufruct and the 
right are capable of being owned, and can also be valuable and beneficial. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the foundations of the ownership, value and 
benefit must be Syari ah compliant. This is a fundamental principle because a Muslim is 
strictly prohibited to consume whatever is regarded unlawful in the eye of Islamic law, 
such as blood, carcasses, liquor, pork, usury and dead animals. In other words, these 
prohibited things are not counted as mal. On this basis, as far as Islamic law is concerned, 
the prohibited is not permitted to be the subject matter of any kind of contract, and if it is 
such a contract is invalid. 19 
17 Al-Suya1r, Jaläl al-DTn `Abd al-Ralmän, al-Asybäh wa al-Na; ä'ir, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 
1983, p. 327. 
'$ Bakar, Mohd. Daud, "Konsep dan Matlamat Harta dalam Pembangunan Unumah", Seminar Pentadbiran 
Harta Menurut Islam, jointly organized by+ IKIM and Institut Tanah dan Ukur Negara (INSTUN) 
Kementerian Tanah dan Pembangunan, 16 - 17th November 1998 at IKIM, p. 8. See also Islam, 
"Muhammad Wohidul, al-Mal: The Concept of Property in Islamic Legal Thought", A. L. Q., (1999), p. 363. 19 Al-Zubayli, vol. 4, p. 44. 
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In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that the definitions given by the majority, 
which do not confine mä1 to desirable and storable items, but are broader than this, are to 
be preferred. Arguably, it can be said that the definition of mal is dependant upon the 
interest and usage of the people. There is nothing in the Qur'an or the Sunnah which 
defines the term. In fact, the Qur'an uses the term mä1 in a general sense referring to 
wealth; the al-Munäfigfin (63): 9 states: "0 ye who believe! Let not your riches or your 
children divert you from the remembrance of Allah. " and the al-Nisä' (4): 29 states: 0 ye 
who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities; but let there be 
amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good will. " 
In other words, it is the custom and the usage of the people that determines the 
foundations of any definition. This notion is supported by the literal definition of mal, 
which is based on the historical account of the practice of the Arabs. Furthermore, with 
regard to the Hanafis' view, a later definition of mal has been given by al-Käsäni, a 
IIanafi jurist. He gives a definition, which is different from the dominant view of his 
school of Fiqh. In fact, his definition is relatively similar to the definitions of the 
majority, i. e. beneficial and Syari ah compliant. He defined mä1 as whatever is beneficial 
according to Islamic law. 20 
20 Al-Käsän3, Badäf al-$anä'f fi Tarlib al-Syarä'fBeirut: Dar al-Kitäb al-`Arabi, Beirut, 1982, vol. 7, p. 
147. 
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In this regard, by referring to the Qur'an as the primary source of Islamic law, it is 
apparent that the purpose of the creation of human beings is to administer the world. 21 
All other creatures that exist on the earth or in the air as well as in the sea are solely for 
the beneficial use of human beings. 22 In relation to this, and for the purpose of 
inheritance, the opinion of the majority of Muslim jurists that the components of tarikah 
consist of mä1, manfa`ah and haq is arguably the correct one. Since inheritance is about 
the transfer of ownership of one's wealth upon death, anything that is considered as one's 
wealth is therefore heritable. In contrast, the old Hanafis' definition appears inappropriate 
to this modern world. 
When considering contemporary developments especially in matters relating to wealth 
creation, it is clear that the majority's definitions are the more acceptable. This is based 
on the fact that in recent times, there have emerged various kinds of property as well as 
new transactions that give rise to different kinds of rights. Furthermore, the requirement 
of storability seems inapplicable because nowadays having a legitimate document such as 
a grant or certificate, rather than physical control can prove the ownership of wealth. The 
classification of mä1 by Daud Bakar, which is suitable to the modern context, appears to 
adopt the majority's definition. According to him, mal or property can be classified into 
three types: 
a- tangible assets like landed property, present items and stock including Islamic 
bonds that are asset-based such as järah, musyärakah and mudarabah bonds. 
21 AI-Bagarah (2): 30 `Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I will create a vicegerent on earth. " They said: 
"Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood? - Whilst we do celebrate Thy 
praises and glorify Thy holy (name)? " He said: "I know what ye know not. " 
Z Al-Bagarah (2): 29 "It is He Who hath created for you All things that are on earth; Then he turned to the 
heaven And made them into seven firmaments. And of all things He hath perfect knowledge. " 
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b- intangible assets such as copyright and royalty, trade name, trademark, 
industrial design, etc 
c- financial rights (haqq mäliyy) such as rights to receive (receivable) that include 
Islamic bonds, deferred dowry & maintenance, right to damages, the right to 
tak, 5ful compensation, etc. 3 
3.2.3. The Heritability of Mal (Tangible and Intangible Asset), Hag (Right) and 
Manfa`ah (Usufruct or Service) 
By virtue of the above classification, as far as the Islamic law of succession is concerned, 
it would seem sensible to adopt the majority's definition because inheritance is related to 
people's wealth, and nowadays, there are numerous rights that can be considered as 
personal wealth. 
In this regard, after examining the issues regarding the definitions of tarikah, the two 
different versions of the hadith and the concept of property in Islamic law, it is important 
to turn here to an in-depth study of the issue of the heritability of marl, haq and manfa`ah. 
Ismail Mohd @ Abu Hassan holds the, arguably correct, opinion that as far as inheritance 
is concerned, the most tenable and practical view is the opinion of the majority. 24 
23 Bakar, Daud, Islamic Property Management: An Overview, Seminar on Islamic Financial Planning, 
organized by Centre For Research and Training (CERT), The Quality Hotel City Center Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 29`h - 30`s July 2002. 24 Ismail Mohd @ Abu Hassan, The Role of the Islamic Law of Succession and Administration of Estate in 
Islamic Financial Planning, Seminar on Islamic Financial Planning, organized by Centre For Research and 
Training (CERT), The Quality Hotel City Center Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 29th - 30th July 2002, p. 5. 
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a) Tangible Assets 
There is no disagreement among the four Sunni schools of law that as long as the subject 
matter is regarded as constituting mal, it falls under the definition of tarikah and hence is 
heritable. Animals, land, houses, buildings, money, shares and ijärah, musyärakah and 
mu4ärabah bonds are therefore heritable because they constitute mill. 
b) Intangible Assets; Manfa`ah (Usufruct or Service) 
With regard to usufructs, such as driving a vehicle or residing in a house, Muslim jurists 
are of different opinions as to whether they constitute mä1 or not. To the Hanafis, usufruct 
is not capable of being stored and its existence does not subsist. It ceases to exist 
gradually by way of its consumption. Relying upon this argument, the Hanafis view is 
that it does not constitute mal and hence is not heritable. This is supported by the textual 
f adith, which they accept to the effect that only mal is heritable. 25 
However, this appears to ignore the fact that usufruct is the main purpose of the existence 
of property, without which the property becomes useless. For instance the purpose of a 
house is for residence and hence if a house is not capable of being used, even though it is 
nicely built, it loses its value and inevitably becomes useless. In other words, the Ilanafis 
have failed to take into account that there is an inter-relationship between the corporeal 
and the usufruct. The benefit of usufruct is actually dependent on the usage of the 
corporeal, and the existence of the corporeal is useless if it has no value, i. e. the usufruct. 
25 Abü Zahrah, Muhammad, Akäm al-Tarikit wa al-Mawärith, Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-`Arabi, n. d., p. 43 
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For instance, when a tenant rents a house under a contract of lease for a fixed period as 
stipulated and agreed in the contract, but dies prior to the expiry of the tenancy period, 
the Hanaffs hold the view that the tenancy agreement ceases automatically upon his 
death. In other words, the usufruct that has been utilized by the tenant and their family 
based on the tenancy agreement does not pass to the legal heirs, namely the 
widow/widower and children by way of succession. It follows that these parties need to 
make a new agreement to remain in the house, or alternatively search for another house to 
live in, even though they are the same people who lived there prior to the death of the 
original tenant. This applies simply because, according to the I lanafis, the contract ceases 
upon the death of the tenant. 
Another example is in the case of waciyyah of usufruct for a certain period. This contract 
is legitimate according to the four Sunni schools of law. On the basis of such a contract, 
the testator remains the lawful owner of the bequeathed property, a house for instance, 
and the ownership is never transferred to the legatee. The legatee is entitled to utilize or 
live in the house as long as the agreed period does not lapse. According to the Hanafis, 
upon the death of the legatee the legal heirs have no right to remain in the house because 
that right ceases immediately upon the legatee's death. 26 
In contrast, the rights of the legal heirs of the dead tenant or legatee are secured if the 
majority view is adopted. Upon the death of the legatee, the contract of lease and the 
bequest of usufruct for a fixed period still subsist even though the lessee or the legatee 
26 `Abd al-Latif, l-Jassan $ubbT Ahmad, Ahkäm al-Mawarith fi al-Syari ah al-Islämiyyah, Iskandariyyah: 
Mu'assasah Syabäb al-Jämi`ah, n. d., pp. 22-23. 
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has passed away. The benefit or usufruct passes to the legal heirs and consequently the 
legal heirs are under an obligation to pay all the rentals. In terms of simplicity, social 
security and economic value, as far as the case of lease contracts and the bequests of 
usufruct are concerned, it is submitted that the majority view is preferable. This applies 
because, as pointed out by the majority, usufruct is heritable due to the fact that it 
constitutes mal. 
c) Intangible Assets; Haq (Right) 
With regard to haq or rights, the four Sunni schools of law unanimously agree that rights 
which have no connection at all with property, i. e. rights in personam such as the right to 
guardianship, to divorce, to revoke a divorce or a gift and the right to custody do not 
constitute mä1. These rights solely depend on the person's desire and wishes, which 
definitely do not constitute mal. They have no attachment to or relationship with the 
property. On that basis, Muslim jurists unanimously agree that these rights are not 
heritable because they are merely personal rights and have no monetary value. 27 
Besides rights in personam, there are three other types of right: 28 
a) The right which is in the property itself or right in rem, 
b) The right which is subservient to the property, and 
c) The right which is a mixture of the right in rem and right in personam. 
27 Abü Zahrah, p. 45. 
28 Rahman, Tanzil-ur, A Code of Muslim Personal Law, Karachi: Islamic Publishers, 1980, vol. ii, p. 410. 
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Right in rem is the right to ownership of the property itself and accordingly there is a 
consensus among the four Sunni schools of law that this kind of right is heritable. Any 
kind of property left by the deceased and to which no dispute arises in terms of the 
deceased's legitimate ownership of that property from the Islamic point of view, is 
therefore heritable. This right is heritable because its existence depends solely on the 
property concerned and hence the heritability of the right follows the heritability of that 
property. 
Rights that are subservient to the property include the right to reside in a house, the right 
to cultivate agricultural land, the right of neighbourhood, 29 the right to redeem a 
mortgage, the right of way, the right of the passage of water, the right to climb stairs, the 
right to the option of defecting, the right to the option of the loss of essential quality and 
the right to the option of selection, and these are unanimously agreed to be heritable. 
These rights are different from the rights in rem because they do not exist in the property 
itself. Instead, they might depend on, aid, relate to or arise out of the property 
concerned. 30 The four Sunni schools of law unanimously agree on the heritability of these 
rights because they constitute mal and have financial value. 
However, with regard to rights that resemble both rights in rem and in personam, Muslim 
jurists differ on the question of their heritability. Examples of these rights are the right of 
pre-emption, the right to the option of exercising a covenant and the right to the option of 
291t is a right to build or heighten one's house or building. It applies in the case of apartments. The top level 
flat owner and his heirs have the right to build another flat on top of the building, which might have risky 
consequences such as collapse. See al-Zullayli pp. 46-47. 
30 Barräj, pp. 81-83. 
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inspecting a property. To the Uanafis, these are not heritable because they do not 
constitute mal. They are merely based on personal desires and wishes and furthermore, 
there is no evidence in the Qur'an or the Sunnah, which states their heritability. 31 
On the other hand, the majority of Muslim jurists are of the view that it is necessary to 
identify which right is the more significant. If the right in rem is more significant, such a 
right is heritable; if it has a lesser impact than the right in personam it is not heritable. In 
other words, the rights of pre-emption, of the option to inspect and of the option to 
exercise a covenant are heritable because with these rights, the property aspect has a 
stronger impact than the personal desire. This is in line with the f adith, which refers to 
the heritability of mä1 and haq. On the basis of the ltadith the majority applied the 
principle that all rights are originally heritable unless there is a proof to the contrary. 32 
In conclusion, the difference of opinion between the IIanafis and the majority is due to 
the different versions of the hadith to which they have referred. Based on the ltadith, they 
have established their own principles in ascertaining the components of tarikah. To the 
Hanafis, the applicable principle is that only mal is heritable and the heritability of rights 
occurs on the condition that there exists evidence or proof showing the connection of the 
rights with mal. This is based upon the version of the hadith they referred to which does 
not enumerate the word haq along with mill. In contrast, the majority relied on the 
version of the hadith that enumerates both mal and haq. In the light of this version, the 
31 Rahman, Tanzil-ur, p. 412. 
32 CASiyyah, p. 84. 
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majority underlined the principle that all rights are heritable unless there is proof to the 
contrary. 
3.2.4. The Intellectual Property Right 
The difference of opinion regarding the concept of mal expands to the determination of 
whether intellectual property constitutes mä1 or not. A fatwä was issued by the Majma° 
33 al-Fiqh al-Islämi regarding the status of trademarks and patent rights in this respect. The 
fatwa declared that such intellectual properties constitute personal rights. They have 
financial value and are capable of being traded. The owner has absolute ownership of it 
and any act of infringement is therefore disallowed. 34 On the basis of this fatwä, it 
appears that intellectual property is therefore heritable. This is based on the fact that 
intellectual property constitutes mal and hence is capable of being transferred by way of 
contracts of exchange, unilateral contracts and inheritance. 
3.2.5. Al-Milkiyyah or Ownership and the Unlawfully Acquired Property. 
Ownership is the most important factor in deciding the heritability of property. Failure to 
meet this condition may result in the non-heritability of the property concerned. This 
section provides a brief discussion of the requirement of milkiyyah. It should be noted 
that Chapter six looks at the issue of milkiyyah in greater detail by concentrating on the 
government retirement benefits, conventional life insurance and the family takäful 
business, from the perspectives of Islamic law and the laws applicable in Malaysia. 
" The fifth conference of the Mu`tamar Majmä` al-Fiqh al-Islämi was held on 10th December 1988 in 
Kuwait. 
34 Majallah Majma` al-Fiqh al-Islämr, 3 (5): 2581. 
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Islamic law specifies two categories of ownership, namely absolute and non-absolute 
ownership. Absolute ownership is where the property exclusively and absolutely belongs 
to the owner and is not subject to limitations of time. 35 The owner has the absolute right 
to deal with the property and no one else has any share in it. 36 In this respect, the owner 
has exclusive power to dispose of the property as he wishes. Islamic law provides four 
legitimate means for acquiring absolute ownership: 37 
a) The contract of exchange such as trading and leasing contracts, and unilateral 
contracts such as wasiyyah, hibah and waqf 
b) The replacement, or khalafiyyah, i. e. inheritance, the payment of diyyah and 
compensation 
c) The control over permissible things such as fish in the sea and birds in the sky, 
and 
d) The product of things owned such as chicken's eggs, cow's milk, etc. 
In defining the term tarikah, the Muslim scholars have stated several examples that, 
according to them, can form part of the tarikah. For instance, the Hanafis and the 
Syäfiis include al-diyyah al-wäjibah, or the blood money that becomes obligatory upon 
the killer who kills the deceased by mistake or through a . Fulh, or conciliation. 
38 However, 
it can be argued that blood money falls under the category of khalafiyyah. Furthermore, 
according to the Syäfiis' definition, the alcoholic drink that turns to vinegar and the prey 
or fish that is caught in a trap or a net that was deliberately placed by the deceased, after 
3' Al-Zuhayll, vol. 4, p. 59. 
36 A1-Qara4äwl, YGsuf, Fiqh al-Zakäh, Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Risälah, 1997, vol. 1, p. 130. 
37 Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, pp. 68-77. See also Bakar, Mohd Daud, Islamic Property Management: An Overview. 
38 Ibn `Abidin, p. 535 and al-Syarbini, vol. 3, p. 3. 
82 
the death of the deceased are regarded as part of the tarikah. 39 Again, it can be argued 
that these two illustrations respectively represent the fourth and the third means of 
acquiring ownership. In addition, according to this definition, the inclusion of diyyah in 
the tarikah is comparable to the diyyah that is payable from the deceased's estate in the 
case where a person dies as a consequence of falling into a hole dug by the deceased in 
his/her lifetime 40 
On the other hand, non-absolute ownership is either the ownership of the corporeal 
without the usufruct, or the ownership of the usufruct without the corporeal. An example 
of the former is a bequest of a usufruct, such as the right to reside in a house. In contrast, 
examples of the latter are lease, wagf and hire contracts. However, it is important to note 
that this kind of ownership is different from the permission to use. 
41 The latter does not 
confer any ownership and there is no issue of inheritance. With the former on the other 
hand, the issue of heritability refers to the concept of mal as discussed above. 
Having discussed these means of acquisition, any other means of acquiring property that 
are not legitimate according to Islamic law, do not entitle ownership to the acquirer. With 
wealth acquired by way of robbery, ribä (including bank interest), rishwah (corruption), 
gharar-based transactions, stealing or gambling, the question of heritability rests upon 
the issue of whether the wealth was legally within the ownership of the deceased or not. 
Relying upon this contention, it is possible to conclude that if the ownership is not 
39 Al-Syarbini, p. 3. See also al-Zullayli, vol. 4, pp. 53-54. 
40 Barrdj, p. 78. 
41 AI-Zubayli, vol. 4, p. 61. 
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legitimate it is not valid to transfer the wealth to the deceased's legal heirs, because the 
condition of legitimate ownership has not been met. It is therefore submitted that these 
kinds of wealth do not constitute tarikah. 
3.2.6. The Treatment of Prohibitions 
As far as inheritance is concerned, items that are prohibited, from the perspective of 
Islamic law, include things such as drugs, intoxicants and pork. In other words, the 
prohibition here applies to the subject matter that is prohibited because of its nature or 
substance. However, it would seem that the issue of whether this kind of wealth is 
considered tarikah or not depends on the question of whether it constitutes mal or not. In 
other words, if these things constitute mal they are heritable and if otherwise they are not. 
The legal principle regarding this issue is whether these items are beneficial or not. In this 
regard, to Muslims, the benefit must accord with Islamic law rulings. It is a fundamental 
principle that the Syari ah promotes benefits and prevents hardship. 
42 Chapter al-Anbiyä' 
(21): 107 states: "We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures". Regarding 
intoxicants and gambling, chapter al-Baqarah (2): 219 states: "They ask concerning wine 
and gambling. Say: In them is great sin and some profit, for men, but the sin in greater 
than the profit". The prohibition of such things is enumerated in chapter al-Ma'idah (5): 
90: "0 ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and (divination 
by) arrows, are an abomination of Satan's handiwork; eschew such (abomination), that ye 
may prosper". Chapter al-A°räf (7): 157 further states: "Those who follows the 
42 Zaydan, °Abd al-Karim, al-Madkhal li Dfrüsah al-Syarfah al-Islämiyyah, 16th edition, Beirut: 
Muassasah al-Risälah, 2001, p. 40. 
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Messenger, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own scriptures, in 
the law and the Gospel, for he commands them what is just and forbids them what is evil, 
he allows them as lawful what is good and pure and prohibits them from what is bad and 
impure; he releases them from their heavy burdens and from the yokes that are upon 
them. So it is those who believe in him, honour him, help him, and follow the light that is 
sent down with him, it is they who will prosper". 
In light of these Qur'anic verses, Muslim jurists have developed a legal maxim: Indeed 
the Syari ah promotes benefits in totality; preventing hardship and promoting benefits a3 
In other words, the prohibition of things by the Syari ah implies that such things do not 
bring benefit Islamically to the Muslim and hence, they do not constitute mal. It can be 
argued that even though the Hanafis view is that the prohibited can also constitute mal, 
taking into account the interest of the non-Muslim, the prohibited is not heritable to the 
Muslim because its consideration of mal is entirely based on the interest of the non- 
Muslim. To a Muslim, such interest does not exist at all. In fact, as far as the Islamic law 
of succession is concerned, having benefit is unanimously agreed on by Muslim scholars 
as being fundamental to the subject matter being considered as constituting mä1.44 Having 
said this, as far as Muslims are concerned, it is submitted that if something does not 
constitute mä1, it is not heritable. 
°J A1-Syätib% al-Muwäfagät, vol. 2, p. 6& 37. 44 Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, p. 44. 
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3.3. The Estate according to the Laws Applicable in Malaysia 
3.3.1. The Definition of Estate 
Section 2 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959, defines estate as: 
"all property which if a person died intestate would vest in the Chief Justice 
under section 39. " 
Section 39 of the same Act generally pertains to the vesting of the property of an 
intestate. The relevant provision of the section is sub-section (1), which states that: 
"where a person dies intestate his movable and immovable property until 
administration is granted in respect thereof shall vest in the Corporation in 
the same manner and to the same extent as it vests in the Probate Judge in 
England. " 
In considering the above provisions, it is possible to say that together they define the 
estate as including the movable and immovable property of the deceased who dies 
intestate. This definition restricts the meaning of estate to the intestate death. In other 
words, the property of the deceased who dies testate does not fall within this definition. 
Hence, it is clear that this statutory definition is absolutely different from the literal 
meaning, as mentioned earlier, that is the definition of estate is applicable to the property 
of the deceased who dies testate or intestate. 
Having discussed this, property that has been the subject of testamentary disposition is 
not the deceased's estate, but instead it is the deceased's legacy. The term legacy is 
literally defined as "money or property that one receives from someone who has died, in 
accordance with their wishes officially recorded while they were alive. A5 This clearly 
°S Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Second Edition, England: Longman Group UK Limited, 
1987, at p. 597. 
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shows that the statutory definition of estate emphasizes the fact that the estate of the 
deceased is the property that passes to the legal heirs by way of succession and not 
through a bequest. 
Section 2 of the Wills Act 1959 defines a will as "a declaration intended to have legal 
effect of the intentions of a testator with respect to his property or other matters which he 
desires to be carried into effect after his death and includes a testament, a codicil and an 
appointment by will or by writing in the nature of a will in exercise of a power and also a 
disposition by will or testament of the guardianship, custody and tuition of any child. " 
This definition uses the term `property' rather than the term `estate'. It is therefore 
understood that there is a difference pertaining to the legal terms used for property 
disposed by will and property disposed by way of succession. It is submitted therefore 
that in legal usage, the term `estate' merely refers to the net estate, which would be 
specifically inherited by the legal heirs of the deceased after the paying off of all debts 
and liabilities and funeral expenses. 
It is significant to note that the term `intestacy' stated in the above provision contains 
several meanings. It is not really restricted to the situation of death with no valid will. It 
includes a person who leaves a will but dies intestate as regards some beneficial interest 
in his movable or immovable property. 46 In situations where there is a failure of the 
executors, even though the deceased leaves a valid will, the situation of his death could 
be possibly considered as `intestacy'. This implies that the bequeathed property falls 
within the statutory meaning of estate and hence is automatically vested in the 
46 Section 2 The Probate and Administration Act, 1959. 
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Corporation until the court grants a letter of administration. 47 The relevant part of section 
16 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 enunciates the situations where there is a 
failure on the part of the executors as: 
"Where- 
a) no executor is appointed by a will; 
b) the executor or all the executors appointed by will are legally incapable of 
acting as such, or have renounced; 
c) no executor survives the testator; 
d) all the executors die before obtaining probate or before having 
administered all the estate of the deceased; or 
e) the executors appointed by any will do not appear and extract probate, 
letters of administration with the will annexed may be granted to such 
persons as the Court deems fittest to administer the estate. " 
Apart from this, section 7 of the same Act enumerates the situations where there is a 
cessation of the right of the executors to prove their executorships, which renders the 
testacy intestate. The provision reads: 
"Where a person appointed executor by a will- 
a) survives the testator but dies without having taken out probate of the will; 
b) is cited to take out probate of the will and does not appear to the citation; 
or 
c) renounces the probate of the will, 
his rights in respect of the executorship shall wholly cease, and the 
representation to the testator and the administration of his estate shall 
devolve and be committed in like manner as if that person had not been 
appointed as executor. " 
A similar definition is found with respect to the administration of small estates. Section 
3(2) of the Small Estate (Distribution) Act 1955 provides: 
"For the purpose of this Act a small estate means an estate of a deceased 
person consisting wholly or partly of immovable property situated in any 
State and not exceeding six hundred thousand ringgit in total value. " 
°' G. Raman, Probate and Administration in Singapore and Malaysia: Law and Practice, Kuala Lumpur: 
Malayan Law Journal Sdn. Bhd., 1991, p. 10. 
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This definition emphasizes the total value of the estate and its classification. To constitute 
a small estate, the total value must not exceed RM600,000 and the presence of 
immovable property is required. The absence of immovable property removes such an 
estate from this definition even though the total value is less than RM600,000. 
In a seminar and dialogue session on estates, Mr. Mohd Zin bin Dollah48 defined the 
estate as being properties or anything that has value and is left behind by the deceased 
upon his/her death. 49 He classified the estate for the purpose of administration into two 
types, namely movable and immovable properties. He cited examples of immovable 
property as being land, houses or permanent buildings constructed on the land and any 
interest of the deceased in the land, and movable property as being cash in savings 
accounts, shares, transport, firearms, etc. Money in the Employment Provident Fund, 5° 
National Shares Trust, New Shares Trust, Johore Shares Trust, etc are also examples of 
movable property. 51 
3.3.2. The Constituents of Estate 
On the basis of the above statutory definition of estate, it can be seen that the basic 
classification of estates is movable and immovable property. However, this definition is 
not very helpful in ascertaining the components of the estate. Therefore, it is necessary to 
48 Mr. Mohd. Zin bin Dollah is the Head of Director Assistants, Estate Distribution Unit, Kelantan, and is 
currently dealing with the administration and distribution of small estates situated in the Kota Bharu 
district. 
49 Kertas Keda 1, Pentadbiran dan Pengurusan Harta Pusaka Kecil, Seminar Dan Dialog Mengenai Harta 
Pusaka Jajahan Tumpat, Anjuran Bcrsama Pejabat Tanah Jajahan Tumpat Dan Jabatan Ketua Pengarah 
Tanah Dan Galian Persekutuan Negeri Kelantan, 8 July 2003, p. 1. 
so Ibid. 
51 Buku Panduan, Permohonan Pembahagian Harta Pusaka Kecil, Seksyen Pembahagian Pusaka, Jabatan 
Pengarah Ranah Dan Galian, p. 1. 
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refer to other related terms such as property, which is mentioned in the definition of the 
term estate. Section 2 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 elaborates the term 
`property' 
"as includes a thing in action and any interest in movable or immovable 
property. " 
It is to be noted that the word used in this provision is "includes" which carries a broad 
meaning. It means to have as a part or contain in addition to other parts. 52 In other words, 
this definition of property is not restricted or limited to any specific kind of property. 
Included in the definition are things in action and any interest, and these two undoubtedly 
constitute incorporeal or intangible property. 53 Hence, it is submitted that the meaning of 
estate as applicable in the administration of Muslim estates in Malaysia may include any 
kind of property either corporeal or incorporeal. 
3.3.3. Tangible Assets 
As for the tangible property of the deceased Muslim's estate, its heritability is certain and 
indisputable. Here, several decided cases will be cited to illustrate examples of tangible 
assets that are normally dealt with by the courts. In Re the Estate of Tunku Mohamed 
Jewa Ibni AlMarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid, Deceased, 54 the estate left by the deceased 
comprised 13 pieces of land, cash deposits in banks and one motorcar. These were the 
52 The Longman Dictionary, p. 530. In Oxford Dictionary, it is stated that if one thing includes another, it 
has the second thing as one of its tarts. See Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, prepared by AS 
Hornby, edited by Sally Wehmeir, 6 edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 605. 
s' See Ree Hee Chun Meng [1989] 2 MLJ 310. In this case the meaning of estate was discussed by 
referring to the definition of estate and property available in the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 by 
virtue of section 2. The issue is whether the chose in action is estate or not. The Court held that even though 
the chose in action is intangible, it is a right that could move from one person to another depending upon 
capacity to sue and in that sense a thing in action could be said to be movable property. 
54 [1982] 2 MLJ 44. 
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assets of the deceased used for the settlement of debts and liabilities including a gift 
inter-vivos of some land made in his lifetime, before the distribution in favour of the legal 
heirs under the farä'icl system. In Fazil Rahman & Ors. VAR. S. Nachiappa Chettiar, 55 
the estate of the deceased comprised pieces of land. The value of the estate was only 
RM14,600 and not enough for the settlement of the debts and liabilities. In other words, 
after paying off the debts including the interest, the legal heirs were entitled to nothing 
because the estate was insolvent. In re Estate of Nik Yusoff Bin Wan Omar, 56 the estate 
left by the deceased comprised 3,000 unit shares in a company to the value of 
RM3,600.00,50 shares in the Cooperative Bank of Malaysia to the value of RM500.00, 
RM2,028.72 cash at the Bank Rakyat Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, RM3,660.25 in the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, insurance policies with the Prudential 
Assurance Company Limited to the value of RM19,812.89 and with the Great Eastern 
Life Assurance Company Limited to the value of RM125,000.00. 
3.3.4. The Treatment of Rights 
With respect to the issue of whether a right is heritable or not according to the courts in 
Malaysia, cases pertaining to the purchaser's right under a contract serve as a good 
illustration. In Haft Osman bin Abu Bakar v Saiyed Noor, 57 the vendor sold a piece of 
land to the purchaser for RM2,250. The purchaser had paid the purchase price but the 
ss (1963) 29 MLJ 309. 
56 Files no. Pn. P. P. (KN). 100/79/1 & P. P. P (D) 214 which are available at the Public Trust Corporation, 
Kota Bharu Branch, Kota Bharu, Kelantan, Malaysia. In this case, the Public Trustee Corporation was 
appointed by the High Court as the personal representative of the deceased. The Public Trustee Corporation 
therefore carried out the administration and the distribution of the estate including the settlement of debts 
and liabilities. Although the Court did not decide the case, its administration was under the supervision of 
the Court. 
57 [1952] MLJ 37. In Bachan Singh v Mahinder Kaur & Ors [1956] MLJ 97, Thomson J stated: "Where 
there is a valid binding contract for the sale of land, the purchaser, when he has performed his side of the 
contract, acquires right ad rem, which is also a right in personam. 
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transfer of ownership of the land was not presented for registration until some six months 
after the vendor's death. It was held that the death of the vendor did not avoid the 
contract; the personal legal representative of the deceased was trustee for the purchaser 
who, subject to the terms of the contract and in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or 
mistake, was entitled to the land and to possession of it. 
The above decision and principle were followed in Kersah La'usin v Sikin Menan. 58 The 
plaintiff applied for a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of the piece of land in 
dispute. The land belonged to his mother, who had died in 1938, and he was the sole 
beneficiary. He agreed to sell the land to the defendant's father and a memorandum of 
transfer of the land was executed in the required form before an Assistant Collector of 
Land Revenue. The transfer could not be registered as the land was still in his mother's 
name. The defendant's father and his family occupied the land. The plaintiff applied for 
distribution of his mother's estate but at the date of the hearing he was absent and letters 
of administration of the estate were granted to the defendant. The plaintiff issued the writ 
against the defendant as administrator of his mother's estate. The defendant 
counterclaimed for delivery of the title deeds. It was held that the unregistered transfer of 
the land gave the purchaser a contractual right that on his death vested in his personal 
representative. 
3.3.5. The Treatment of Usufruct 
The case of a Temporary Occupation License (TOL) is a good example to illustrate the 
court's view on the question of the heritability of usufruct upon the death of a Muslim 
58 [1966] 2 MLJ 20. 
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holder. The TOL is a license, or permission, of a temporary nature, granted by the State 
Authority, for some restricted purpose, for which otherwise the occupant would have 
become a trespasser or an illegal squatter. 59 The purpose, nature and duration of the 
license are clearly prescribed in the Malaysian National Land Code. In other words, the 
rights granted under this license are restricted and limited in terms of its purpose, nature 
and duration. 60 However, section 44 of the Code stipulates the rights of the TOL holder 
with respect to the exclusive use and enjoyment, the right of support, the right of access, 
the right to extract, move or use within the boundaries of the land any rock material in or 
upon the land, and to fell, clear, destroy or use within such boundaries any forest produce 
thereon. However, he is not allowed to extract any metal or mineral from any rock 
material in or upon the land, nor may he remove beyond the said boundaries any rock 
material or forest produce extracted or taken therefrom. 
61 The concept of the TOL is best 
illustrated in Papoo v Veriah62 where Good J. stated that: 
"The public... apparently continue to treat land held under TOL as if such 
license was capable of transferring some kind of title to the holder and as if it 
conferred upon the holder a right to deal in land, or in things attached to the 
land, which comes to the same thing, as if it was land in the ownership of the 
license holder. Even the administration appears to share the misapprehension 
of the public so far as buildings on the land are concerned.... A temporary 
license is exactly what the name implies. It is a license to occupy and nothing 
more.... The license is personal to the holder; it dies with the holder. " 
With regard to issues relating to succession, section 68 of the National Land Code 
expressly provides that a TOL terminates upon the death of the holder. This was 
59 Buang, Salleh, Temporary occupation licenses; some proposals for reforms [ 1987] 2 MLJ cclii. 
60 Buang, Salleh, Malaysian Torrens System, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992, p. 47. 
61 Ibid, p. 48. 
62 [1965] 1 MLJ 127. 
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discussed in Fatimah v Moideen Kutty. 63 In this case, the deceased was the TOL holder of 
a piece of land. He died in 1962 and subsequently; the license was renewed for the 
following year, i. e. 1963. Upon knowing of the death, the Collector of the Land Revenue 
refused to renew the license after the end of 1963. The appellant was the deceased's wife 
and was appointed as the deceased personal representative. Two houses owned by the 
deceased on the land were rented to the respondent at a rental of $40 per mensem. After 
the death of the deceased, the tenant paid the rent to the appellant and until July 1964 he 
commenced to remit a sum of $20 as part payment of rent, the balance being put towards 
alleged expenses incurred in connection with the tenancy amounting to $2,450.35. 
However, the appellant, as the deceased's administratrix, denied liability and demanded 
payment in full and, having failed to obtain satisfaction, refused, after the 13`h of March, 
1965 to accept further payments of $20 as rent. The issue in this case was whether the 
administratrix was entitled to maintain a claim for arrears of rent in respect of the houses 
that were built on State land, which was then under illegal occupation since the TOL 
issued to the deceased landlord had lapsed following his death in 1962. The Court held 
that the appellant was not entitled to the rent and Suffian F. J stated: 
"Immediately before the issue of the TOL to the deceased, the land 
concerned was state land. After the issue of the TOL, the land was still 
State Land, but the deceased had a license to occupy it temporarily. By 
law this license was not transferable and I agree with Good J. in Papoo v 
Veriah [1966] 1 MLJ 127 that the license was not transmitted to the 
widow on the licensee's death and he died on 10th August 1962. Thereafter 
the Collector renewed the license for the year 1963 in the deceased's 
name. When he knew of the deceased's death, he refused to renew it after 
the end of 1963. Whatever may have been the deceased's or the widow's 
right between the deceased's death and the end of 1963, thereafter because 
the Government refused to renew the TOL in the name of the deceased or 
63 [1969] 1 MLJ 72. 
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any one else, neither his estate nor she had any right of any kind whatever 
to the land. " 
The following example concerns usufruct arising under a lease or tenancy agreement. A 
lease or tenancy can be defined as a conveyance by which the proprietor of the land (the 
lessor) grants to another person (the lessee) an interest in the land less than freehold and 
less than that to which the lessor is himself entitled. ' The Malaysian National Land Code 
stipulates in detail the conditions of a valid lease. Section 221(2) and section 222(2) state 
respectively that every lease or sub-lease must exceed three years. The maximum period 
of 99 years may be granted if it relates to the whole of any alienated land, and 30 years if 
it relates to a part only thereof. 65 
The issue before the Court was whether the tenancy becomes part of the deceased 
tenant's estate upon his death and pass to his legal heirs beneficially. In Alagappa 
Chettiar v Kader & Ors, 66 the plaintiff was the landlord of premises let to the first 
defendant, since deceased, on a monthly tenancy. After the death of the first defendant, 
the plaintiff sued the personal representative of the deceased and the other defendants to 
recover possession of the premises occupied by them. No notice to terminate the tenancy 
was given. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that no notice was necessary. The 
Court held that such a tenancy is an interest that is transmitted to personal representatives 
and the plaintiff was not entitled to recover possession as the tenancy in dispute was still 
in existence at the date of the institution of the suit. It was the view of the Court that a 
weekly or monthly tenancy is not a succession of leases for one week or one month at a 
64 Buang, Malaysian Torrens System, p. 98. 65 Section 221(3) of the Malaysian National Land Code. 
66 [1939] MLJ 304. 
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time but is one of indefinite duration, which exists until terminated by the act of a party 
or by the operation of law. 
In Kechik & Ors v Habeeb Mohamed & Anor, 67 the issue before the Court concerned the 
tenancy agreement between a landlord and tenant. The landlord died intestate on 30`h 
April 1958 and the tenant died intestate on 14`h February 1958. At the time of his death, 
the tenant was occupying the premises in dispute as a monthly tenant of the deceased 
landlord. The plaintiff was the widow of the landlord and was granted the letters of 
administration for her husband's estate. The first defendant was the widow of the 
deceased tenant who had granted sub-tenancies of portions of the premises to the second 
and third defendants in April and June 1958, i. e. after the tenant's death. The first 
defendant was granted the letters of administration for her husband's estate on December 
14,1958 and extracted it on May18,1960. The issue before the learned judge was 
whether the second and third defendants were unlawfully occupying the premises. He 
held in favour of the plaintiff declaring that the second and third defendants were 
unlawfully occupying the premises and as such she was entitled to possession of the 
premises as well as the damages that would be ascertained on inquiry. This decision was 
substantially dependent on the judge's view that until her husband's estate became vested 
in her as administratrix, the first defendant had no power to grant sub-tenancies to the 
second and third defendants. The defendants appealed. 
On appeal, the Court had to determine the question of whether the tenancy had become 
part of the tenant's estate, which upon his death would pass to his legal heirs beneficially. 
67 (1963) 29 MLJ 127. 
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On this issue, the Court held that the monthly contractual tenancy continued in existence 
after his death for the benefit of his estate and would be terminated only by a proper 
notice to quit. Such notice must contain at least one word that could be comprehended as 
putting an end to the contract. It would also be acceptable if the notice contained wording 
requiring the tenant to quit the premises at the expiration of a particular period of time. In 
this regard, the notice that had been issued by the plaintiff was not proper enough to 
constitute a notice to quit. As a result the tenancy remained and passed to the deceased 
tenant's legal heir, i. e. his wife who stood as the administratrix of the estate. 
The Court also had to decide the issue of precisely when the tenancy had passed to the 
wife because until the wife was legally granted the letters of administration, the 
deceased's property was vested in the Chief Justice. In this regard, the Court held that 
from the period when the sub-tenancies were granted but the letters of administration 
were not yet approved by the court, the deceased's property was not vested in the first 
defendant. However, the Court insisted on stating that the right of tenancy was part of the 
deceased's estate and hence, even though the sub-tenancies were granted before the wife 
legally took out the letters of administration, the doctrine of retrospect was applicable to 
protect the wife. Furthermore, as the granting of the sub-tenancies was clearly for the 
benefit of the estate itself, once she got the title, the wife would be able to sue in the 
capacity of administratrix for the rents if they had not been paid. 
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3.4. Comparison of Islamic and Malaysian Laws 
3.4.1. The Definition of Tarikah and Estate 
The statutory definition of estate appears to emphasize the procedural matter of in whom 
the deceased's estate will be vested after death. If the deceased dies testate, the property 
is vested in the executor and if he/she dies intestate, the property is vested in the 
administrator. Furthermore, it emphasizes the classification of estates as movable and 
immovable. On this basis, it is possible to say that such a definition is completely 
different from the definition of tarikah given by the Muslim scholars. The statutory 
definition is appropriate as far as procedural aspects are concerned, but not for the 
determination of the components of heritable estate. 
The definite meaning of tarikah as defined by Muslim scholars is necessary in order to 
identify exactly what is heritable and what is not from the perspective of Islamic law. 
Furthermore, it would help Muslims, including those who directly deal with the 
administration and distribution of Muslim estates, such as judges, lawyers, the Collectors 
as well as the officers in the Public Trustee Corporation, to identify and ascertain the 
interest of legal heirs in the deceased's wealth. 
The Small Estate (Distribution) Act 1955 provides nothing regarding the definition of 
estate. This might be due to the fact that the purpose of having this Act is merely to 
administer and distribute the estate that falls under this category. It possibly has no 
intention of focusing on the disputes regarding questions of Islamic law, particularly as 
regards the ascertainment of the deceased's estate. As long as it is established that the 
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property left behind belonged to the deceased, it is the responsibility of the Collector to 
administer and distribute it accordingly. Mr. Mohd. Zin's opinion on the meaning of 
estate is significant because it elaborates further the ambiguous statutory definition. His 
view is based on a comprehensive analysis of the statutory provisions of the Probate and 
Administration Act and the Small Estate (Distribution) Act as well as his vast experience 
of adjudicating cases concerning the administration and distribution of small estates. 
Moreover, his view is relatively similar to the dominant and preferable definition of 
tarikah as elaborated by the majority of Muslim scholars. 
3.4.2. The Constituents of Tarikah and Estate in Malaysian Law 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the majority of the Muslim scholars of the 
Sunni schools of laws unanimously agree that the tarikah comprises mal i. e. tangible and 
intangible property, which includes rights and services. Only the Hanaffs are of the view 
that services are not heritable on the basis that they do not constitute mal. In ascertaining 
the components of tarikah, an investigation into the Islamic concept of property is 
important because the fundamental criterion of heritable wealth is that it must constitute 
mal. 
After careful examination of the subject, it is clear that the Islamic concept of property is 
relatively similar to that in English law. The Islamic classification of property into three 
categories, namely mal, haq and manfa°ah, i. e. tangible and intangible, corresponds with 
the similar classification under English law. The only difference pertains to the 
perspective of the Syari ah and whether or not the wealth is beneficial. Things like pigs, 
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wine, carcasses, blood and human bodies are not property in the eye of Islamic law 
because they are prohibited, and consequently not beneficial to Muslims. In contrast, they 
are property according to English law. 
The definition of estate as found in section 2 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 
should be read together with the other relevant provisions. Cross-references between the 
provisions, which elaborate further the meaning of `intestate' as well as the meaning of 
`property', are important in order to have a clear understanding of the components of 
estate. On the basis of these observations, it is possible to conclude that the statutory term 
`estate' as applies to the process of estate administration in Malaysia, is in agreement 
with the meaning of tarikah as comprehended by the classical Muslim scholars of the 
Mälikis, Syafiis and Hanbalis, whose definition of tarikah includes mal, jiaq and 
manfa°ah; tangible and intangible assets. It is significant that it is only the I-Ianafis who 
hold the view that the term tarikah refers only to tangible assets. 
3.4.3. The Heritability of Mal; Tangible and Intangible Assets 
In considering the court cases that have been discussed and to illustrate the examples of 
corporeal properties, it is clear that the courts do not deal with the aspects of the legality 
of property from the Islamic perspective or Syari ah compliance. It would seem that bank 
interest, shares and conventional insurance policies are among the issues that need to be 
looked at as far as Syari ah compliance is concerned. The Muslims, particularly in 
Malaysia, commonly utilize these three instruments. Therefore, the question pertaining to 
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Syari ah compliance should be taken into account by the courts because it is part and 
parcel of the requirements of an heritable estate. 
It is the dominant and preferable opinion of Muslim scholars that bank interest constitutes 
ribä and is strictly prohibited. 68 Therefore, from the perspective of the Islamic law of 
succession, it is absolutely non-heritable. In the case of conventional life insurance, the 
majority of Muslim scholars have decreed its illegitimacy. 69 
In the case of shares, section 103 of the Malaysian Companies Act provides for the 
transmission of shares from a company shareholder when he dies. This provision explains 
that the transmitted shares will be vested in the deceased shareholder's personal 
representative or the trustee in bankruptcy. The personal representative thereby becomes 
legal owner of the shares even though he is not registered as a member of the company. 70 
Currently, there is a council that deals with the ascertainment of which shares comply 
with the requirements of Islamic law. The Syari ah Advisory Council of the Securities 
Commission, Malaysia was established in May 1996. Its members comprise individuals 
who are in the position to present Syari ah opinions and those who have vast experience 
in the application of the Syari ah, particularly in the areas of Islamic economics and 
finance. The Council produces quarterly guidelines listing shares that satisfy the 
68 Al-QGsi, `Abd al-Mun`im Mabm0d, Rib!! Islamic Law and Interest, unpublished Ph. D Thesis, Temple 
University, 1983, pp. 171- 190. 
69 This issue will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 7 because in Malaysia its application is quite 
complicated. 
70 Arjunan, K. & Low Chee Keong, Lipton & Herzbergs Understanding Company Law in Malaysia, 
student edition, Victoria: LBC Information Services, 1995. 
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principles of Islamic law and those that do not. 7' Various capital market products are 
available for Muslims who seek to invest and transact only in the Islamic capital market, 
these include Islamic debt securities, Islamic unit trusts, Islamic and Syari ah Indices, 
warrants, call warrants and Crude Palm Oil futures contracts. 72 
With regard to the administration of small estates, the definition of a small estate requires 
the existence of immovable property, which is certainly corporeal in nature. Relying upon 
the decisions of cases as decided by the Collector, the examples of corporeal properties 
normally brought forward for distribution are compensation money, 73 houses, motorcars, 
land, jewellery, 74 shares in the ASB75 and cash in the Employer Provident Fund. 76 The 
parties before the Collector have not as yet raised issues of the legal character or Syaricah 
compliance with respect to these properties. The issue of Syari ah compliance in relation 
to property such as shares and life insurance policies77 needs to be highlighted and 
discussed in detail. 
3.4.4. The Heritability of Haq (Rights) 
The cited cases were concerned with either the right of the purchaser under the contract, 
which is considered by the court as a right in rem as well as a right in personam, or the 
71 The list is updated twice a year and released on the last Friday of April and October. See Securities 
Commission, Frequently-Asked Question, [online], available from from http: //www. sc. 
com. my/htm//icm/fr_icm. html [accessed on 25th August 2003]. 
72 See Securities Commission, Frequently-Asked Question, [online], available from from http: //www. sc. 
com. my/htm//icm/fr_icm. html [accessed on 25" August 2003]. 
73 Files no. APKKB527/2002 and APKKBIO/2003. 
74 File no. APKKB 543/2002. 
75 Files no. APKKB549/2002, APKKB. 571/2002 and APKKB. 575/2002. 
76 File no. APKKB 562/2003. 
77 On 15'h June 1972, the National Fatwd Council issued afatwa that conventional life insurance as run by 
the insurance companies is an invalid transaction not compatible with the Islamic principles. The contract is 
not free from the elements of uncertainty, gambling and interest. See Takaful Nasional, Konsep Takaful, 
[online], available from http: //www. takafulnasional. com. my/default. fm [accessed on 2"d August 2003]. 
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personal right of the purchaser, which is related to the property. The court's view is that 
such a right is heritable upon the death of the purchaser and is vested in his personal 
representative. This is similar to the application of Islamic law that considers that the 
right in rem is heritable. Looking into the definition of the estate as discussed previously, 
it can be concluded that the general definition of the estate found in the Probate and 
Administration Act, 1959 gives the court the discretion to determine which right is 
heritable and which is not. 
3.4.5. The Heritability of Manfa`ah (Benefits or Services) 
Discussing the issue of the heritability of usufruct, it seems that the courts in Malaysia 
have not been decisive in their decisions. In terms of nature, there is no difference 
between the Temporary Occupation License and the tenancy agreement. Both are 
agreements between two parties allowing one of them to benefit from the property on 
which the agreement is concluded. Both contracts confer on the holder or lesee a right in 
personam as well as a right in rem to occupy the premises in dispute resulting in the 
enjoyment of the usufruct or benefit. With regard to the TOL, the court considers it as 
something that is personal granted to its holder. Being personal, such a license is not 
transferable or inherited upon death. This principle is equivalent to the view of the 
I-Ianafis that usufruct is not property and not heritable. The TOL is similar to the igtac 
irq in Islamic law. In this case, only the ownership to the usufruct or the right to use the 
land is transferred to the person granted with the right. 78 The ownership of the land 
remains with the original proprietor. However, with respect to the tenancy agreement, the 
78 Awang, Ridzuan, Undang- Undang Tanah Islam; Pendekatan Perbandingan, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan 
Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1994, p. 202- 239. 
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court holds a view akin to the opinion of the majority of Muslim scholars. The Mälikis, 
Shäfiis and the 1-ianbalis are of the view that manfa'ah is property and hence is 
heritable. 79 
3.5. Conclusion 
The tarikah constitutes one significant element of the Islamic law of succession. Its 
various definitions as given by the Muslim scholars are primarily due to the two different 
versions of the hadith they have referred to. Apart from this, the Muslim jurists also 
differ regarding the Islamic concept of mal. This causes divergent opinions in relation to 
the question of the heritability of rights and usufructs and services. Considering the 
contemporary development of people's financial activities, including in Malaysia, the 
opinion of the majority is deemed preferable. 
79 Rosman, Arieff Salleh, Harta Intelektual Menurut Fiqh Islam; Pendekatan Perbandingan Dengan 
Undang-Undang Malaysia, Skudai: Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 2002, p. 50. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE TARIKAH: RIGHTS 
ATTACHED TO ESTATES 
4.1 Introduction 
The foremost fundamental principle of succession is that legal heirs are only entitled to 
the estate that is not subject to the rights and claims of others. From the perspective of the 
Islamic law of succession, these are known as the rights that are attached to the tarikah, 
the al-huqüq a1-muta°1ligah bi al-tarikah. Pearl states that these rights are carried out 
during the process of the administration of estates. ' According to Nasir, they are known 
as charges on the estate. 
2 Baillie names them as the purposes to which the tarikah is 
applicable. 3 
This chapter looks into the process of discharging these purposes from the perspective of 
the Islamic law of succession. The related issues that appear significant to the concept of 
tarikah are also dealt with, such as the questions of when the ownership of the wealth is 
transferred to the legal heirs, the accretion to the estate, the estate duty and the locus 
standi of the legal heir. A comparison with the laws applicable in Malaysia is made for 
the purpose of identifying whether the current Malaysian practices apply the Islamic law 
and if so, to what extent it is applied. 
1 Pearl, David, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law, 2od edition, London: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 138. 
2 Nasir, Jamal J., p. 202. 
3 Baillie, Neil B. E. ,A 
Digest ofMoohummdan Law, Lahore: Premier Book House, 1965, p. 693. 
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4.2. Is there Administration of Tarikah in Islamic Law? 
4.2.1. Brief Accounts of Estate Administration in Malaysia 
The administration of estates is defined as the process whereby the personal 
representatives collect the assets of the estate and then meet the debts and liabilities and 
pay out the legacies and devises before distributing the residue, managing the estate as 
necessary in the meantime. It is the responsibility of the deceased's personal 
representatives to ascertain the extent of the assets, to call them in and have them valued, 
to settle any liabilities including the estate duty, to discharge all the debts, funeral and 
testamentary expenses and, lastly, to distribute the estate accordingly, either following the 
testator's instructions in the will or under the intestacy rules. 5 
In applying for a letter of representation, an applicant is required to provide in the 
affidavit, which is filed along with the petition, the relevant information relating to the 
deceased's estate. He/she needs to furnish the necessary certificates to prove the assets of 
the deceased and the extent of the holding at the date of death. In addition, the applicant 
is required to supply information relating to claims against the estate as well as all claims 
for the estate. 6 The issuance of the certificates is deemed necessary as these provide 
documentary evidence of the deceased's ownership of the assets. Without such 
documents, it is very difficult to prove and ascertain the deceased's assets, and an 
application before the court may as a consequence be rejected. This was evident in the 
Court's decision in Kutai Bin Haji Lateh; Dato' Bagindarajah Redek; Bin Keneh; 
° Sawyer, Caroline, Principles of Succession, Wills and Probate, 2"d edition, London: Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 1998, p. 329. S Raman, G., pp. 29 & 108. 6 Doshi, Varsha L., Making a Will, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn Bhd., 1994, p. 55. 
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Lanjong Bin Keneh v Taensah Binti Haji Enoh. 7 In this case, the Court rejected the claim 
of debt, which was not supported by any documentary evidence but rested entirely on the 
evidence of the interested parties. 
Before the estate is distributed to the legatee under either the valid will of the testator or 
the intestacy rules, i. e. the farä'icl system, all debts and liabilities attached to the estate 
have to be discharged. The interest of the legatee and legal heirs arises only after all debts 
and liabilities are discharged. Hence the estate, which is distributed to the legatee and 
legal heirs, is the remaining property or the residue left after the settlement of all claims 
and liabilities. In other words, if the estate is insolvent the legatee and the legal heirs 
receive nothing. Their interests in the property are not given effect if the property is sold 
for the purpose of settling debts and liabilities against the estate. This stance was adopted 
in the case of Fazil Rahman & Ors v AR. S. Nachiappa Chettiar where the total value of 
the estate was RM 14,6000 and the total value of debts RM33,780. The Court held that the 
legal heirs, namely the children of the deceased, had no interest in the estate and the 
defendant was allowed to sell the estate to recover the debts. 
The general power of a personal representative is illustrated in the Official Administrator 
v Haji Abdul Majid Bin Shakabudin. 8 In this case, the deceased was indebted to a Chinese 
person. Some of the debt had been paid off but the sum of RM2060 was still unpaid. The 
Official Administrator took out an originating summons asking for an order under section 
94 (iii) of the Probate and Administration Enactment giving him leave to sell the 
[1934] 1 MLJ 251. 
8 [1939] 1 MLJ 162 
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deceased's interest in a piece of land. The Court held in favour of the applicant allowing 
him to sell the deceased's interest in the land. The Court stated that whatever the 
deceased could have done voluntarily during her lifetime, her personal representative 
could do voluntarily after her death, namely sell the estate to pay a just legal debt. 
According to section 67 (1) (a) of the Probate and Administration Act, the personal 
representative must utilize the property of the deceased to pay off all debts and liabilities: 
"The property of a deceased person, to the extent of his beneficial interest 
therein, and the property of which a deceased person in pursuance of any 
general power disposes by his will, are assets for payment of his debts and 
liabilities, and any disposition by will inconsistent with this Act is void as 
against the creditors; and the Court shall, if necessary, administer the property 
for the purpose of the payment of debts and liabilities. " 
Section 69 provides that the administration of an insolvent estate is in accordance with 
the rules set out in Part I of the First Schedule and if the estate is solvent, its 
administration is prescribed in the rules of Part II of the same schedule. In relation to the 
discussion on tarikah, these rules set out that the funeral, testamentary and administration 
expenses, debts and liabilities are paid out of the estate before any distribution in favour 
of the legatee and legal heirs under the intestacy rules. This indicates that priority, arising 
after the deceased's death, is given to the necessary expenses including the rights of 
creditors. Unless and until all the expenses are fully satisfied, the legatees and legal heirs 
have no interest to claim. It is important to mention here that the present research is an 
attempt to ascertain the tarikah or estate that is to be inherited by the legal heir, it does 
not discuss in detail the situation of an insolvent estate regarding the priorities among the 
creditors as this falls under the subject of Bankruptcy Law and certainly requires a 
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lengthy discussion. It is sufficient here to merely refer to the above statutory provision to 
ascertain the extent to which the laws applicable in Malaysia adopt the principles of 
Islamic law. 
4.2.2. The Administration of Tarikah in the Islamic Law of Succession 
It is imperative to note that as far as the Islamic administration of estates is concerned, 
the four Sunni schools of law hold different opinions regarding the order of priorities for 
meeting the rights and liabilities attached to the tarikah. These differences occur because 
of the different ways of classifying debt. According to the Hanafis, Mälikis and Syäfiis, 
debts are classified into two groups, namely special debts and general debts. Special 
debts are debts that are against and attached to a particular asset of the estate such as a 
mortgaged property. 9 On the other hand, the Hanbalis place all debts in one category 
regardless of whether they are attached to the property or not. 
10 The charges on estates 
and the different opinions of the Muslim scholars regarding them are illustrated in the 
following table. 
Order of 
Priorities MAlikis Hanafis S äfiis Hanbalis 
1 Special debts Special debts Special debts Burial expenses 
2 Burial expenses Burial expenses Burial expenses Debts 
3 General debts General debts General debts Wadi ah 
4 Wasi ah Wayi ah Wa. Fi ah Legal heirs 
5 Legal heirs Legal heirs Legal heirs 
9 Ibn °Abidin, vol. 5, p. 535, al-Dusugi, vol. 4, p. 457 and al-Syarbini, vol. 3, pp. 3-4. 
10 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni wa al-Syarh al-Kabir `a1ä Main al-Mugni`, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1992, vol. 7, p. 
5. 
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4.2.3. Comparison of Islamic and Malaysian Laws 
On the basis of the above discussion, it is incorrect to say that the administration of 
estates as understood nowadays is unknown to Islamic jurisprudence. " It is unacceptable 
to suggest that in Islam, there is no such administration of estates but merely distribution 
of the property of the deceased, by the State if not by the heirs themselves. 12 It should be 
observed that Islamic law lays down clear principles applicable to the administration of 
tarikah. The above-mentioned rights have to be discharged and the powers and 
responsibilities regarding the discharging of these rights lies with the legal heirs. 
Furthermore, a Qär or a Syari ah judge supervises the carrying out of these duties. This 
is a matter of administration involving the rights of others and hence, the participation of 
a Syari ah judge appointed and empowered by the State is a matter of necessity as far as 
the public interest, or masälih mursalah, is concerned. In this respect, the legal heirs may 
choose a qualified person to carry out the duties on their behalf, based on the concept of 
wakalah, and his/her appointment must be duly endorsed by the State, i. e. the court. 
With respect to the above table, it is not necessary to discuss the rights of legal heirs to 
the remaining estate under the farä'ici law as this has been done in Chapter 2 when 
examining the basic features of the law. The application of this law in Malaysia has also 
been discussed in Chapter 2 and hence, to avoid unnecessary repetition the analysis of the 
extent to which the law is applicable in Malaysia is not dealt with here. 
11 Khan, Muhammad Mustafa, Islamic Law of Inheritance A New Approach, , p. 22. '2 Ibid, p. 22. 
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4.3. Funeral Expenses 
4.3.1. Funeral Expenses under Islamic law 
There is an obligation to carry out a funeral ceremony for the deceased and the expenses 
of the ceremony are taken from the deceased's estate. This is based on several hadith, one 
being the hadi-th narrated by Khabbäb bin al-Irt that Mu5°ab bin `Umayr, a companion of 
the Prophet. He had died on the battlefield of Uhud and had nothing except his garment 
to clothe his body. The Prophet then ordered other companions to use the garment to 
clothe his body. 13 
It can be argued that funeral expenses are originally a matter for the deceased individual 
and not a responsibility of others. Only if the deceased dies penniless should the expenses 
be borne by those who were responsible for providing for his/her maintenance when 
alive, and if none is present by the bayt al-mä1. Therefore, if a wife dies leaving an estate 
sufficient to cover her own funeral expenses, it is preferable that the expenses be 
deducted from her tarikah rather than considering them as the responsibility of another. 
The funeral ceremony expenses must avoid any element of extravagance, superfluity or 
deficiency. 14 The expenses must fulfil whatever is necessarily and fundamentally needed 
by the deceased, which include the costs of a coffin, clothing, bathing, carrying the 
deceased to the graveyard and digging and covering the grave and so on. Expenditure on 
the unnecessary would be tantamount to the infringement of the rights of others such as 
13 Säbiq, Sayyid, Fiqh al-Sunnah, 11th edition, Cairo: Dar al-Fatb Ii l9am al-`Arabi, 1999, vol. I, p. 359. 
14 Ibn °Abidin, vol. 5, p. 536 and al-Syarbini, vol. 3, p. 3. 
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creditors, legatees and legal heirs because the expenses are deducted from the total 
amount of the deceased's property. 15 
4.3.1.1. Funeral Expenses and Special Debts 
A special debt is one that is specifically attached to part of the estate such as a mortgaged 
property. To the Mälikis, Uanafis and Syäfiis, funeral expenses should be paid after the 
settlement of these debts. This is based on the analogy that during a person's lifetime, 
others' rights take precedence over his/her own rights and hence, the same principle is 
applicable when he/she dies. 16 On the other hand, the Hanbalis are of the view that such 
expenses take precedence over all types of debt. This opinion is based on an analogy to 
the position of a bankrupt whose properties are sold except those considered as his 
necessities. 17 However, the I; ianbalis further hold the view that as compared with general 
debts, this type of debt is to be settled first because of its nature, being attached to the 
specific property of the estate. 18 
In the light of the above arguments, it would seem that the opinion of the Hanbalis is to 
be preferred. This is based on the fact that although the majority view is similarly 
analogous to a principle that is applicable during lifetime, the view of the Ijanbalis is 
stronger because there is an exception to the principle relied upon by the majority 
concerning the basic needs and necessities of the deceased as in the case of a bankrupt. It 
is important to note that covering the deceased's body and arranging all the necessary 
15 Al-Syirazi, Abi Isl)aq Ibrähim bin `Ali ibn Yüsuf al-Firüzäbadi, al-Muhadhdhab fi Fiqh al-Imdm al- 
S, äfri, n. p.: Dar al-Fikr, n. d. , vol. 2, p. 23 and al-Syarbini,, p. 
3. 
' Ibn `Abidin, p. 536, al-Dusügi, p. 457 and al-Syarbini, p. 4. 
17 Al-Bahüti, Kasyäf al-Qana`, vol. 2, p. 541.. 
18 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 403-404. 
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things related to the burial in accordance with the Islamic teachings are necessities 
fundamentally needed by the deceased. 19 
4.3.2. Funeral Expenses under the Malaysian laws 
In Jub'il Bin Mohamed Taib Taral & Ors v Sunway Lagoon Sdn Bhd, 20 the plaintiff had 
failed to furnish any particulars proving that he had spent RM5000 on the deceased's 
Muslim funeral and hence the Court accepted the defending counsel's contention that the 
reasonable amount for the funeral expenses was RM2000. The Court refused to accept 
the claim of RM5000, which included the feast held by the plaintiff in honour of the 
deceased. In Zulkifli Bin Ayob v Velasani alp KMadhavan & Anor, 21 the amount awarded 
by the Session Court was RM3000. The appellant in her appeal before the High Court did 
not challenge this amount. The High Court in Mariah bte Mohamad (Administratrix of 
the estate of Wan Salleh Bin Wan Ibrahim, deceased) v. Abdullah Bin Daud (Dr Lom kok 
Eng & Anor, Third Parties)22 agreed with the widow's claim that the amount she had 
spent on her husband's funeral was RM500 and viewed that this amount was reasonable 
and appropriate for a Muslim's funeral. 
19 This is known as one of the objectives of Syari ah or magä. Fid al-Syari ah, namely the necessities or 
darüriyydt, which are must and basic for the establishment of welfare in this world and the world hereafter 
in the sense that if they are ignored then the coherence and order cannot be established and fasäd (chaos 
and disorder) will prevail. See Khan, M. Fahim and Ghifari, Noor Muhammad, "Shatibi's Objectives of 
Shari'ah and Some Implications for Consumer Theory", in: Readings in Islamic Economic Thought, edited 
by Sadeq, M. Abul Hassan and Ghazali, Aidit, Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia, 1992, pp. 176-177. 
20 [2001] 6 MLJ 669. 
21 [2000] 1 MLJ 593. 
22 [1990] 1 MLJ 240. 
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4.3.3. Comparison of the Treatment of Funeral Expenses and Special Debts 
From the above cases it can be seen that the courts have not fixed a standard amount for 
the funeral expenses of a deceased Muslim. The amounts considered reasonable, and 
therefore granted by the courts, are based on the evidence brought forward by the parties 
concerned. The courts have not discussed in detail the particulars that are necessary for 
the process of a Muslim's funeral as prescribed in Islamic law, which would determine an 
exact amount for funeral expenses. 
However, it appears that the courts have granted the claims for funeral expenses as part of 
the compensation even though they are part and parcel of the expenses that according to 
Islamic law should be borne by the estate. It is the deceased's right against his own estate. 
If such compensation is granted, it implies that the funeral expenses are a duty borne by 
others, not the estate. However, if others have voluntarily incurred the expense no valid 
reason arises for such a claim because the funeral process is the right of the deceased, 
which must be completely performed by the survivors, taken from the estate. This claim 
can only be made against the estate, not against a third party. It is imperative to mention 
that the funeral process is the right of the deceased, and its expenses have priority over 
others' rights namely the creditor, the legatee and the legal heir. On the basis that it is the 
deceased's right, there is no valid reason to claim for such compensation. 
In Malaysia, the funeral expenses of a deceased Muslim are normally settled without any 
dispute arising. 23 The expenses are either settled voluntarily by the deceased's legal heirs 
or taken from the estate. If the funeral expenses are incurred by others, such as the 
23 Scc APKKB. 594/2000. 
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deceased's relatives, they are entitled to a refund deducted from the estate. Due to the 
lack of disputes relating to funeral expenses, there are no cases to be found pertaining to 
such claims made before the Collector in the process of distributing small estates. 24 
As far as the amount of the expenses is concerned, the claims brought before the court as 
discussed above are regarding the claims for compensation in negligent cases. The 
amounts ranging from RM500 to RM3000 granted by the courts are reasonable in the 
context of Islamic law. According to the rule in Islamic law, the amount allocated and 
deducted from the estate must not exceed the prescribed limit otherwise it would be 
tantamount to a violation of the rights of the creditor, the legatee and the legal heirs. This 
means that unnecessary expenses for such as a feast in order to honour the deceased, even 
though recommended by the Syari ah, should not be taken from the estate. The courts 
have upheld the Islamic principles in the sense that the amount permitted to be deducted 
from the estate must only cover basic things, which are really and necessarily needed by 
the deceased as prescribed by the Islamic law regarding the burial process. Only those 
things should be paid from the estate and additional expenses for things such as feasts 
should not. 
The Syäfiis school of law is the dominant school in Malaysia. It appears that no issues 
have arisen regarding whether or not special debts take precedence over funeral expenses. 
24 See files 2002 on small estates distribution no. APKKB. 502, APKKB. 507, APKKB. 508, APKKB. 512, 
APKKB. 517, APKKB. 519, APKKB. 521, APKKB. 526 and APKKB. 527 which are available at the Kota 
Bharu Land Office, Sapura Building, Kota Bharu, Kelantan. See also files ARB (KB)20000 299, Pn. P. P. 
(KN). 100/79/1 and P. P. P. (D)214 which are available at the Public Trustee Corporation, Kota Bharu 
Branch, Kelantan. 
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4.4. Payment of Debts 
4.4.1. Payment of Debts under the Islamic Law of Succession 
This is based on the Qur'anic verse al-Nisä' (4): 11, which states that the distribution of 
the deceased's property among the legal heirs takes place after the settlement of debts and 
the execution of the bequests of the deceased. However, it is to be noted that the verse 
pronounces the execution of wasiyyah first, followed by the settlement of debts. 
According to Muslim scholars, this sequence does not imply that wasiyyah has priority 
over debt settlement. This is because debts are the rights of others against the estate and 
therefore should be paid regardless of whether it is ordained or not. 25 In contrast, 
wasiyyah is the right of the deceased and hence, others' rights should have priority in 
terms of settlement. This is supported by the hadith attributed to W! bin Ab-1 Tdlib, 
which states that the Prophet ordered the payment of debts prior to the execution of 
wasiyyah. 26 
4.4.1.1. Types of Debt Liabilities 
According to the four Sunni schools of law, there are two types of debt liability, namely 
liabilities to Allah and liabilities to creditors. Liabilities to Allah arise due to failures to 
perform religious duties such as obligatory prayers, pilgrimage, zakat and kaf'rah 
(expiation). To the Hanafis, it is not a religious obligation upon the legal heirs to to pay 
these debts from the estate. To them, mandatory devotional acts consist of two 
fundamental elements, namely the performance and the intention. A dead person is not 
25 See Qulb, Sayyid, Fi Zi1äI aI-Qur'an, translated and edited by Salahi, Adil and Shamis, Ashur, Leicester: 
The Islamic Foundation, 2001, p. 54. 
26 Ibn Majah, vol. 2, p. 906. 
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able to perform these requirements and hence such obligations cease upon death. 27 In 
contrast, the other three schools of law are of the view that such liabilities to Allah 
remain and do not lapse upon one's death. The debts must therefore be paid by the legal 
heirs upon the deceased's death from the estate. 
Arguably, the Ijanaffs' view can be rebutted by the fact that the kaffa-rah or expiation is 
comparable to the payment of debts to Allah. KafJrah arises out of one's inability to 
perform the original mandatory act. This is supported by the hadith, which states that 
debts to Allah are worthier of being paid than creditor's debts. 28 
Liabilities to creditors include personal financial promises such as where the deceased 
promised a present, such as a car, to his son provided he excels in his studies. This is 
because a promise is an obligation that must be performed. The Qur'anic verse al-Isrä' 
(16): 34 states: "Come not nigh to the orphan's property except to improve it, until he 
attains the age of full strength; and fulfil (every) engagement, for every engagement will 
be enquired into (on the Day of Reckoning)". 29 It is clear that breaking a promise is 
considerably a religious sin. If such a promise is not fulfilled, a Muslim who undertakes it 
will be accountable to Alläh in the hereafter and he will be questioned regarding his 
failure to fulfil it. This is similar to the case of a Muslim living in the countries which do 
27 Ibn `Abidin, vol. 5, p. 534. 
28 Ibn Mäjah, vol. 1, p. 559. 
29 There is a lladith narrated by al-Bukhdr regarding the attitudes of a hypocrite. The Prophet said: 
Whoever has the four (characteristics) will be pure hypocrite, and whoever has one of the following four 
characteristics will have one characteristic of hypocrisy unless and until he gives it up. Whenever he is 
entrusted, he betrays (proves dishonest), whenever he speaks, he tells lie, whenever he makes a covenant, 
he proves treacherous and whenever he quarrels, he behaves in a very imprudent, evil and insulting manner. 
See al-Hiläli, Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din and Khan, Muhammad Muhsin, Interpretation of the Meanings of 
the Noble Qur'an in the English Language, Riyadh: Darussalam, 2000, vol. 4, p. 183. 
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not recognize the Islamic Law of Succession, who neglects to write a will to have his 
wealth distributed according to Islamic Law of Succession, as stated by Siddiqi in his 
fatwä. Hence, to release him from such a burden, the promise must be discharged and 
must be taken from his estate. 
Even though a financial promise is normally not put into writing, a Muslim jurist could 
lawfully enforce it if sufficient evidence can prove of its existence before the court. This 
is analogous to the betrothal or promise to marry. A betrothal is not a contract of 
marriage, but because it is a promise to marry, the party who refuses to fulfil the promise 
without a valid reason is therefore liable to compensate the other party. Section 124 of the 
Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 states that, if the other party is 
willing to perform the marriage, the party in default is liable to pay to the other party the 
sum which is agreed in the contract of betrothal. 30 Thus, in addition to spiritual 
consequences, promise, as the previous paragraph indicates, can have legal consequence 
too. 
Liabilities to creditors also include the guarantees provided by the deceased for business 
loans. 31 This falls under the concept of kafalah in Islamic law and hence, the deceased's 
estate is liable for the financial guarantee if the original debtor is unable to pay the loan. 32 
Other examples are ordinary loans such as personal, credit card and study loans. 
30 Ibrahim, Family Law in Malaysia and Singapore, p. 193. 
31 Mahmood, Rosli, Perbankan dan Pemberian Pinjaman, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & 
Distributors, 1998, pp. 71-74. 
32 Al-Zulaayli, vol. 5, p. 132 and Daud, Mustafa Hj., Perniagaan Menurut Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan 
Publications & Distributors Sdn Bhd, 1995, pp. 42-43. 
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4.4.1.2. Allah's Debts v. Creditors' Debts 
To the Hanafis, debts to Allah are not worthy of being paid and hence there is no issue of 
conflict between these and debts to creditors. However, the Mälikis, the Syäfiis and the 
Uanbalis differ in ascertaining which of the debts has priority. According to the Mälikis, 
creditors' claims take priority over liabilities to Allah on the grounds that Allah is 
Benevolent and hence these debts should be discharged after the creditor's claims are 
fully satisfied but before the execution of any bequests. 33 The Syäfiis on the other hand 
rely on the hadith of the Prophet, which mentions that debts to Allah should be given 
priority in terms of settlement over debts to human beings. Therefore, if the deceased 
leaves behind an estate insufficient to pay off all the debts due against him, priority is 
given to the payment of the debts owed to Allah; creditors' claims are only discharged if 
there is remaining property. 34 The Hanbal s take the middle view, i. e. all debts are of 
equal status and none has priority over another. According to them, the word used in the 
relevant Qur'anic verse is "dayn", which implies a general meaning of debt and thus 
covers all types of debts with no difference between them. According to this view, all 
debts should be treated equally in terms of priority and furthermore, the settlement of all 
debts must be based on a proportional calculation. 35 
4.4.2. Payment of Debts and Liabilities under Malaysian Laws 
The personal representative is allowed by the court to sell the deceased's property for the 
purpose of settling claims against the estate. The interest of the legal heirs to the 
deceased's estate is considered only after the payment of all debts and the execution of 
33A1-Dusügi, vol. 4, p. 458. 
34 Al-Syarbin% vol. 3, p. 3. 
35 Al-Bahüti vol. 4, pp. 403-404. 
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any bequests. All debts, including income tax, personal loans, loans for study, business 
and cars and credit card debts, etc should be settled prior to the distribution of the estate 
in favour of the legatee and the legal heirs. 
4.4.2.1. Estate Duty 
This liability has now been abolished and is only payable on the estates of persons dying 
before the 1st of November 1991. The estate of a person who dies on or after this date is 
not liable for estate duty. Section 46 of Chapter VII of the Finance Act 199236 provides: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Estate Duty Enactment 1941, the Estate 
Duty Ordinance of Sabah, the Estate Duty Ordinance of Sarawak, the 
Finance (estate Duty) 1965, the Finance (Estate Duty) Act 1971, the 
Finance (Estate Duty) Act 1979 and the Finance (Estate Duty) Act 1980 
are repealed. 
(2) The repeal of the laws mentioned in subsection (1) shall not affect the 
operation of such laws in regard to any person dying before the coming 
into force of the repeal of such laws as if the repeal had not been made. 37 
As far as Islamic law is concerned, according to Zulkifli Muda, the imposition of estate 
duty is against Islamic principles on the basis that no such imposition is found in the 
Syari ah and, further, it is made upon a dead person. 38 However, Dato' Hasbullah has 
stated that estate duty should not be considered as against Islamic law on the basis that a 
government is allowed to act in the public interest. 39 The same opinion was given by 
36 Act 476. 
37 Section 45 of Chapter VII of the Finance Act 1993 provides: This Chapter shall be deemed to have come 
into force on the I" November 1991. 
38 Muda, Zulkifli, interview on 12'h September 2003. He is an Islamic scholar teaching subjects of Islamic 
law at the Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University, Malaysia. 
39 Dato' Haji Hasbullah, interview on 9`s September 2003. He is the Mufti of the State of Kelantan, 
Malaysia. 
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Dato' Hashim Yahya who further supported it with examples of taxes imposed during the 
Caliph `Umar al-Kha1täb era. 40 
In the light of the above discussion, the opinion that the imposition of estate duty is not 
contrary to Islamic law would seem the correct one. Clearly, estate duty is actually 
imposed on the estate, which is passed to the legal heirs. It is not an imposition on the 
wealth of the deceased and it is not the deceased's responsibility to pay. It is rather the 
responsibility of the legatee and legal heirs. This practice is relatively similar to that of 
zakät, which is imposed on the recipients of property when the total amount received by 
each of them reaches the zakatable amount. 
Zakät is imposed not on the estate but on the individual recipients. If the amount received 
by a legatee or heir reaches the zakatable amount and it satisfies the conditions that 
render it compulsory, the rate of 2.5 per cent of the whole portion is deducted as the 
payment of zakdt. 41 Al-Qaradäwi, in his Ph. D thesis on zakat, stated that Ibn Mas°nd, Ibn 
`Abbas and Mu`äwiyyah are reported as holding the view that zakirt is due on assets when 
they are acquired, without requiring the passage of a year. 42 He further added that Ibn 
Rushd explains this difference on the grounds that no hadith is authentically reported on 
this issue. 43 Bearing this in mind, it is submitted that zakät becomes payable by each legal 
heir after they have received their full share of the estate. 
40 Dato' Hashim Yahya, interview on 11th September 2003. He is a former Mufti of Wilayah Persekutuan 
Kuala Lumpur. For the imposition of kharäj, see al-Jammal, Muhammad `Abdul Mun`im, Ensyklopedia 
Ekonomi Islam, translated into Bahasa Malaysia by Abdullah, Salahuddin, 2, d edition, Kuala Lumpur: 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, vol 1, p. 304. 
41 Al-Qara4äwl, Yüsuf, Figh al-Zakdh, Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Risälah, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 65-100. 
42 Ibid, p. 97. 
43 Ibid. 
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4.4.2.2. Settlement of Debts 
The priority of debt settlement over the rights of the legatees and legal heirs was 
practiced by the High Court in the case of Fazil Rahman & Ors v AR. S. Nachiappa 
Chettiar. 44 In this case the deceased died in 1959 leaving an estate comprising five pieces 
of land and a house. His four children survived him but none had applied for letters of 
administration. Neither did they attend the hearing during which Nachiappa Chettiar, the 
defendant, applied for the letter of representation as a creditor. As a result he was granted 
the letter and in his capacity as the deceased's personal representative, he applied for 
leave to sell the deceased's estate. The proceeds were to be applied to pay off all the 
debts owed by the deceased to the administrator and to meet the expenses of taking out 
letters of administration and the sale and payment of the estate duty. The total value of 
the estate was RM14,600, whereas the debts, the principal and the interest, amounted to 
RM33,780. The children of the deceased applied for the removal of the grant after 
realizing that if the administrator were entitled to recover his debt including interest there 
would be nothing left for any of them. The Court was of the view that there are two 
grounds for the removal of such a grant, namely where the administration has been 
improperly carried out and the interest of the deceased's children. It was found that the 
administrator had practiced no maladministration and further, that the interest of the 
children was not affected by refusing to revoke the grant. The Court relied upon Part I of 
the First Schedule to the Probate and Administration Ordinance 35 of 1959, which 
provides that after payment of the funeral, testamentary and administration expenses, "the 
same rules shall prevail and be observed as to ... debts and liabilities provable 
[against 
44 (1963) 29 MLJ 309. 
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the estate]... as may be in force for the time being under the law of bankruptcy with 
respect to the assets of persons adjudged bankrupt. " 
Even though the Court allowed the sale of the deceased's estate for the purpose of 
settling debts and liabilities, the interests of the interested parties, especially the rights of 
the legal heirs, were taken into account. Hence, where the rights and interests of the 
legatees and legal heirs are affected by the sale of an estate, the court will find the best 
possible means to settle the issue in a way that has the least affect on the rights of those 
interested parties. 
In Re The Estate of Tunku Mohamed Jewa Ibni AlMarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid, 
Deceased, 45 the administrators applied for leave to sell a piece of land that was part of the 
estate. They had already made a conditional contract with the potential buyer to sell the 
land. The deceased's estate mainly comprised 13 pieces of land, cash deposits in banks 
and one motorcar as assets. The liabilities consisted of funeral expenses and a gift-inter- 
vivos of some land made in his lifetime. The estate duty had been assessed at 
RM240,053.15 of which the sum of RM188,174.80 had been paid towards partial 
discharge, leaving a balance of RM90,503.16. The intention of the plaintiffs in making 
the application to sell the properties was with the view to settling this balance and all 
other liabilities incurred on behalf of the estate and thereafter to distribute the balance 
among the beneficiaries. The application was refused because the Court felt that it has a 
duty to protect the rights of all the beneficiaries who have interests in the land. The Court 
held that as there were better offers for the land the conditional contract should not be 
45 [1982] 2 MLJ 44 
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approved, but the land should be sold by way of tender in order to obtain the best possible 
puce. 
4.4.2.3. Harta Sepencarian, or Jointly Acquired Property; an Ordinary Debt 
There are various definitions of harta sepencarian, or jointly acquired property, as found 
in the states enactments in Malaysia. Section 2 of the Islamic Family Law (Federal 
Territory) Act, 1984 defines it as property jointly acquired by the husband and wife 
during the subsistence of their marriage in accordance with the conditions stipulated by 
Hukum Syara'. Section 2 of the Terengganu Administration of Islamic Law Enactment, 
1955 defines it as the earnings, or the property acquired, as a result of the joint labour of 
two spouses and includes the income derived from capital that is the result of joint labour. 
In summary, it is clear that the definitions of harta sepencarian, as available in the 
various states enactments, imply that it is the wealth acquired by the joint efforts of the 
husband and wife during their marriage. 
There are differences in the interpretations of the civil court and the SharTah court judges 
on the issue of whether the concept of harta sepencarian is of adat or of Islamic law. 
From examinations of the cases decided by the civil courts, it appears that the judges of 
the civil courts have considered it a matter of Malay adat rather than Islamic law as 
discussed in Hujah Lijah binti Jamal v. Fatimah binti Mat Diah46, Roberts v. Ummi 
Kalthom47 and Boto' binti Taha v. Jaafar bin Muhamed. 48 On the other hand, the Syariah 
46 (1950) 16 MLJ 63. In this case, Briggs, J. held: "The rules governing harta sepencarian are not a part of 
groper Islamic law, but a matter of Malay adat. " 
7 [1966] 163. In this case, Raja Azlan, J. held: "Harta Sepencarian is a matter of Malay adat and is 
applicable only to the case of a divorced spouse who claims against the other spouse during his or her 
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court judges have viewed it as a matter of Islamic law as decided in Noor Bee v. Ahmad 
Sanusi 9 and Kalthom bt Abdul Wahid v. Nordin bin Othman. so 
Even though Muslim scholars have not discussed the concept of harta sepencarian in 
their Fiqh treatises, its legitimacy is largely based on several Islamic principles, which 
constitute it as a matter of Islamic law. It is an established and continuous adat practice 
as confirmed in the civil court decisions cited above, and hence fulfils the requirements 
of `urf, or custom, which stands as one of the sources of Islamic law. 51 It has been 
regarded as an established adat by al-Sheikh Ahmad bin Mohd Zain bin Mustafa al- 
Fatani in his al-Fatawä al-Fataniah. 52 The legitimacy of harta sepencarian from the 
perspective of Islamic law could also be based on the Hanafis concept of syarikah al- 
abdän. In summary, the right to harta sepencarian between husband and wife has been 
legally recognized and applied in Malaysia and is considered as part of Islamic law. 
Every enactment of the states in Malaysia contains a statutory provision regarding the 
existence of this right. It is therefore beyond doubt that prior to distributing the estate of 
lifetime; this rule of law is local law which the court must take judicial notice of and it is the duty of the 
court to propound it... " 
48 [1985] 2 MLJ 98. In this case, Salleh Abbas, J. held: Harta Sepencarian is not so much based on Islamic 
jurisprudence as on customs practiced by Malays. " 
09 (1981) 1(2) JH 63. In this case, Hj. Harussani Zakaria, Chief Qadhi of Pulau Pinang stated: Harta 
Sepencarian is recognized by the Islamic law based on the services and joint life. A wife remains at home 
organizing the house affairs whereas a husband goes out for work. 
50 (1994) 9 JH 178. In this case, Sheikh Ghazali Hj. Abdul Rahman, J. stated : "Cases on harta sepencarian 
had been decided by the Syariah courts in Malaysia based on the opinions of Muslim jurists and `urf of the 
state. " 
51 Article 36 and 41 of the Majallah al-Ahkam respectively state "Custom is of force" and "Custom is only 
El ven effect to, when it is continuous or preponderant. " 
His fatwd was cited by Haji Daud bin Muhammad, Harta Sepencarian Dalam Hukum Syarak, p. 51. That 
fatwa concerns the practice of the Muslim community in the southern Thailand, where the husband and 
wife work together. The fatwd ruled that the income of the work should be divided equally between the two 
and if one of them dies, the estate of the deceased must be ascertained unless the living spouse agrees that 
such joint wealth wholly belongs to the deceased. See also Suwaid Tapah, Harta Sepencarian dan Wang 
Simpanan KWSP, p. 1. 
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the deceased Muslim, the deduction of the portion known as harta sepencarian must be 
taken into account. 
However, it is strange that only the surviving spouse can file a claim for harta 
sepencarian. The legal heirs of the deceased have no right to claim it as part of the 
estate. 53 This means that, the existence of harta sepencarian is dependent on whether the 
spouse claims it or not. However, it has been argued that according to Islamic law the 
existence of harta sepencarian is legitimately based upon sound proofs. Therefore, such a 
right arises regardless of the surviving spouse claiming it or not. According to al-Zuhayli, 
a right continues to exist and is transferable to the legal heir upon death unless the 
rightful owner waives it prior to his death. 54 Clearly this principle should be extended and 
made applicable to the claim of harta sepencarian. Hence, as it is a transferable right 
nothing should prevent the legal heirs from claiming harta sepencarian. 
4.4.3. Comparison of the Treatment of Settlement of Debts 
It is significant to note that the Court in Fazil Rahman & Ors v AR. S Nachiappa 
Chettiarss agreed with the amount of debt claimed by the administrator. It is clear from 
the perspective of Islamic law that such an amount is inclusive of the interest, or ribä, 
which is absolutely prohibited. This clearly affects the rights of the legal heirs in the 
sense that they would receive nothing from the estate because the whole estate is subject 
to the payment of debt including the interest. It appears that the Court did not adopt the 
principle of Islamic law, which strictly prohibits interest, or ribä. However, it can be 
53 Suwaid Tapah, p. 4. 
54 Al-Zuhayl% vol. 4, p. 2845. 
55 (1963) 29 MLJ 309. 
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argued that what was imposed and granted by the Court does not contradict Islamic 
principles. It is the deceased's responsibility to avoid any transaction involving interest 
from the very beginning. Once he has agreed to such a transaction he becomes 
accountable to his agreement until it ends. 
According to Dato' Hasbullah, the Mufti of the State of Kelantan, a Muslim is subject to 
his agreement. This is stated in a hadith and furthermore, is based on the principle of 
public interest, or ma. lahah. 56 The former Mufti of Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 
Dato' Hashim Yahya, has also voiced the same opinion that a Muslim is bound by the 
terms of the agreement that he/she has entered into and is obliged to pay the interest, 
which on death is paid from the estate. 7 It is submitted therefore that this principle is 
applicable to all kinds of transaction that involve the prohibited element of ribä. Any 
interest or ribä which arises from a transaction, such as an approved bank loan, involving 
a Muslim, even though it is strictly prohibited, must be settled and upon death deductions 
must be made from the estate for the settlement of such interest, as part of the debt- 
financial liabilities, before it is distributed among the legal heirs. 
The principle adopted in Re Estate of Tunku Mohamed Jewa Ibni AlMarhum Sultan 
Abdul Hamid, Deceased58 sheds light on the courts' attitudes towards protecting the 
deceased's estate from unnecessary dealings that would cause the reduction of the estate 
even though they are for the purpose of settling attached debts and liabilities. In other 
words, even though the settlement of debts and liabilities has priority over the rights of 
56 Dato' Hasbullah, interview. 
57 Dato'Hashim Yahya, interview. 
58 [1982] 2 MLJ 44. 
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legatees and legal heirs, there are methods and modes that can possibly save all the 
interested parties from loosing their rights and interests in the estate. This principle is 
equivalent to the principle in Islamic law regarding the duty of a representative, or wakil. 
As a personal representative, an administrator or executor is acting as a trustee. From the 
perspective of Islamic law, a trustee must act in the interest of the represented parties. 
He/she must avoid doing anything, which is detrimental to the interest of the parties 
concerned. 59 
With regard to harta sepencarian, it is important to mention that this claim should not 
take precedence over all other claims. However, the courts have apparently never 
discussed the issue of the priority of such a claim. Harta sepencarian is clearly wealth 
that exclusively belongs to the deceased's spouse, which is seemingly kept by the 
deceased on trust. It is absolutely a kind of ordinary debts and liabilities because it is not 
specifically attached to any part of the deceased's wealth. It belongs to the deceased's 
surviving spouse, which while she was alive he kept on trust. It is therefore submitted 
that a claim for harta sepencarian should have no priority over the payment of general 
debts and liabilities as well as the execution of waviyyah. This is on the basis of its being 
excluded from the meaning of a special debt because this property is not specifically 
attached to a part of the estate. This submission was agreed with by Shafaie Musa, the 
former Head of the Department of Islamic Law of the International Islamic University of 
Malaysia during a semi-structured interview conducted as part of this research. 60 
59 Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, p. 149. 
60 Shafaai Musa, interview on 5`h September 2003. He is the former Head, Department of Islamic Law, 
Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University. 
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4.5. The Execution of a Wasiyyah or Bequest 
4.5.1. The Execution of Wasiyyah under Islamic Law 
The four Sunni schools of law unanimously agree that the execution of the wa. iyyah of 
the deceased should occur after the payment of the funeral expenses and all debts but 
prior to the distribution of the tarikah to the legal heirs. This is based on the Qur'anic 
verse al-Nisä' (4): 11 where Allah commands that the distribution of property to the 
entitled legal heirs takes place after the execution of the wa. Fiyyah. 
Wa. iyyah is another means of disbursing one's wealth upon death. According to Pearl, it 
is an optional testamentary succession and is different from compulsory succession that is 
the farä'icl system. 61 This optional disposal of property upon death is an absolute right of 
the deceased, which, as a testamentary disposition, is not effective until the testator's 
death. Likewise with compulsory succession, the ownership of the property disposed of 
by means of a bequest is transferred only upon death. 
It is to be noted that making a wa. Fiyyah is a practice recommended to all Muslims. It was 
originally incumbent upon every Muslim following the revelation of the Qur'anic verse 
al-Bagarah (2): 180, which apparently states that there is an obligation upon a Muslim 
close to death to make a bequest in favour of his parents and next of kin. However, 
according to the four Sunni schools of law, this original ruling was abrogated by the 
revelation of the Qur'anic verses al-Nisä' (4): 11,12 and 176 and the badith of the 
Prophet `no wa. iyyah in favour of legal heirs'. 
61 Pearl, David, p. 138. 
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4.5.1.1. The Significance of Wa. iyyah in Islamic Estate Planning 
It is important to mention that in relation to inheritance, pertaining to the aspect of 
procedural matters of estate administration in Malaysia, the issue of appointing an 
executor through the mechanism of a bequest is significant. According to Mustapha 
Mohamad, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department of Malaysia, more than 90 
percent of Muslims in Malaysia die without leaving wills, causing losses both to the 
community and the country as a whole due to unresolved property distribution. 
62 He has 
stated that land cannot be developed because of ambiguous ownership, particularly where 
the land is in a prime location like Kampung Banc in Kuala Lumpur, and delays in 
making claims and unclaimed pieces of hereditary land due to various factors such as 
unnamed heirs in the title, are all factors contributing to the problem. 
63 He addressed the 
importance of making a will by stating that 90 percent of cases referred to the Federal 
Land and Mines Director-General's Department involved Muslims while the remainder 
concerned property belonging to non-Muslims. According to him, the small percentage of 
non-Muslim cases is due to the fact that non-Muslims usually practice property 
distribution through wills. 64 
Furthermore, Muzammil H. Siddiqi, former President of the Islamic Society of North 
America, stated in a fatwä in response to a question regarding the significance of making 
a will, that in countries where the Islamic inheritance law are not recognized, a Muslim 
must prepare a will before his death because without having made a will, his wealth most 
62 Utusan Online, Home News [online], 25th May 2004, available from: www. utusanonline. com. [accessed 
20th June 2005]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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probably will be distributed according to the state laws where he/she lived, not according 
to Allah's laws. A Muslim in this case may be held responsible on the Day of Judgment 
because of his/her negligence in a very important matter. 65 
In this respect, it is important to mention that in Islamic law, the subject matter of a 
wasiyyah is strictly limited to mä1, haq and manfa`ah. This implies that a wa$iyyah can 
not include the instructions of the testator on the manner in which the estate is to be 
distributed after death as suggested by Dr. Muzammil above. This is completely different 
from a will made under the Malaysian Wills Act, 1956. Such a testimony empowers the 
testator to insert anything in the will including instructions regarding the manner in which 
the property is to be distributed as well as the appointment of a guardian. This implies 
that a wasiyyah is different from a will as provided for in the Malaysian Wills Act, 
1956.66 In other words, a will is broader than a wa. Fiyyah as far as the subject matter is 
concerned. 67 
It is submitted that what concerns Mustapha Mohamad, the Malaysian Minister and Dr. 
Muzammil Siddique regarding the significance of having a will, as far as the Islamic 
inheritance law is concerned, is the wiydyah or the trusteeship. 68 This is a very wide 
subject and stands as one of the means of creating a specific form of trust under Islamic 
65 See footnote no. 5, p. 2. 
66 Section 2 of the Malaysian Wills Act, 1959 (Act 346) defines the will as a declaration intended to have 
legal effect of the intentions of a testator with respect to his property or other matters which he desires to be 
carried into effect after his death and includes a testament, a codicil and an appointment by will, or by 
writing in the nature of a will, in exercise of a power and also a disposition by will or testament of the 
guardianship, custody and tuition of any child. 
In this respect, it is incorrect to equate a wa. Fiyyah with a will as understood in the modern law. See Doi, 
I., Abdur Rahman, Shariah: The Islamic Law, Kuala Lumpur: A. S. Noordeen, 2002, p. 293. 
68 Al-Mawrid, A Modern Arabic - English Dictionary, Eighth Edition, 1996, p. 1235. 
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law. 69 One area of concern is the appointment of a person to administer the deceased's 
estate, including the manner in which the estate is to be distributed. 70 In other words, 
Muslims are certainly recommended to use the means of a will, which is apparently a 
combination of the waviyyah and wiFäyah, to fasten and mitigate the process of the 
distribution of their estates under Islamic inheritance law. 
4.5.1.2. Limitation of Waliyyah on the Recipient 
Even though a Muslim is allowed to dispose of his property by way of a waýiyyah, and by 
that means he is permitted to freely select the beneficiaries and confer upon them rights 
to his estate effectively upon his death, such a right is not absolute. His right to make a 
wa. Fiyyah is subject to limitations. A wa. yiyyah that exceeds the prescribed limits would 
constitute an ultra vires wa. Fiyyah, which means the consent or refusal of the entitled 
heirs is decisive. 7' 
There is no single Qur'anic verse prohibiting a Muslim from making a bequest in favour 
of legal heirs. This limitation is therefore based on a number of sound Prophetic 
traditions that state that making a bequest in favour of legal heirs is not permitted. 72 The 
Qur'anic verse al-Baqarah (2): 180, which is known as the verse of bequest, however, 
states that making a bequest in favour of parents and next of kin is an obligation. 
69 Ibrahim, Badruddin Hj., The Doctrine of al-'T. ßä' or al-Wi. Fdyah with Reference to theAappointment of 
Wä. i al-Mukhtdr under Islamic law, unpublished Ph. D proposal, n. d., p. 1. 
70 Al-Zutiayli, vol. 8, p. 131 & 137. It is defined as an instruction given to a person to carry out certain 
things after his death. See also al-Syarbini, vol. 3, p. 39. 
71 Coulson, p. 242- 243. 
72 There are a number of Prophetic traditions but with different versions that do not allow making bequests 
in favour of legal heirs. The difference is only in the matter of the words of the narrations. They carry the 
same meaning, i. e. a bequest is not allowed to be made in favour of legal heirs. See Tanzil-ur-Rahman, 
vol. 2, pp. 457-461. Example is the hadiith `No wasryyah in favour of wdrith'. 
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However, according to the Muslim jurists of the Sunni schools of law, the ruling 
contained in this Qur'anic verse was abrogated by the subsequent revelation of verses of 
inheritance. 73 
With careful observation, it becomes apparent that there are no conflicting messages 
between the Qur'anic verse of bequest and the Prophetic traditions which prohibit making 
bequests in favour of legal heirs, including the parents. With respect to these Prophetic 
traditions, the Hanafis' opinion is that if the deceased makes a bequest in favour of the 
heir who is entitled to his property under inheritance, such a bequest, if not consented to 
by the other legal heirs, is invalid. This is on the basis that bequests made in favour of 
legal heirs need the approval of the other legal heirs. The deceased has no right to make a 
bequest in favour of a legal heir and if he/she does so the rights of the other legal heirs 
are encroached on. This is the reason for the need for the approval of the other legal heirs 
because their rights have been affected. The Hanafis base their argument on the hadith 
that narrates that if other legal heirs consent, the bequest is effective. 
74 The other three 
schools of law hold the opinion that the bequest is void; if the other legal heirs agree, the 
legatee is entitled to the property bequeathed but on the ground that it is a gift or hibah 
from them. This opinion is based on the hadith that Allah has specified the details of the 
rights of every legal heir, and hence they have no further right under a bequest. 
73 Al-Zui}ayli, vol. 8, pp. 11-12. 
74Ibn `Abidºn, vol. 6, p. 656. The Iianafis accept another version of the Iadith, which carries the addition of 
the words "except when the heirs permit the same. " See al-$an`äni, Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Amir al- 
Yamani, Subul al-Saläm Syarh Bulügh al-Mardm min Jam`i Adillah al-Ahkäm, Beirut: Där aKutub, p. 204. 
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Based on the above arguments, it is clear that the meaning of `wärith' in that particular 
hadi-th and those ahäd17h which give the same effect, is the `wärith' who is entitled to the 
deceased's property under inheritance law. If the legal heir is either de jure or de facto 
excluded from inheritance or is disqualified due to the presence of any impediment to 
inheritance that affects his/her entitlement, any bequest made by the deceased in their 
favour is valid. According to al-Qaracjäwi, when the verses of inheritance were revealed, 
even though the entitled legal heirs' rights to bequests were abolished, the disentitled 
legal heirs' rights to bequests remained in existence. 75 Such heirs have no rights under 
inheritance and hence are entitled to the bequest. This is sanctioned by the hadith, from 
which we can identify the reason behind the prohibition of bequests being made in favour 
of legal heirs, i. e. those who are entitled to the deceased's property under inheritance law 
are not entitled to bequests. Since Allah has prescribed their rights to the deceased's 
wealth by way of succession, they have no right to the deceased's wealth by way of 
bequest. 76 
4.5.1.3. Limitation of Wagiyyah on the Quantum 
The whole version of the hadith is that Sa°ad bin Abi Wagä narrates that the Prophet 
came to visit me in the year of the farewell pilgrimage when I was afflicted with a severe 
illness. I said to him: "0 Prophet, you see how ill I am. I have property and no heir except 
my daughter. Shall I then give away two-thirds of my property as alms? " He replied 
"No. " I said "A half then? " He still said "No. " I then asked "A third? " He replied: "A 
third. And a third is much. It is better that you leave your heirs rich than you should leave 
75 Al-Qaradawl, Fatwa Terkini Wanita dan Keluarga, translated by H. Mohd. Roihan M. A, p. 172. 
76 Abu Imamah narrated: "I heard the Prophet says: Allah has already given to each entitled relative his 
proper entitlement. Therefore, no bequest in favour of a legal heir. " Al-$an`äni, p. 204. 
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them destitute, begging from their neighbours. "77 Besides this version, there are different 
versions reported in other books of hadith, which carry the same effect: that the quantum 
of bequest is limited to 1/3 of the whole estate of the deceased. 78 
In this regard, there are two circumstances that need to be considered, namely the 
situation where the deceased leaves behind heirs and that where there is no heir. In the 
former case, the four Sunni schools of law hold the same opinion that a bequest 
exceeding the limit of 1/3 is valid provided the consent of all the entitled legal heirs is 
obtained. This is due to the fact that the right to the whole property, on the death of the 
deceased, passes immediately to the legal heirs and hence, they have absolute freedom to 
do as they will with such a right. If such a bequest is approved it becomes effective. If it 
is not, it is still valid but only up to the portion of 1/3, because the exceeding part is 
regarded as an encroachment on the rights of the legal heirs. 
In the second situation, the Hanafis, the Syäfiis and the Hanbalis are of the opinion that a 
bequest exceeding 1/3 of the whole estate is valid. The idea of limiting the bequest to 1/3 
is to protect the interests of the legal heirs and hence, since no legal heir exists, the issue 
of encroachment does not arise. In this connection, the majority goes further, saying that 
there is no need to get the consent of the ruler of the state, in his position as the heir of 
those who leave behind no heir, because unlike the Mälikis, they are of the view that the 
bayt al-mä1, or State Treasury, is entitled to the deceased's property not in the capacity of 
77 Khan, translation of, Sahih al-Bukhdri, p. 16. Sec also Coulson, N. J. p. 214. 
78 For example in another itadith narrated by Mu`ädh bin Jabal that Allah had conferred upon a Muslim an 
alms of 1/3 of his property in the time of death approaching as an addition for his good deeds. See al- 
$an`änT, p. 108. 
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a legal heir but by way of escheat. The Mälikis, on the other hand, hold the view that in 
such cases, the deceased has no right to make a bequest of more than 1/3 of his wealth 
because the bayt al-mä1 is regarded as the residuary heir and neither the ruler nor his 
representative has the right to give consent. But if the administration of the bayt al-mä1 is 
not as outlined by Islamic law and involves such things as corruption and the unfair 
distribution of property, the deceased is allowed to bequeath all his property in a manner 
to please Allah. 79 
4.5.2. The Execution of a Wafiyyah or Bequest under Malaysian Laws 
4.5.2.1. The One-third Rule and the Beneficiary Must be a Non-legal Heir 
A Muslim is allowed to make a will to dispose of up to one-third of his/her property. If 
the will is for more than one-third, the consent of all the legal heirs must be obtained in 
order for it to be effective. This principle was adopted in Shaik Abdul Latif, Halima and 
Janiah v Shaik Elias Bux. 80 In this case, the deceased, Shaik Baboo Bux, had disposed of 
all of his properties, movable and immovable. He directed that his estate, subject to 
certain trusts, should be distributed equally between his adopted son, Shaik Abdul Latif, 
his two widows, Halimah and Jainab, and his daughter, Fatimah, an infant. In addition to 
the above-mentioned persons the deceased left other surviving relatives, viz., a sister 
named Jaigun and two brothers named Shaik Elias Bux and Shaik Ali Bux. Under the 
Mohammedan Law, the testator's two brothers, together with Jaigun, the deceased's 
79 Barräj, p. 133. 
ß° (1915) 1 FMSLR 205. See also Re M. Mohamed Hanifa, (the deceased) (1940) 9 MLJ 229. In this case 
the Court held that the maximum portion for a bequest is one-third of the property. In Abdul Rahim v Abdul 
Hameed & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 78, the Court declared invalid the disposition of property by way of a will 
by the deceased for the reason that it exceeded one-third of the estate and hence it was against the Islamic 
law. 
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sister are among the deceased's heirs and are entitled to the deceased's estate. Under the 
will however, they were to receive nothing and neither would the deceased's daughter 
receive the share due to her according to Mohammedan Law. Before the trial judge, the 
plaintiff, Shaik Elias Bux prayed for a judgment declaring the will inoperative in so far as 
it attempted to deprive the testator's daughter, the plaintiff himself as a deceased brother, 
the second brother and the sister of the shares they were entitled to as heirs under 
Mohammedan Law. There was no contention from the defendant that there had been any 
consent to the will from them. The trial judge held that the will was inoperative with 
respect to such part of the property bequeathed to the testator's adopted son as it 
exceeded the one-third of the estate permissible to leave to a stranger, and also 
inoperative in so far as it deprived the testator's two brothers and sister of their legal 
shares as heirs. On appeal, the Court unanimously upheld the decision of the trial judge. 
The Court held that under Mohammedan Law a testator has the power to dispose of not 
more than one-third of the property belonging to him at the time of death; and that the 
residue of such property must descend in fixed proportions to those declared by 
Mohammedan Law to be his heirs unless the heirs consent to a deviation from this rule. 
A will is not supposed to be made in favour of the heirs who are entitled under the 
Islamic law of succession. If it is made in favour of any of them it is subject to the 
approval of other heirs, whose shares are affected by the will. The affected legal heirs 
whose consent is required in order to make the will operative must declare their consent. 
Mere silence does not amount to consent. According to the Court, once the other legal 
heirs' approval is obtained, the will is operative and the consent is regarded as their 
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donations in favour of the legatee. In Amanullah Bin Haji Ali Hassan v. Hajjah Jamilah 
Binti Shek Madar'8' the will executed by the deceased was for more than one-third of the 
property and furthermore, was in favour of the heirs. The Court held that the will was 
void on the basis that it purported to dispose of more than a third of the estate and to 
benefit the testator's heirs. The counsel for the plaintiff argued that the silence of the 
relatives after the will had been read should be taken as consent by the beneficiaries to 
the disposition by the will. Rejecting the argument, Syed Othman J. stated: 
"To my mind, in Muslim law, before the court can accept that an heir 
consents to a will where required, it must be shown that the will was validly 
made and that the heir declares his approval to the disposition; and if the will 
is invalid the question of consent does not arise. The effect of a declaration of 
approval to a disposition under a properly made will, according to a jurist, is 
that the heir donates his share to the person taking under the disposition. See 
page 261 Minhaj al-Talibin. In the case here I can see no evidence that any 
beneficiary present declared his approval to the plaintiff taking the whole of 
the estate. Considering the circumstances in which the document was made, I 
am convinced that the plaintiff was taking advantage of the situation by 
exerting his status as the eldest son in the family and that he knew no one 
would dare to challenge him by reason of his status, and particularly at that 
time when the others were concerned with the deceased who was on the 
throes of death, all he seemed to care was to get the deceased's estate to 
himself by any means. " 
4.5.3. Comparison of the Treatment of the Execution of Waýiyyah 
With respect to the consent of the affected legal heirs to the bequest made in favour of 
other heirs, or made in excess of the quantum of one-third, it is the opinion of the 
majority of Muslim scholars that the approval must be obtained after the death of the 
testator. Approval obtained prior to the deceased's death has no effect. The reason for this 
is that the will itself becomes effective only after the death and prior to that, the legal 
81 [1975]1 MLJ 30. See also Siti bte. Yatim vMohamad Nor bin Bujai (1928) 6 FMSLR 135 or [1983] JH 
217, and Haji Hussain v Liah be Lerong & Ors (1940) MLJ 98. In these two cases, the Muslim testators had 
bequeathed their properties in favour of their children without obtaining the consent of the other affected 
legal heirs. The Court gave judgment invalidating the wills. 
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heirs have no right to the property. Only the Mälikis make a distinction between the 
approval made during the testator's health and that made during his/her death sickness. 
During his/her health, the heirs have no right at all to the estate but during the death 
sickness, the testator is not absolutely free to make any transaction regarding his/her 
property. He/she is allowed to make a will within the limit of one-third and the remaining 
two-thirds is left in abeyance for the legal heirs. In this connection, it is not extravagant to 
say that the contention by the defence counsel that the heirs consented to the bequest 
while it was being read to them has no legal effect. This is the opinion of the majority of 
Muslim jurists, including the Syäfiis. 
Moreover, the Court's refusal to accept the defence counsel's argument, that silence 
amounts to consent, is sound on the basis that if the heirs' consented to the bequest, 
according to the Court, it would amount to their donating their shares to the beneficiaries. 
However, in Islamic law a donation requires the donor to declare definitely the intention 
to donate; such a declaration can be either by word or conduct but not by mere silence. 82 
It is therefore submitted that the Court's decision to refuse to accept the argument that 
silence is tantamount to consent in the above case relating to the approval of the affected 
heirs is compliant with the principles of Islamic law. 
4.5.3.1. A Nomination: Is It Typical of Waciyyah? 
Nomination is a process by which an individual gives direction to the person holding the 
relevant funds on his/her behalf to pay the funds to a named person on his/her death. 
83 
82 Al-Zu1ayli, vol. 5, p. 8. Doi, Abd Rahman I., Shariah: The Islamic Law, p. 334. 
83 Caroline Sawyer, Principles of Succession, Wills & Probate, p. 13. 
139 
Likewise with a wasiyjiah, nomination takes effect upon the death of the nominator. In 
Malaysia, the National Fatwä Council issued a fatwä on 9t' October 1973 that a nominee 
who is appointed by way of nomination holds such position as no more than a trustee. 
The complete fatwä reads: 
"Nominees of the funds in the Employees Provident Fund, Post Office 
Savings Bank, Insurance and Co-operative Societies are in the position of 
persons who carry out the will of the deceased or the testator. They can 
receive the money of the deceased from the sources stated to be divided 
among the persons entitled to them under the Islamic law of inheritance. s84 
In this respect, as stated in the abovefatwa, nomination is applicable to funds such as the 
Employee Provident Fund, Post Office Savings Bank, Insurance and Co-operative 
Societies. Looking into the nature of these funds, they can be classified into two groups, 
namely 1) savings accounts in the financial institutions and 2) the proceeds of life 
insurance policies. According to Pawancheek Merican, a practicing lawyer, the former is 
a statutory nomination whereas the latter is a nomination that has the effect of creating a 
trust in favour of the nominee. 85 The second type will not be discussed here because a 
comprehensive discussion on the question of the heritability of the proceeds of a life 
insurance policy, which certainly includes the nominee, is undertaken in Chapter 7. 
With respect to funds kept in financial institutions like the Employers Provident Fund and 
Pilgrimage Fund, there are two court cases that can be referred to. In re Ismail Rentah, 86 
the deceased was a member of a co-operative society and had nominated his daughter as 
84 See [1974] 1 MLJ x. 85 Pawancheek Merican, Islamic Inheritance Law, p. 146. 
86 [1940] MU 77. 
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nominee to receive his shares and benefits in the society upon his death. Raja Musa J. 
held that such a nomination would not constitute a hibah because there was no transfer of 
ownership to the nominee. The Court held that the nominee could receive the property as 
a trustee, in which case she would be under a responsibility to distribute it to the legal 
heirs under the farä'icd law. 
In this case, it appears from the judgment that the nomination by the deceased amounted 
to a trust document equivalent to the appointment of an executor. However, the judge 
came to his decision after considering the wording of the letter of nomination from which 
he concluded that it was apparently a bequest. It was held that since the nominee was an 
entitled legal heir and the other entitled legal heirs had not consented to the bequest, the 
bequest was invalid. The Court also considered the case from the point of view of there 
being a hibah, but due to there being no transfer of ownership to the donee, the hibah 
failed. 87 The letter reads: 
"Whereas I, Ismail bin Rentah, living at Terusan.... do nominate/ appoint in 
the presence of two witnesses Maznah binti Ismail living at Terusan and who 
is related to me by way of being my child as being the person who may 
receive all my money in the said society if I die in accordance with the 
provisions of section 22 of the Co-operative Society Enactment 1922. " 
A similar principle was adopted in Wan Puziah v. Wan Abdullah bin Muda & Another. 
88 
The plaintiff in this case was the adopted daughter of the deceased. She claimed her share 
in the deceased's savings in the Pilgrimage Fund. During her lifetime, the deceased had 
declared on the nomination form that upon her death, half of all her savings in the 
Pilgrimage Fund would be for the benefit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that the 
87 [1939] F. M. S. L. R p. 234. 88 [2001] JH June 235. 
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nomination constituted a valid bequest. Her contention was, however, challenged by the 
defendants, who were nephews and heirs of the deceased. They contended that the 
nomination did not amount to a bequest and applied for the moneys to be distributed 
according to farä yid law. Ismail Yahya H held that the nomination by the deceased 
depositor for her savings account with the Pilgrimage Fund in favour of the plaintiff was 
a bequest. In his judgment, the judge initially referred to the fatwä issued in 1973 by the 
National Fatwä Council, but due to the absence of any stipulation regarding the 
nomination under the Pilgrimage Fund's regulations i. e. lacuna, the judge viewed that he 
was free to refer to the sources of Islamic law and accordingly applied his own reasoning. 
Arguably, the concept of nomination is originally typical of wa$iyyah. It is clear that by 
looking at the clauses of the nominations as appeared in the above cases, there are 
similarities between nomination and wa$iyyah. Therefore, in order to fulfil the purpose 
of nomination, which is to smooth the process of withdrawing money after the death of 
the member, the institution that regulates the nomination must come up with a clear 
provision which clarifies the purpose and duties of the nominee. An example is the new 
nomination clause drafted by the Pilgrimage Fund, the Takaful Nasional Berhad and the 
Employee Provident Fund, which clearly states that the duty of the nominee is to 
distribute the money in accordance with Islamic law. 
4.6. The Distribution of Estates 
After the settlement of the funeral expenses, followed by the paying of all debts incurred 
by the deceased and then the execution of any bequests, which constitute the deceased's 
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right, the remaining estate must be distributed among the legal heirs in accordance with 
the Islamic law of succession, a full discussion of which can be found in Chapter 2 where 
there is also a discussion of the Malaysian laws. 
4.7. The Transfer of Ownership to the Legal Heirs and the Locus Standi 
With regard to the question of when the right of the legal heirs to the estate arises, the 
plaintiffs, consisting of the deceased's widow and son, in Saeda binti Abu Bakr & Malik 
Bin Haji Mohamed Yusuf v Hj Abdul Rahman bin Haji Mohamad Yusuf & Osman Bin 
Haji Mohamed Yusuf applied to the Court for a declaration that the will made by the 
deceased was invalid. 89 The Court had to decide the issue pertaining to a bequest made by 
a Muslim testator instructing his personal representative to administer the estate for ten 
years after his death, and subsequently to distribute the estate to the legal heirs in 
accordance with the Mohammedan law. The Court held that any instruction in a bequest 
which is intended to postpone the vesting of the legal heirs' right in the estate is invalid 
and the legal heirs are entitled to have the estate distributed immediately without any 
unnecessary delay. 
This principle was followed in Abdul Rahim v Abdul Hamid & Anor90. In this case, the 
Court had to decide such an issue in relation to a bequest made by a Muslim testator. 
Clause 7 of his will read "I declare and direct that twenty-one (21) years after the death of 
the last survivor of my children my trustee are to wind up my said business and to sell 
call in and convert into cash every other property real and personal estate of whatsoever 
89 (1918) 1 FMSLR 352; [1983] JH 53. 
90 [1983] 2 MLJ 78. 
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nature and where so ever situate and to divide the proceeds of such sale calling in and 
conversion into nine (9) shares... " The Court viewed that this clause constituted an 
attempt by the deceased to dispose of all his properties by his will, which rendered it 
invalid because it was against the principle of one-third disposal. Furthermore, the Court 
held that the intention of the deceased, as stated in the will, to postpone the vesting of the 
legal heirs' rights in the estate until and after the lapse of twenty-one years was against 
Islamic law. It was the Court's view that a testator cannot delay the vesting of such rights 
in an estate. 
The above decisions illustrate the Court's views on when the heirs' right to the ownership 
of the estate arises. In this regard, it is the opinion of the majority of Muslim scholars, 
consisting of the Mälikis, Syäfiis and the Hanbalis, that the ownership in the estate, after 
the death of the deceased, is immediately transferred to the legal heirs without taking into 
account the debts and liabilities incurred by the deceased. According to them, debts and 
liabilities, which are attached to the estate do not prevent the right of ownership of the 
estate from being vested in the heirs. The debts and liabilities, however, remain with the 
estate and it is the responsibility of the legal heirs to discharge them before distributing 
the estate further. The Hanafis, however, maintain that the rights of the heirs to the 
ownership of the estate arise only after all debts and liabilities attached to the estate are 
fully discharged. 91 
The discussion on this issue is significant because it relates to the issue of whether or not 
the heirs have the locus standi to bring a case before the court in order to protect their 
91 Barräj, p. 146 and Tanzil al-Rahman, p. 433. 
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rights and interests in the estate against the conduct of personal representatives. It was 
held by the Shariah Appeal Court in the Juma'aton case that the heirs of the deceased had 
no locus standi in respect of the estate of the deceased on the basis that they had no letter 
of administration granted by the civil High Court under the Probate and Administration 
Act, 1959. However, looking into the facts of the case, it appears that the declaration 
sought by the applicant was not a claim of rights or interest in any specific property of the 
estate but for the inclusion in the estate of certain subject matter, which was the subject of 
administration, i. e. the shares in a company and the dividends and other incomes and 
benefits there-from. Those shares, dividends and interests were claimed by the applicants 
to have been held by the defendant in his own name but on behalf of their deceased 
father. However, the defendant denied this claim. A decision was reached by the Syariah 
Appeal Court referring to the decisions in several previously decided cases, 92 one of 
which was Puncak Klasik Sdn. Bhd v. Foh Chong & Sons Sdn. Bhd. 93 In this case, the 
plaintiff had purchased a piece of land from the trustee of the estate and a third defendant, 
who was in occupation of a portion of that land, claimed beneficial ownership in respect 
of the land. The Court held that the third defendant could not be said to be the beneficial 
owner as there was no instrument of transfer executed in his favour and that a beneficiary 
has no interest in property in any specific investment forming part of the estate, or in the 
income from any such investment, when the administration of the estate is incomplete 
92 Lee Ah Thaw v Lee Chun Tek (1978) 1 MLJ 173, Tan Heng Poh v Tan Boon Thong (1992) 3 CLJ 1340 
and Khoo Teng Seong v Khoo Teng Peng (1990) 2 CLJ 233. In those cases including the Puncak Klasik 
case relied upon by the Shariah Court of Appeal, Mohamad Imam observes that those cases are concerned 
with the rights or interests claimed were not only in the undetermined residue pending completion of the 
administration of the estate, but they were in the specific (specie) properties whose availability to satisfy 
the interests or rights depended on the chance completion of the administration and the ascertainment of the 
residue. See Imam, Mohamad, "Probate and Administration of A Muslim's Estate In Malaysia- Legislative 
Competence and Shariah Civil Court Jurisdiction", Jurnal Undang- Undang Malaysia, 2 (1998), p. 126. 
93 (1998) 1 CLJ 60. 
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and the residue unascertained, and, consequently, none of the beneficiaries of the estate 
had any interest in any specific property of the said estate. 
However, the High Court in Singapore took a different view regarding the locus standi of 
the deceased's heirs. This was discussed in Omar Ali bin Mohd & Ors v Syed Jafarsadeq 
bin Abdulkadir Alhadad & Ors. 94 In this case the plaintiffs sought, inter alia, declarations 
that the unexpired residue of the leasehold interest of 99 years in a property vested in the 
estate of the father of the plaintiffs (the intestate) and that the purported sale of the 
property by the first four defendants (who were the trustees of the estate of the holder of 
the reversion to the property) to the fifth defendant, in so far as it included the leasehold 
interest of the intestate's estate, was null and void. The defendants claimed that the 
plaintiffs had no legal authority whatsoever to institute the action on the basis that no one 
had the legal authority to act on behalf of the estate of the intestate until he/she had 
applied to the court for a grant of letters of administration. The learned assistant registrar 
held in favour of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The High Court held that the 
plaintiffs were not suing on behalf of the estate. They were suing in their own capacity as 
beneficiaries of the estate for a declaration to protect the property of the estate and to 
prevent the sale of the property to the fifth defendant from going through. This, according 
to the Court, they had the locus standi to do as they had at least an equity in the estate. 
In this connection, it is important to mention the significance of distinguishing the rights 
of the heirs and the rights and powers of the personal representatives. If we examine the 
94 [1995] 3 SLR 388. 
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purpose of appointing a personal representative and the doctrine of retrospect, 95 it can be 
suggested that a personal representative is the one who is responsible for administering 
the estate, including the discharge of debts and liabilities, as well as distributing the estate 
to the heirs. In the course of estate administration, the court supervises the personal 
representative and determines whether or not he/she is carrying out these duties 
diligently. It is the responsibility of the personal representative to discharge the debts and 
liabilities of the estate, and in the meantime the court is under a duty to protect the rights 
of the beneficiaries. 96 The rights and interests of the heirs in the estate are not 
extinguished with the appointment of a personal representative. These rights and interests 
remain dormant or are postponed until the administration is complete. In other words, the 
heirs' rights and interests in the estate remain substantive, and are therefore sufficient to 
render locus standi to the heirs in respect of the estate. 97 The legatee, beneficiary and 
heirs may have no interest or right in any specific property of the estate but they still have 
rights and interests in the overall, or the totality, of the estate. 98 
4.8. Conclusion. 
The four Sunni schools of law unanimously agree that after the death of the deceased, 
deductions should be made from the estate for the funeral rites and ceremonies. This is 
regarded as the deceased's right, which constitutes a religious necessity after death. The 
deceased needs clothes to cover his/her body as well as other necessary things. On this 
95 The doctrine of retrospect states that even though the property of the deceased is vested in the 
administrator only after the High Court issues the grant, he may still bring action against the wrongdoer to 
recover what has been taken into his/her possession illegally prior to the conferment of such grant. See 
Meyappa Chetly v Subramaniam (1916) AC 603. 
96 See Fazil Rahman & Ors v Nachiappa Cheltiar [ 1963] MLJ 309. 
97 See Imam, Mohamad, p. 127. 
98 Ibid, p. 127. 
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ground the funeral expenses are given preference over other rights. The settlement of 
debts becomes the second priority. This is regarded as the creditors' rights against the 
deceased's property. When compared with the funeral expenses, this right is less 
important on the basis that funeral expenses are a necessity of the deceased, which should 
be given priority. This follows the same principle as in the case of a bankrupt, where all 
his/her property, apart from what is necessary for his/her basic needs, is taken to pay the 
debts. After the settlement of the deceased's debts, if there is remaining property and if 
the deceased has made a bequest, it is the responsibility of the legal heir to execute it, 
although this depends on its validity and effectiveness. The deceased is allowed to make 
a bequest of up to one-third of the remaining property, if it exceeds that limit, the consent 
and approval of other legal heirs is needed on the grounds that it encroaches on their 
rights. After the execution of the bequest, the remaining two-thirds is distributed among 
the legal heirs. The chapter al-Nisä' verse 11 clearly sanctions the distribution of the 
deceased's estate only after the rights of the creditors to the deceased's property are 
settled and after the execution of the deceased's bequest. 
The Probate and Administration Act, 1959 and the Small Estate (Distribution) Act, 1955 
govern the administration of Muslim estates. The personal representative of the deceased, 
either the executor or the administrator, and the Collector at the Land Office are under a 
duty to administer and distribute the property to the parties who have rights and interests 
in the estate according to Islamic law. The Islamic law is the personal law of the Muslims 
in Malaysia and hence it is their right that, in personal matters such as succession, the 
decisions regarding any dispute are based on their personal law. This is very important to 
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them because it is their personal religious duty and, as regards the disposal of property, 
Muslims are subject to reward in the hereafter. 
149 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE HIBAHHARTA OF THE BUMIPUTRA-COMMERCE 
TRUSTEE BERHAD 
5.1. Introduction 
The Hibah Harta is an Islamic estate-planning instrument. It is also known as a Hibah 
Trust or Amanah Hibah. For the purpose of this research, the term used throughout the 
writing is the Hibah Harta. An exemplary sample of the Trust Deed Agreement of the 
Hibah Harta can be found in the appendix. The idea behind the introduction of this 
instrument is to assist Muslims in Malaysia, in terms of estate planning, by offering them 
an alternative way to distribute their wealth upon death. Unlike the distribution under 
farä'icl and wa. Fiyyah, which serves the purpose but carries strict restrictions, this 
alternative enables Muslims to freely choose the recipients as well as to fix the quantum 
of wealth, which they wish to dispose of. 
The Hibah Harta was launched by Mr. Azmi Abdullah, the executive director of the 
Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Berhad (BCB), Malaysia on 14`h of February 2001, ' and is 
currently run by the Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee Berhad (BCT), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the BCB. 2 Its operation and modus operandi have been allegedly approved 
by the Fatwä Council of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, through a fatwa 
Utusan Online, BCB Lancar Produk Amanah Berkembar, [online], 15th February 2001, available from 
http: //www. utusanonline. com [accessed on 4th April 2005]. 2 Ibid. 
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legalizing it from the Islamic point of view. 3 This product is undoubtedly the result of the 
research conducted relentlessly by Tuan Haji Othman bin Yaacob during his service at 
the BCT. 4 He is currently a consultant at the Darul Hibah Consultant Sdn. Bhd, Kuala 
Lumpur, a firm that he set up after retiring from the BCT. S 
It is indisputable that the introduction of this instrument is an excellent idea. It offers 
Muslims, particularly those in Malaysia an alternative way to dispose of their property 
upon death. Arguably, there should be similar efforts on the part of Muslim scholars to 
conduct research into other matters of Islamic law and develop instruments and modes 
that are practicable and suitable for the changes and needs of Muslims in this modern 
world. Since its emergence, the Hibah Harta has received encouraging recognition from 
the public. Many Muslims have used it to dispose of wealth ranging from cash, land, 
shares, stocks, life insurance and takiful policies etc. amounting to millions of Malaysian 
ringgits. 
However, there appears to be some dispute among Malaysian Muslim scholars regarding 
the Hibah Harta, particularly in terms of its Syari ah compliance. The Mufti's Office 
itself, which declared the validity of the instrument from the perspective of Islamic law, 
has subsequently issued an official letter to the BCT, reminding them not to manipulate 
3 Utusan Online, Skim Hibah Harta Dapat Sambutan, [online], 25th August 2002, available from 
http: //utusanonline. com [accessed 24th April 2005]. 
4 Aimi Zulhazmi Abdul Rashid, the Manager of Business Development, Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee 
Bhd., interview on 16d' October 2003 in his office located at D-0-6, Megan Phileo Promenade, 189 Jalan 
Tun Razak, 50400 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
5 Ibid. 
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thefatwa while promoting the product. 6 The present research has undertaken an in-depth 
study of the product and analyzed its compliance with Islamic law principles. To this end, 
the fatwa issued by the Fatwä Council of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur is 
scrutinized and the issue concerning the question of its heritability from the Islamic 
perspective is examined in depth. It is worth noting that this topic is related to the 
discussion of the concept of tarikah because, according to Dato' Ismail Bin Yahya, a 
Syari ah Judge at the Syariah High Court of Terengganu, among the rights and liabilities 
that must be settled prior to the distribution of estates among the legal heirs, is the 
property which is disposed of by way of hibah. 7 
5.2. The Concept of the Hibah Harta 
The unpublished article 8 by Tuan Haji Othman Bin Yaacob, a Hibah consultant at Darul 
Hibah Consultant Sdn Bhd. and the information obtained during an interview with Mr. 
Aimi Zulhazmi Abdul Rashid, the Manager of Business Development, Bumiputra- 
Commerce Trustee Berhad, form the basis for the discussion on the concept of the BCT's 
Hibah Harta. 
6 Dato' Hashim Yahya, interview. He is the former Mufti of the Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, and 
the fatwä was issued during his tenure as Mufti. 
7 Yahya, Ismail, Perlaksanaan Wasiat di Mahkamah: Teori dan Praktis, seminar of Pemakaian Undang- 
Undang Hibah di Malaysia, held on 27th September 2003, at the Moot Court, Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of 
Laws (AIKOL), International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), jointly organized by Klinik Bantuan 
Guaman Syarie, AIKOL, IIUM and Yayasan Asnita with the cooperation of Kementerian Pembangunan 
Wanita dan Keluarga, Malaysia, pp. 3-4. 
8 This paper was presented to the Fatwd Council of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia by the 
author asking it to endorse the instrument regarding its Syarr`ah compliance. This was to enable the Darul 
Hibah Consultant Sdn. Bhd. to promote it throughout the country. According to Ustazah Siti Nor Badar, in 
an interview on 17`h August 2003 in her office, the Council had refused to issue such a verdict fearing that 
it would be misused for commercial purposes. See also Yaacob, Othman, Pengurusan Trust Hibah 
Menggunakan Fungsi Dan Tanggungjawab Pemegang Amanah Untuk Menjamin Kepentingan Pihak-Pihak 
Serta Pelaksanaan Syarat Hibah, unpublished paper, p. 4. 
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The Hibah Harta is defined as an Islamic instrument designed to assist Muslims to better 
manage their assets and distribute them among beneficiaries in the proportion he 
determines with minimum effort. 9 In other words, it is a mode of creating a gift in favour 
of heirs, relatives or next of kin. The gift is a gift without consideration. This new 
concept of hibah adopts the medium of trust, which is created through a trust deed. 
10 
5.2.1. The Offer and Acceptance and the Appointment of the Trustee 
In Islamic law, there are five pillars of hibah that must be fully met in order to make the 
hibah contract valid, namely the donor, the donee, the offer, the acceptance and the asset. 
These basic requirements are completely satisfied by the parties to the contract at the 
primary stage. The offer and acceptance, or FTghah, include the pronouncement of 
transference of ownership to the donee by the donor and the taking possession of the 
ownership by the donee. 
After the completion of the . ighah pronouncement, both then mutually agree upon the 
appointment of the BCT as the trustee. " At this stage, the two parties have to come to an 
agreement on the stipulation of some conditions, which are purposely designated for their 
benefit and protection. 12 In other words, there are two stages that must be met by the 
donor and the donee. The first stage is the completion of the offer and acceptance and the 
9 Brochure on Hibah Harta, Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee. 
10 Ibid. 
Aimi Zulhazmi, interview. 
12 Ibid. 
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taking possession between them, and at the second stage they jointly appoint the BCT as 
the trustee to the subject matter of the contract. 13 
At the second stage, while appointing the BCT as the trustee, the donor and the donee are 
required to agree to the insertion of the conditions of `umrä and rugbä. 14 The stipulation 
of such conditions is merely for the sake of protecting their mutual interest and benefit in 
the property. The agreement on the appointment of the trustee and the conditions are 
documented in the Trust Deed, which is signed by the donor, the trustee and the donee. 15 
In general, the `umra and rugbä conditions denote that after the demise of the donor, the 
property under the Hibah Trust is transferred to the beneficiary, namely the donee. If the 
donee dies prior to the donor, the property returns to the donor. 16 However, in certain 
cases the appointment of the BCT as trustee solely by the donee is made prior to this 
stage for the purpose of representing the donee in making the acceptance of the donor's 
offer and also to accept the delivery of possession of the gifted property. '7 
It is clear that the Hibah Harta instrument involves three parties, namely the donor, the 
donee and the trustee. The presence of the `umrä and rugbä conditions is relatively 
significant. According to Othman Yaacob, the appointment of the trustee is primarily for 
the purpose of carrying out the conditions of `umrä and rugbä or to revoke the contract. 18 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See the sample of a Trust Deed, which was given by Aimi Zulhazmi during the interview. 
16 The Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee brochure on Hibah Harta. 17 Othman, p. 8. 
18 Ibid, p. 5. 
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Hence, the `umrä and rugbä conditions are part and parcel of the contract without which 
the need and purpose of having the product are defeated. 
5.2.2. The Delivery of the Subject Matter 
The handing over of the property by the donor to the donee takes place directly and 
during the lifetime of the donor. 19 This handing over occurs immediately after the 
completion of the offer and acceptance. However, the donee is allowed to appoint the 
trustee (the BCT) to receive the hibah property on his/her behalf. 20 It is worth mentioning 
that the handing over of the property by the donor to the donee may take place either 
actually or constructively. 21 An actual acceptance occurs when the donee him/herself 
accepts the property. A constructive acceptance occurs by way of appointing a trustee to 
receive the property and the property is then registered under the trustee's name. 
22 The 
donee is required to take ownership of the property, on the same occasion and with the 
permission of the donor. If the donee does not do this, the hibah is not complete and is 
revocable by the donor. The basis of such revocation is that the donee has refused to 
accept the gift. 23 However, if the donee takes possession him/herself the property is still 
required to be registered under the trustee's name. 
The handing over of the property or the transfer and registration of ownership to and 
under the donee's name normally takes place only after the donor dies. However, it may 
19 Ibid. 4. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, p. S. 
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occur while he is still alive if his/her permission has been obtained. This clearly shows 
that the donee has no absolute legal right to deal with the property. This restriction fulfils 
the purpose of having such a contract, which is to prevent the donee from carrying out 
any malicious act on the property. 
5.2.3. The Basic Conditions of the Contract 
It is a condition that for the contract to be valid, the donor must be sui juris and not a 
bankrupt or unable. 24 Also, the donee must be alive at the time of the contract. In 
addition, at least two qualified males or one qualified male and two qualified females 
must witness the offer and acceptance by the donor and the donee, and the offer and 
acceptance pronouncement must be documented in the Trust Deed. 25 As regards the 
property intended for hibah, there is a condition that it must be within the donor's 
absolute ownership and halal, saleable or transferable immovable property such as 
houses and land and movable property such as cash in the Employee Provident Fund, a 
bank or the Pilgrimage Fund, furniture, trust shares and stock shares from Islamic 
counters, insurance tak4ful, conventional insurance and the like. 26 
5.2.4. The Distinctive Features of the Hibah Harta Instrument 
This contract is irrevocable unless it is a gift from parents or grandparents to children or 
grandchildren. 27 The contract is revocable only with the consent of the donee or with a 
24 Ibid, p. 4. 
25 See the sample of a Trust Deed, p. 1. 
26 Othman, p. 4. 
27 Utusan Online, Hibah Harta: A Muslim's Way to Prove One's Eternal Love, [online] 23d April 2001, 
available from http: //www. titusanonline [accessed 20th April 2005]. 
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court order. The donee has no absolute right to deal with the property because it is 
registered under the trustee's name. By registering the title of the property under the 
trustee's name, the interest of the donor is protected in the sense that the donee is 
prevented from selling, mortgaging or undertaking any other mode of dealing with the 
property that may defeat the intention of the donor in making such a gift. 28 Only after the 
demise of the donor or with his permission, is the ownership of the property permissibly 
transferred to the donee. 29 By stipulating the conditions of `umrä and rugbä in the trust 
deed, there is the legal possibility that the gift may be returned to the donor and never 
inherited by the donee's legal heirs under the farä'ici law. 
The donor is lawfully permitted to appoint the recipients as well as to fix the amount to 
be disposed to them. As this instrument is based on a hibah contract, it is permissible for 
the donor to have his wealth distributed equally among his heirs regardless of their 
positions such as son, daughter, father and siblings. The distribution of property under the 
inheritance law gives the deceased no choice other than to distribute the estate in 
accordance with the farä'ici law. This results in female heirs, especially daughters, 
receiving less than the males. Adopted children and non-Muslims, who are absolutely not 
entitled under the inheritance law, can be included as recipients under the Hibah Harta. 
According to Othman, although the transfer of ownership is done during the donor's 
lifetime, the donor can still enjoy the proceeds from his assets. 30 This is based on the 
28 Othman, P. S. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Utusan Online, Hibah Harta: A Muslim's Way to Prove One's Eternal Love. 
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principle that a conditional hibah is valid as long as it does not transform or diminish the 
original condition or monetary value of the gifted property. 31 
5.3. The Hibah and the Ownership Arising from a Hibah Contract from the 
Perspective of Islamic Law 
The hibah is a mode of property disposal according to Islamic law. Unlike farä'ici and 
wa$iyyah, which become effective immediately upon the death of the deceased or the 
testator, a hibah is operative during the lifetime of the donor. 32 The Arabic term of hibah 
literally means `atiyyah or gift. 33 It is technically defined as a contract voluntarily made 
during the lifetime of the donor vesting the ownership of the corpus of property to a 
person without consideration. 34 It is different with hadiyyah and ýFadagah. Hadiyyah, or 
present, is a gift based on respect or love, and . adagah, or donation, is a gift to a person 
who is in need of the gift with the intention of gaining reward from Allah. 35 It is therefore 
understood that hibah, or gift inter vivos, in Islamic law, is a contract whereby the donor 
voluntarily agrees to transfer the absolute ownership of the gifted property in favour of 
the donee. Furthermore, such a transaction requires no return or exchange. Hadiyyah and 
. Fadägah are components of hibah, though they are more specific in the sense that they 
require precise intention and reason from the donor. 
31 See Question-Answer paper annexed to the article on hibah by Othman, p. 4. The example given in the 
paper is "A, (the donor) owns RM100,000 in trust shares and gives, by way of hibah, the whole 100,000 
shares to B with the condition that the dividends, bonuses and right issue are to be payable to A every 
2 
This hibah is valid because the capital RM100,000 is not affected. 
2 Caroll, Lucy, "Definition and Interpretation of Muslim Law in South Asia: The Case of Gifts to Minors", 
U. S., 1: 1 (1994), p. 8. 
" AI-Mawrid, p. 1201 and al-Munj id, p. 920. 
34 Al-Syarbini, vol. 2, p. 396. 35 Ibid, p. 397. See also al-Zubaylº, vol. 5, p. 5. 
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Making a hibah contract is recommended based on the Qur'anic verse (2: 215), which 
encourages Muslims to offer gifts among themselves. 36 There are also hadiths that read: 
"exchange gifts among yourselves so that love may increase among yous37 and "if any 
one seeks to take back a gift he is like a dog who returns to its vomit. s38 The 
recommendation of making a hibah contract is unanimously agreed on by Muslim 
scholars as it is an act of helping each other in the course of righteousness and piety as 
inspired by the Qur'anic verse (5: 2). 39 
Making a gift by way of hibah is an agreement, and hence the general principle 
applicable to the contract is that it needs the pronouncement of an offer and acceptance 
from the donor and the donee respectively. 40 This is to ensure that the contract is based 
on the mutual consent of both parties. 41 The donor must be the legal owner of the gifted 
property, in good health, sound mind and possess legal capacity and the legal power of 
disposal. The donee must possess legal capacity to accept the offer otherwise the 
acceptance is not valid. However, a guardian can undertake the acceptance and taking 
possession in the case of minors, those of unsound mind or those who have no legal 
capacity. 42 
36 The Qur'anic verse al-Baqarah (2: 215) reads: "They ask thee what they should spend (in charity). Say: 
"Whatever ye spend that is good, is for parents and kindred and those in want and for wayfarers, and 
whatever you do that is good- Allah knoweth it well. " 
37 Al-$an`än3, vol. 3, p. 92 and al-SyawkänY, vol. 5, p 347. 
38 Al-$an`än3, vol. 3, p. 93. 
39 See al-Zuhayli, vol. 5, p. 7. The relevant Qur'Anic verse al-Ma'idah (5: 2) reads: "Help ye one another in 
righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour. " 
40 Ibn Rusyd, vol. 2, p. 329 and al-Syarbini, p. 397. 
41 In case of a dumb person, a sign is acceptable if it is understood and indicates the intention. See a]- 
Syarbin3, p. 397. 
42 See al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, pp. 143- 145. This is a general principle applicable to the contracting parties of all 
types of contract. 
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The Syariah High Court of Terengganu followed the above principles in the case of 
Harun bin Muda and others v. Mandak binti Mamat and others. 3 In this case, the Court 
scrutinized in depth all the essentials of a hibah contract, i. e. the donor, the donee, the 
offer and acceptance and the subject matter, from the Syäfi'is' point of view by referring 
to several Syafiis' books. It was found that there was no retraction or revocation of the 
hibah by the father. On that basis, the Court held that the hibah made by the father to his 
sons and daughter was valid. 
5.3.1. Taking Possession of the Gifted Property 
Taking possession of the property by the donee is necessary in order to prove the transfer 
of ownership. Muslim scholars differ on the issue of whether the ownership is transferred 
with the mere acceptance of the offer or when possession is taken of the property. The 
Hanafis and the Syäfiis hold the view that taking possession by the donee is a condition 
to make the contract luzüm, or binding. This is based on the practice of the Righteous 
Caliph Abü Bakr. In the Muwafta' of Imam Malik, there is a report from'A'isyah, which 
states that Caliph Abü Bakr made a gift in favour of cA'isyah of 20 wasaq (a weight) of 
dates. The dates had not been plucked from the trees by the time Abü Bakr was 
approaching death. Abü Bakr said to °A'isyah, "if you had taken possession of the dates 
they would have been yours. Now you shall distribute them in accordance with the law of 
inheritance among all the heirs. "44 It is also narrated that the Caliph `Umar said, "What is 
the matter with some men who make gifts to their sons and then hold on to them. When 
the son of one of them dies he says that my wealth is in my hands, I did not give it to 
43 [1999] 1 JH 63. 
44 Ibn `Abidin, vol. 4, p. 533 and al-Syarbini, vol. 2, p. 400. 
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anyone. If his (own) son is dead he would say I had given this to my son. He who makes 
a gift and then does not permit it to the donee, retaining it till such time that he dies so 
that it is given to the heirs, then, such a gift is void. "45 The non-binding effect of the 
contract means the ownership of the property remains with the donor and the contract is 
not binding on him/her. 
In relation to this, it is imperative that the taking possession of the property by the donee 
is with the permission of the donor. If possession is taken without such permission, the 
transfer of ownership is invalid and as a result, the ownership remains with the donor. 16 
However, to the Mälikis, possession is a condition for the completion of hibah. It is not a 
condition of its validity. This opinion is based on the analogy with a sale contract. 7 
Taking possession is the right of the donee. The mere acceptance by the donee renders 
the contract complete and the ownership is therefore transferred to the donee. Once the 
contract is concluded by the mere acceptance of the donee, he may be compelled to take 
possession 48 Furthermore, even though taking possession is the right of the donee, if he 
delays it until possession is lost through the illness or insolvency of the donor, his right is 
annulled. 49 In consequence of this, there is no need to obtain permission from the donor 
for the possession of the property because the transfer of ownership occurs with the mere 
acceptance of the donee. 
°S See Ibn Rusyd, Bidayah al-Mujtahid, translated into English by Nyazee, Professor Imran Ahsan Khan 
and reviewed by Rauf, Professor Mohanunad Abdul, Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2003, vol. 2, p. 400. 
46 Al-SyarbinT, p. 400. 
47 Ibn Rusyd, p. 399. In a contract of sale, when the contract is valid, the ownership is therefore transferred 
to the purchaser. The seller is under obligation to transfer the possession of the property to the purchaser. 
°B Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 400. 
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It is submitted that taking possession of the property is necessary for the transfer of 
ownership. It is not the purpose of hibah that the donor remains in control of the 
property. 50 Looking into the literal and technical definitions of hibah itself, the transfer of 
ownership appears to be the most significant factor of establishing the contract. Mere 
acceptance of the offer becomes futile if the donor remains the owner of the property. 
The analogy made by the Mälikis seems incorrect because the hibah contract is a contract 
of donation whereas a sale contract is a contract of exchange. In a sale contract, the seller 
is compelled to deliver the goods purchased in return for the consideration paid by the 
buyer, whereas in a hibah contract, the donor should not be compelled because he will 
not receive any consideration in return. 
Therefore, the opinion of the majority, which is based on strong arguments, is to be 
preferred. The ownership of the hibah property under a valid hibah contract is completely 
transferred to the donee only when the donee has taken possession of it. Prior to that, the 
contract remains incomplete. Without such delivery of possession, the donor remains the 
owner of the property. 
The Malaysian Supreme Court applied this principle in the case of Tengku Jaafar v. 
Government of Pahang. 51 In this case, the Court decided that for a hibah contract to be 
valid, three conditions must be fulfilled, namely 1) the donor's intention to make the 
hibah 2) the donee's acceptance and, 3) the taking possession of the gifted property 
50 Caroll, "Lucy, Life Interest and Inter-Generational Transfer of Property Avoiding the Law of 
Succession", I. L. S., 8: 2 (2001), p. 265. 
51 [1987] 2 MLJ 74. 
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physically or constructively. The Court rejected the appeal because the third condition 
had not been fulfilled. 
In the case of Salmiah binti Che Mat v. Zakaria bin Hashim, 52 the Syariah Subordinate 
Court of Bukit Mertajam Pulau Pinang viewed the significance of documenting the 
transfer of ownership of the property as proof of taking possession and obtaining the 
donor's permission by the donee, such as form 14A of section 215 of the National Land 
Code. Even though the donee had already built a house and carried out some renovation 
on the property, which would seem as if he had already accepted the offer, the Court held 
that he failed to meet the requirement of obtaining permission from the donor. On that 
basis, it was held that the hibah was invalid. 
However, in the case of Awang bin Abdul Rahman v. Shamsuddin bin Awang and 
another, 53 the Syariah High Court of Terengganu held that acceptance could also be in 
the form of the donee having physical control over the gifted property. When the donee 
has started benefiting from the property in ways such as building a house or planting 
trees, these acts are sufficient to constitute acceptance of the offer by him/her. The Court 
was also of the view that when a gifted property is subsequently mortgaged by the donor 
after the completion of a hibah contract, that would imply that there is no transfer of 
ownership and hence, the hibah is not validly constituted. 
52 [2000] 1 JH 79. 
53 [1997] 2 JH 193. 
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As far as the term possession is concerned, the view that physical control over the gifted 
property by the donee is sufficient to constitute the acceptance is to be preferred because 
the documentation of permission is a matter of administration only. It should suffice that 
the donee can provide sufficient evidence of the hibah and the permission given by the 
donor. 
It is therefore essential that the donor renounces completely his title and rights to the 
property. If the donor continues to exercise the rights of ownership in the property, the 
hibah will be considered null and void. 54 This was applied in the case Re Rosmawati 
binti Sharibun & Another55 regarding the position of the monies held jointly by the 
deceased and his third wife, Latifah, in accounts in the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) 
and the Bumiputra Commerce Bank (BCB) and whether they constituted part of the 
estate of the deceased or were absolutely given to her by the deceased as hibah. The 
evidence showed that the cheques had not been signed solely by Latifah, but included the 
signature of the deceased. In addition, the facts showed that prior to the insertion of 
Latifah's name as the joint account holder, the deceased had transferred the monies in the 
SCB that had been under his and his second wife, Buruk binti Abdullah's, name solely to 
his name and then replaced the name of Buruk with that of Latifah. In the light of this 
evidence, the Court held that the hibah was not complete, as the deceased as the donor 
did not perfect the transfer of ownership. 
54 Tanzil -ur-Rahman, p. 2. 55 [2002] 4 AMR 4913. 
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When the hibah contract has been validly executed and the donee has taken possession of 
the gift, the ownership is completely transferred to him/her. As a result, the donor has no 
right at all to ask for the return of the gift. Where either the donor or the donee dies prior 
to the taking possession, their heirs are entitled to the right to give permission for 
possession and the right to take possession. 56 
5.3.2. Retraction of Hibah 
When the donee has accepted the gift and has also taken possession of it, the donor has 
no right to ask for its return. This is a general principle agreed upon by the Malik-is, 
Syäfiis and Hanbalis. 57 This is based on the sound hadith: "The person, who takes back 
his gift, is like the one who swallows up what he vomits. i58 However, the Hanafis are of 
the opinion that the donor is entitled to ask for the return of a gift. This opinion is based 
on the With: "The donor is more deserved to the gifted property as long as he does not 
receive any in exchange of it. "59 
The majority opinion appears preferable because when the contract is complete and the 
donee has taken possession of the gift, the ownership is transferred to the donee 
completely. Moreover, this is supported by the hadith: "It is not lawful for the donor to 
retract his gift except a father who takes back the gift he makes to his son. "60 From this 
56 Al-Syarbini, p. 401. 
57 A1-Düsügi, vol. 4, p. 110, al-Syarbini, vol. 2, p. 401 and Ibn Qudämah, vol. 6, p. 279. 
58 Al-$an`äni, p. 90. 
59 Al-Zu1 ayli, vol. 5, p. 28. 
60 AI-$an`äni, p. 90. 
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hadith, the majority makes an exception to the general principle stating that a father is 
permitted to retract his hibah made to his son. 
The majority opinion was adopted in the case of Eshah binti Abdul Rahman v. Azuhar bin 
Ismail. 61 The Syariah High Court of Kuala Terengganu decided that retraction of hibah 
property is against Islamic law. The learned Hakim Syarie, Ismail Yahya pointed to the 
above hadith that clearly prohibits a Muslim from retracting his hibah except where it is a 
gift by a father to his son. 
5.4. The Trust and the Issue of Ownership 
5.4.1. The Trustee in the Instrument 
In the case of Yong Nyee Fan & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Kim Guan & Co Sdn Bhd, 62 according 
to Hashim Yeop Sani J, a trust is defined as: 
"the relationship which arises wherever a person called the trustee is 
compelled in equity to hold property, real or personal, and whether by 
legal or equitable title, for the benefit of some persons (of whom he 
may be one) or for some objects permitted by law, in such a way that 
the real benefit of the property accrues, not to the trustee, but to the 
beneficiaries or other objects of the trust. " 
Under Malaysian laws, trusts can be classified into statutory trusts, public trusts, private 
trusts, resulting trusts, constructive trusts, express trusts and implied trusts. 63 However, it 
is clear from the above definition that where there is a trust no issue of transfer of 
ownership arises. The complete transfer of ownership to the beneficiary depends upon the 
61 [1997] 2 JH 219. 
62 [1990] 3 MLJ 493. 
63 George, Mary. Malaysian Trust Law. Subang Jaya: Pclanduk Publications, 1999, pp. 38- 42. 
166 
intention of the settlor. For instance, under the resulting trust, the trust property results 
back to the settlor because of the presence of the incomplete transfer of the beneficial 
interest of the subject matter to the beneficiary. It is also understood that a trustee is 
under a responsibility to hold the property for the benefit of the beneficiary, and that the 
donee can appoint the trustee (the BCT) to accept the offer and to take possession of the 
gifted property on his/her behalf. 64 Furthermore, at the second stage, the donor and the 
donee are required to agree on the appointment of the BCT as the trustee to hold the 
property. 
In Islamic law this arrangement falls under the principle of agency, or wakälah. 65 There is 
no specific discussion on the issue of trust in Islamic law as it appears in Malaysian civil 
law. Under Islamic law, a trust can be made, but it is subject to the principles of wa, ciyyah 
and hibah, especially regarding the questions of when the transfer of ownership takes 
place and the quantum and beneficiaries of the trust property. 
From the perspective of Islamic law, the rightful party to the matter for which the agency 
is constituted is the only one that can appoint an agent. 66 He/she is responsible for 
keeping and dealing with the trusted property based on the concept of amänah. The 
command to carry out a trust is found in the Qur'anic verse al-Nisd'(4): 58.67 Here it is 
reported that the Arabs, during the jähiliyyah period, used to leave their properties in the 
hands of the Prophet Muhammad. Before he migrated to Medina, the Prophet gave all the 
64 Othman, p. 4. 
65 See al-Zubayli, vol. 4, p. 150. 
66 Ibid. 
67 The verse reads, "Allah doth command you to render back your trusts to those to whom they are due. " 
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trust properties to cAll Ibn Abi Tälib, who was asked by the Prophet to hand them over to 
the rightful owners. 68 
According to Othman, such a representative can be appointed by the donor himself to 
accept the offer. His conclusion is based on his understanding that according to the 
Hanaffs, only the offer of the donor constitutes the essential of a hibah contract, whereby 
the acceptance by the donee is merely to confirm the transfer of ownership, i. e. the effect 
of the contract. Based on this, he asserts that it is permissible to make a hibah without the 
knowledge of the donee, and the agent (the BCT) can be appointed by the donor to accept 
the offer on behalf of the donee. 69 
His opinion was applied and inserted in the Trust Deed, one of the documentations of the 
Hibah Harta instrument. There is a clause stating the appointment of the agent (the BCT) 
by the donor, the purpose of such appointment being to accept and administer the gifted 
properties on behalf of and in the interest of the beneficiaries. 70 In addition, both the 
donor and the donee sign a power of attorney document, which specifies the duties of the 
BCT as the trustee. This reflects that it is the donor who appoints the trustee, not the 
donee. 
These arrangements are clearly against the principles of Islamic law because the donee is 
the only rightful party who can appoint an agent to accept the offer and to receive the 
68 Al-Bull, Said Ramadan, Fiqh al-St-rah al-Nabawiyyah, Damshiq: Dar al-Fikr, 1996, p. 133. 
69 Othman, p. 17. 
70 See the sample of Surat Ikatan Amanah, which was given by Aimi Zulhazmi during the interview. 
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gifted property. Similarly, only he/she can appoint an agent as trustee to administer 
his/her property, i. e. the gifted property. 
5.4.2. The Ownership of the Donee 
Looking into the clauses in the sample Trust Deed Agreement, which was given by the 
manager of the Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee Berhad during an interview undertaken as 
part of this research, it appears that the donor remains in control of the property. Even 
though the document is signed at the second stage, i. e. after the completion of the hibah 
contract or after the transfer of ownership, there is a clause stating that the donor is the 
owner of the property. The clause reads: 
"WHEREAS: - 
B. The Donor is the owner of the property listed under the Schedule C 
hereto (hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Asset" and reference to the 
Trust Asset shall be construed as reference to all or any or more of 
them). " 
There is also a clause stating that it is the donor who agrees to the property being 
registered under the trustee's name. The relevant provision reads: 
"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the 
mutual covenants herein contained, the Donor agrees to execute such 
further instruments as shall be necessary to vest the Trustee with full 
title to the property, and agrees to hold the Trust Asset, IN TRUST... " 
Only upon the death of the donor, i. e. where the donee survives, does the donee become 
absolute owner of the trust asset. Clause 5.4 states: 
"If any Donor and the Donee should die under such circumstances as 
would render it doubtful which of them survived the other, this clause 
shall, notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary, have effect as if 
the Donee had survived the other. The Trust Asset thus becomes 
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absolute ownership of the Donee as such the distribution of the Trust 
Asset shall be according to Clause 1.1. (d). " 
In the light of the above information, it seems that the donee has no right at all over the 
property. The appointment of the trustee is apparently intended to prevent the donee from 
dealing with the property. It would appear that the donor has not yet renounced 
absolutely his right to the property; this may possibly invalidate the contracts in the 
Hibah Harta. 
5.5. The `Umrä and Rugbä 
Al- Syarbini states that the `umrä and rugbä conditions were practiced by the Arabs 
during the jahiliyyah or "ignorance period". 71 These two conditions are inserted at the 
second stage of the whole process of making the Hibah Harta instrument. This is done 
after the donor and the donee have each completed their respective offer and acceptance. 
At this stage both also agree on the appointment of the BCT as the trustee who will 
temporarily keep the hibah property. 
Both conditions restrict the donee's right of ownership of the gifted property. The 
application of the `umrä condition means that the donee remains the owner of the 
property only for his lifetime, after his death the property returns to the donor. The term 
itself originates from the root word `amara, which means to live long. 
72 An example of 
`umrä is where the donor pronounces "I give the house for you for your life time". If this 
is valid, the effect is that the gifted property returns to the donor when the donee dies. 
'1 Al-Syarbinº, p. 399. 
72 A1-Mawrid, p. 780. 
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The rugbä condition is, on the other hand, stipulated in order to ensure that either the 
donee or the donor becomes the owner of the hibah property when the other party dies. 
An example is where the donor pronounces, "If I die before you, this property is yours 
and if you die before me it is mine. " The term originates from the root word raqaba, 
which literally means to observe. 73 Both the donor and the donee are considering the 
death of the other. This means that, even though the donee has taken possession of the 
property, it will return to the donor if the donee dies first. 
The stipulation of the conditions in the Hibah Harta instrument is significant. It is one of 
the duties of the trustee to carry out the conditions and to revoke the hibah contract if 
necessary. 74 This means that if the donee dies before the donor, the trustee must return 
the gifted property to the donor and the hibah is automatically revoked. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the property is not registered under the donee's name but the 
trustee's name. This is to ensure that the donee cannot deal with the property prior to the 
donor's death. Applying the rugbä condition, where the donor dies first, the trustee 
transfers the ownership to the donee. 
5.5.1. The Perspective of Islamic Law 
5.5.1.1. `Umrd 
In Fiqh terminology, `umrä is a gift for life. The l; Ianafis, Syäfiis and Hanbalis are all of 
the opinion that the contract is valid but the `umrä condition is void. 75 Al-Syarbini is even 
73 Ibid, p. 592. 
74 Othman, p. 21. 
75 Al-Syarbini, vol. 2, p. 398. He states that al-Sabki and al-BulgaynT, two prominent Syäfi is scholars, hold 
the same opinion, i. e. the contract is valid but the condition is void. See also al-BahütT, Kashdf al-Qina"an 
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of the view that the pronouncement of "if I die, this property is yours" is in essence a 
wasiyyah. 76 To the Mälikis, the `umrä condition is valid on the basis that it is a gift of 
manfa`ah, i. e. the contract of `driyyah. 77 The donee is only entitled to the usufruct, the 
corpus of the property remains in the ownership of the donor. 
There are several Prophetic Traditions or hadith on which the majority opinion is based: 
a) It is reported by Jäbir bin °Abdulläh that the Prophet said, `If a 
property is given in gift to a man for his lifetime it shall become his 
property and it shall not return back to the donor (after his death)., 78 
b) It is reported from Jäbir that a woman in Medina gave a garden to her 
son as a gift for life (`umrä). The latter thereafter died leaving behind 
several children. The woman also died afterwards. She left behind 
several children and a brother. The children of her son said that the 
garden belonged to their father during his life as well as thereafter. 
Both the parties took their dispute to Täriq, the freed slave of the 
Caliph `Uthmän. He sent for Jabir, who bore testimony to the 
statement of the Prophet. Tariq thereafter wrote to `Abd al-Malik b 
Marwan. Therein he also mentioned about the testimony of Jäbir. cAbd 
Malik said, " Jäbir has spoken truly. " Täriq thereupon issued his orders 
and the garden continued to be in the possession of the children of that 
son. s79 
c) °Umrä gift is subjected to inheritance in favour of the donee's legal 
heirs. 80 
d) The Prophet had decided that the `umrä gift is for whom it is made» 
Main a! -Igna-`, vol. 4, p. 300 and Ibn Qudämah, p. 282. According to the }Janbalis, the hadith that prohibits 
`umrä and rugbä "do not make `umril and do not make ruqba" is to inform those who make both contract 
that the property would never be returned to the donor. See also Ibn Qüdi, SyamsuddTn A1)mad, Natä'y al- 
Afkär ft Kasy al-Rumüz wa al-Asrär, Egypt: Sharikah Maktabah wa Malba`ah al-Bäbt al-Ijalabi wa 
Awlädihi, 1970, vol. 9, p. 25 and al-Jaziri, `Abd Rabman, Kitdb al-Fiqh `alä al-Madhhab al-Arba`ah, n. p.: 
Dar al-Manar, 1999, vol. 3, p. 334. 
76 Al-Syarbini, vol. 2, p. 399. 
77 Ibn Rusyd, vol. 2, p. 334. If it is stated to those of your dependants after your (donee's) death, it would 
then be for the dependants and would only return to the donor when the donee's dependants stop or finish. 
It is also stated that `umrd is a gift of usufruct, which means that when the donee dies, the property returns 
to the donor. If it is pronounced further that "for your dependants as well", when the donee dies, it (the 
usufruct) passes to the donee's heirs by succession. See Imam Malik bin Anas, a! -Mudawwanah a! -Kubrd, 
Beirut: Dar $ädir, n. d., vol. 6, pp. 199-200. 
78 See al-Syarbini, vol. 2, p. 398. 
79 Al-Nawawi, Yahya ibn Syaraf, Syarh Sahih Muslim, Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 1987, vol. 11, p. 69-72. 80 Al-Syarbini, p. 398. He states that Bukhäri and Muslim reported this hadith in their Sahihayn. 
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Al-Zuhay1 is of the same opinion. He states that an `umrä gift is valid but the time limit 
is null and void based on the sound hadith: "anyone who makes an `umrä, it is for whom 
it is made" and the principle that hibah is not invalid with the presence of an illegitimate 
condition. This is different from contracts of exchange such as sale contracts, which 
become void with the presence of an illegitimate condition. 82 
5.5.1.2. Ruqba 
This is a kind of gift that is attached with the condition that the gifted property returns to 
the donor if the donee dies first. According to Abü Iianifah and Muhammad, such hibah 
is void. Furthermore, they are of the view that this is a contract of `äriyyah. In this regard, 
the donor is allowed to ask for the return of the property whenever he wishes. 83 To the 
Mälikis, 84 Syäfiis8S and IIanbalis86 it is a hibah contract but the rugbä condition is void. 
Their opinion is based on the hadith: "do not grant it for life and do not turn it to a rugbd. 
One who grants it for life or turns it into rugba, it belongs to his heirs. , 87 
81 The hadith was narrated by Bukhäri and Muslim. See al-Bahüt% p. 300. 82 Al-Zuhayli, p. 9. This is different from a contract of exchange such as sale contracts, which become void 
with the presence of illegitimate condition. 83 AI-Zuhayli, p. 9. 
84 Ibn Rusyd, English translation, 402. 
85 Qalyubi wa `Umayrah, p. 169. It is stated that the ruqba is valid according to the gativl jaded, but the 
condition is fasid. See also al-SharbTni, vol. 2, p. 399. He states that the rugbd is valid according to the 
jaw! jadid but the condition is ineffective. To the qawl qadim, it is absolutely void. 6 Al-Bahüt3, vol. 4, p. 301. 87 Ibid. See also Ibn Rusyd, English translation, vol. 2, p. 402. That (iadith is related from JAbir. 
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5.5.2. `Umriff and Rugbd in the Instrument 
It is clear from the above discussion that the four Sunni schools of law unanimously 
agree on the invalidity of the `umrä and rugbä conditions. However, according to 
Othman, the validity of the conditions is based on the opinion of the two Syäfiis 
scholars, al-Subki and al-Bulgayni. 88 He also referred to the books of Ahmad Ibrahim, 
Islamic Law in Malaysia and Tyabji's Muhammadan Law, The Personal Law of Muslims, 
in which he claims they state that Imam al-Syäfi 1 agreed with the rugbd condition. ß9 
It is important to note that the opinion on the invalidity of the conditions is based on the 
sound hadiths, which stand as one of the primary sources of Islamic law. Moreover, the 
conditions clearly contradict the concept of hibah, i. e. the absolute ownership of the 
gifted property is transferred to the donee. Therefore, in light of the above arguments, it is 
submitted that although the conditions are null and void, the hibah contract remains valid 
and effective. This is supported by the hadith that clearly prohibits the donor from 
retracting his hibah, as discussed previously. 
It is clear from Othman's study that he merely relied on the opinions of the scholars 
without studying the basis on which these opinions were founded. In this regard, it is not 
an exaggeration to say that his research is not based on the sound methodology of Islamic 
research and as a consequence there is a possibility that his findings are based on an 
unacceptable proof. On the basis of the observations of the present research, it is argued 
88 Othman, p. 10. 
89 See Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaysia, p. 297 and Tyabji, Muhammadan Law, The Personal Law 
of Muslims, 3`d edition, Bombay: N. M. Tripathi & Co., Law Publishers, 1940. p. 516. 
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that Imam al-Syarbini states that Imärn al-Subki and Imam al-Bulgayn propound the 
invalidity of the condition of `umrä, but the validity of the hibah contract. 90 With respect 
to Othman's references to Ahmad Ibrahim's91 and Tyabji's92 books, from which he 
concluded that Im,; -um al-Syäfi i validated the condition of `umrä, after due investigation 
into these two books, along with Minhäj al-Tälibin by al-Nawäwi93 and its translation by 
E. C. Howard, 94 the opposite conclusion can arguably be reached. There is nothing in 
these treaties that states Imäm al-Syäfii's views on the validity of the 'umrd condition. 
The main concern of the discussion is whether the contract of hibah, not the 'umrd 
condition, is valid or not. There is no dispute on the invalidity of `umrä. 
Othman further states that because of the grave disagreement on the validity of the `umrd 
and rugbä conditions among the Muslim scholars, such conditions should not be inserted 
alongside the pronouncement of offer and acceptance of the hibah. Instead, he suggests 
that they are stipulated in the trust deed and stand as an agreement between the donor and 
the donee. 95 According to him, Islamic law permits the insertion of any conditions to a 
validly completed contract as long as the parties to the contract consent and such 
conditions do not contravene Islamic law. 96 
90 Al-Syarbini, vol. 2, p. 398. 91 Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaysia, p. 297. 
92 See Tyabji, Faiz Badruddin M. A., Muhammadan Law The Personal Law of Muslims, p. 516. 93 Al-Nawäwi, AbT Zakariyyd Ya}lyä ibn Sharaf, Minhdj al-7'älibin, n. p: n. p., n. d., pp. 81-82. 94 Al-Nawawr, Minhaj et Talibin A Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the School of Shafii by al- 
NawdwF, translated into English from the French Edition of L. W. C. Van Den Berg, by E. C. Howard, Adam 
Publishers & Distributors, Delhi, First Edition, 2(01, p. 234. 
95 Othman, p. 8. 
96 Ibid. 
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However, it would seem clear that if such conditions were inserted after the completion 
of the contract of hibah, this would amount to wa. iyyah because the effectiveness of the 
hibah conditions is subject to the occurrence of death. It is a well-known principle in 
Islamic law that a wa. Fiyyah made by a Muslim testator is only effective upon his/her 
death. Therefore, the agreement of the donee to the condition that the property would 
return to the donor if he/she dies prior to the donor, is wa. iyyah. These conditions clearly 
contradict the opinion of the four Sunni schools of law who unanimously agree on the 
transfer of absolute ownership of the gifted property to the donee. The conditions clearly 
contravene the Islamic principles of farä'iti and wa. iyyah, and hence they are absolutely 
null and void. 
5.6. Analysis of the Fatwa 
The Fatwä Council of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur allegedly approved the 
BCT's Hibah Harta in terms of Syari ah compliance when it issued its fatwä on 14th 
November 2000.97 However, in issuing the fatwa, the Council relied merely on the 
information presented by Tuan Haji Othman, a BCT hibah consultant and two hibah 
experts appointed by BCT. Satisfied with the explanation of the nature and process of 
completion of the contract, including the stipulation of the `umrä and rugbä conditions, 
the Council passed a resolution stating its satisfaction with the product provided that 
several conditions were strictly and fully complied with. 
97 Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee Berhad brochure on Amanah Hibah. 
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The religious ruling of the Fatwä Council states that the Council agreed with the Hibah 
Harta instrument run by the Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee Berhad on the condition that: 
1- The delivery of possession is directly made to the donee and the documents pertaining 
to the changes of names and others are kept by the Bumiputra Commerce-Trustee 
Berhad. 
2- The agreements and conditions between the donor and the donee must be made after 
the completion of the offer and acceptance. 
3- The trust property must be kept in an Islamic Bank account such as those at the Bank 
Islam Malaysia Berhad, the Bank Muamalah or at Islamic counters of conventional 
banks. 
Looking into the Council's resolution, it is important to clarify the first two points 
because they are directly related to the issue of the validity of the product from the 
perspective of Islamic law. The third element regarding the place where the trust property 
should be kept does not fall within this context because it has nothing to do with the issue 
of Syari ah compliance. It does not relate to the process of the completeness of the 
contract but rather is a matter of administration. 
Regarding the first issue, based on the information pertaining to the process leading to the 
completeness of the hibah contract it is clear that the delivery of the hibah property is not 
directly made to the donee. The hibah property is registered in the name of the trustee, 
i. e. the BCT. It is registered in the donee's name only upon obtaining the donor's 
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permission or after the donor's demise. These facts show a contradiction between the 
fatwä and the practice as applied by the instrument. 
With respect to the second issue, it appears that the Council agrees with the inclusion of 
the Cumrä and rugbä conditions provided they are inserted after the completion of the 
hibah contract. It seems that to the Council, both conditions are acceptable in Islamic law 
as long as they are inserted afterwards. This means that the Council agrees that whenever 
the donee dies prior to the donor, the donee's heirs will not inherit the trust property, it 
will return to the donor as prescribed by the conditions. This means that even though the 
property has already been validly given to the donee, the donor still has the right to claim 
it or to take it back and the donee's heirs arc left with no entitlement. This is clearly 
against the principles of fara'id and wasiyyah as explained above. It appears, therefore, 
that the Council has made a mistake in endorsing the instrument. 
Moreover, there is another problem that is important to mention here. This concerns the 
enforcement of the fatwä. It is a well-known fact that the Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee 
is a large company that operates throughout the region of Malaysia. It is therefore 
understood that the product would be promoted to other states in Malaysia, and for 
commercial purposes it would not be a good idea to confine it to the Federal Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur. When this is taken into account, it can be seen that a problem may arise 
in that every state in Malaysia has its own Fatwd Committee. Each Fatwä Committee has 
98 its own mechanisms and methods as well as different opinions when issuing a fatwä. 
98 It is the standard practice of the Fatwa Committee of every state in Malaysia, except Perlis, that reference 
is made to the prevailing views of the Syafiis. If it would lead to a situation, which is repugnant to the 
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What will happen if the Fatwä Committees of the other states issue fatwäs that are 
against the product? 
It is therefore suggested that the National Fatwä Council, which is responsible for all 
Muslims throughout Malaysia, recognizes the product 99 The fatwä issued by the Council 
could be streamlined throughout Malaysia and be accepted and gazetted by every state in 
order to have legal effect. '°° It is important to mention that differences between fatwäs 
are very difficult to resolve except through legal processes. A fattivä binds only the state 
where it is issued and gazetted, and hence only binds the Syariah courts of that state. 
Furthermore, the civil courts are not bound to followfatwas. 
5.7. The Tarikah and the Entitlement of the Donor's and the Donee's Heirs 
Another dispute that may arise as a result of the uncertainties concerning the validity of 
the instrument in terms of its Syari ah compliance concerns the entitlement of the legal 
heirs of the donor and the donee to the trust property. Based on the concept of the Hibah 
Harta instrument, it is unclear who actually possesses the ownership of the property. It is 
based on the hibah contract but the donor remains entitled to enjoy the proceeds accrued 
public interest, the Mufti may follow the prevailing views of the Ijanafis, Mälikis or iianbalis. If it is still 
against the public interest, then the Mufti may exercise his own ytihdd. 
99 Among the functions of the National Fatwa Committee is the discussion of any major issue at national 
level and eventually issue a fatwa on it and to unify or standardize contradicting fatwiis in Malaysia, if any. 
See Farid Suffian, Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia, Text and Material, p. 271. However, it has 
been confirmed by Ustazah Hajjah Siti Nor Badar at the Mufti Office, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur 
during the interview that Othman had submitted an application to get the product endorsed by the National 
Fatwd Council so that it could be promoted throughout the region but, it was very unfortunate that his 
application was rejected. 
lou The Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993, section 34 states: Upon publication 
in the Gazette, a fatwa shall be binding on every Muslim resident in the Federal Territories as dictate of his 
religion and it shall be his religious-duty to abide by and uphold the fatwa, unless he is permitted by 
Islamic Law to depart from the fatwa in matters of personal observance, belief, or opinion. The similar 
provisions are found in the enactments for the administration of Islamic Law of other states. 
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from the property. Furthermore, the donee is absolutely impeded from any kind of 
dealing with the property that is supposed to be his/hers. Clearly, it is futile to give 
someone the corpus of the property but forbid him/her to utilize the manfa°ah or the 
usufruct of the corpus. Without usufruct, the corpus stands unproductive. 
Having said that, it should be highlighted that the absolute ownership of the property is 
part and parcel of inheritance. If such an absolute ownership is not established, the legal 
heirs are not entitled to claim their inheritance under farä'icl law. In this regard, if the 
property returns to the donor after the demise of the donee following the `umrä or rugbd 
condition, as stipulated in the Hibah Harta instrument, the legal heirs of the donee have 
no entitlement to the trust property under inheritance. 
However, it is submitted that the `umra and ruqba conditions are against the Syari ah, 
though they are inserted after the completion of the hibah contract. The majority of 
Muslim scholars, consisting of the Hanafis, Mälikis and Syäfiis, nullify the conditions 
stipulated in a contract that defeat the purpose of the contract. 
1°' The Hanbalis however, 
especially Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim allow the absolute freedom of stipulating 
conditions as long as they do not contradict the Syari ah. However, they hold the same 
view as the majority if such conditions contradict the Syari ah. 
102 In relation to this, the 
hibah contract in the Hibah Harta instrument is still valid but the conditions are null and 
void. Therefore, the property is absolutely within the donee's ownership and can never 
101 Al-Zulaayli, p. vol. 4, p. 202. Hamid, Mohamed El Fatih, "The Freedom to Make Stipulations in the 
Islamic Law of Contract", JICL, 6(1976), pp. 22. 
102 MGsä, Muhammad YGsuf, "The Liberty of the Individual in Contracts and Conditions according to 
Islamic Law", I. Q., 2: 4 (1995), p. 257. 
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return to the donor. When the donee dies, even if it is prior to the donor's death, his legal 
heirs inherit the property. 
5.8. Conclusion 
The issue of Syari ah compliance is an important consideration. Even though a religious 
authority, i. e. the Fatwä Council of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, endorsed the 
Hibah Harta prior to its launch, there remain questions and debates over its validity in 
terms of its conformity with the principles of Islamic law. This problem becomes obvious 
primarily due to the concept of ownership adopted in the contract and the stipulation of 
the `umrä and rugbä conditions. Clearly, the issue of ownership and the insertion of such 
conditions are the main factors that attract the public to the instrument. In other words, 
the public is allured to dispose of their wealth through the instrument primarily because 
their interest in the subject of the arrangement is well protected. Their right to the 
property remains in existence and the donee is absolutely prevented from taking 
ownership. 
181 
CHAPTER SIX 
FAMILY TAl FUL, CONVENTIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
AND GOVERNMENT RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
6.1. FAMILY TAJ FUL AND CONVENTIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
6.1.1. Introduction 
Takcrful and the conventional insurance business have become increasingly important for 
Muslims in Malaysia, as elsewhere. The basic aim of tak4ful and insurance is to mitigate 
the financial burden suffered by its members. Each member contributes a specified 
amount of money to a common fund to provide for protection against specified risks that 
may occur in the future. 
This sub-section will embark on a discussion in particular on the issue of the heritability 
of the proceeds payable under family taki ful and conventional life insurance policies 
upon the death of the participant or the insured from the perspective of the Islamic law of 
succession. This research will focus solely on these two policies or plans due to the fact 
that they are connected to death, which is an essential element of inheritance law. The 
issue focused on is the position of the money paid by the company on the death of the 
policyholder and whether it should be distributed in accordance with the farä'id law or by 
another mode. In order to come to a conclusion, an elaboration on the nature of the 
contracts concerned is necessary as well as their compliance with the Syari ah principles, 
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as these are part and parcel of the process of determining the question of the heritability 
of one's wealth. 
6.1.2. The Concept of Takadful 
Takäful insurance was introduced for the purpose of serving the Muslim as an alternative' 
to conventional insurance, which it can be said does not operate fully in line with Islamic 
teaching. 2 In Malaysia, the Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad was the first 
takdful operator to be established and begin operating in August 1985.3 The concept of 
Islamic insurance or takdful is based on mutual help and cooperation as well as on the 
concept of tabarru`ät, which literally means sincere donation. The word takaful itself 
literally means joint guarantee5 and this literal meaning portrays the nature of its 
operation, which is mutual help and assistance to ease the burden suffered by fellow 
friends. The contract governing each of the participants is a contract of gratuity or 
tabarru`ät. This contract is incorporated merely to eliminate the element of uncertainty or 
gharar, which would invalidate the contract. 
1 Billah, Maasum, Quantum of Damages In Takaful (Islamic Insurance) In the Contemporary Economic 
Reality, [online], n. d., available from: htt: //islamic-finance. net/islamic -insurance/article/t-quantum%28 
accessed 17th December 2004]. 
Takaful Nasional Sdn. Bhd., Konsep Takäfu1, [online], n. d., available from: 
http: //www. takaftilnasional. com. my/default. fm [accessed 2nd August 2003]. 
3 Yusof, Mohd Fadzli, Takaful; Sistem Insurans Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors 
Sdn. Bhd., 1996, p. 5. 
s Yusuf, Mohd Fazli Yusof, Brief Outline On the Concept and Operational System of Takaful Business 
(Islamic Insurance), in Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Concept and Operational System From the 
Practitioner's Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: BIMB Institute of Research and Training Sdn. Bhd., n. d., p. 8. 
7 Yusof, Mohd. Fazli, Takäful: Sistem Insuran Islam, p. 23. Family takaful is similar to the life insurance 
policy whereas the general takaful is similar to the general insurance policy. Both types of takaful plans 
fully meet the Syari ah principles. See also Takaful Nasional Sdn Bhd [online], 
htti): //www. takafuinasional. com. my/default. fm 
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The takäful insurance business classifies its policies into two sections namely the Family 
Takäful Business (Islamic life insurance) and the General Takäful Business (Islamic 
general insurance).? Generally speaking, a tak4ful plan provides a long term financial 
facility with two primary aims; gradually depositing money into the account for the 
purpose of gaining the protection benefit against death or any loss of human limbs and 
secondly saving the money to gain a return on the savings plus the profit from 
investment. The Family Takdful Plan is a long-term al-mudärabah (profit and loss 
sharing) contract and basically provides cover for mutual aid among its members or 
participants expressed in the form of financial benefits paid from a defined fund should 
any of its members suffer a tragedy. 9 Apart from this, it also enables the participant to 
save regularly for a fixed period as well as invest with a view to earning profits. The 
General Takäful Plan is usually a short-term plan and basically provides protection in the 
form of mutual financial help to compensate its members or participants for any material 
loss, damage or destruction. 
In order to realize the objective of the financial assistance facility among the 
participants, " the contribution that is required to be paid by the participant on a regular 
basis as in consideration for participation is credited to the Family Takäful Fund and 
subsequently channelled into two separate accounts, namely the Participant's Account 
9 Ibrahim, Ahmad, "The Philosophy of Islamic Insurance - Shariah Concepts and Principles", JUUIKIM, 
2: 1 (1998), p. 11. 
11 Yusof, Brief Outline On the Concept and Operational System of Takaful Business, p. 11. 
13 Ibrahim, p. 12. 
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(PA) and the Participant's Special Account (PSA). 
13 Moneys deposited in the PA are 
invested based on the principle of al-muräbahah. On the other hand, the PSA is solely for 
the purpose of tabarru`ät or donation and is used to help fellow participating members in 
covering any loss or damage. '4 
The PA is exclusively for the purpose of savings and investment. The substantial 
proportion that is deducted from the total instalment as well as the profit from investment 
belong exclusively to the participant and are not used for donation purposes. In this 
regard, if a participant discontinues his participation before the maturity of the plan, he is 
fully entitled to the whole amount contained in that account despite his discontinuance. 
This account serves as a deposit account and hence the participant is absolutely free to 
withdraw his money from the account whenever he wishes to do so. This money is 
therefore clearly heritable when he dies. 15 
The remaining amount of the total instalment after the deduction of the proportion 
payable to the PA is on the other hand credited to the PSA. Monetary contributions to this 
account are perceived as donations from the participant and are used for tabarnfat 
purposes. This accumulated money is not returned to the participant if he ceases his 
participation. As it is a donation that he or she intended to be used specifically for 
tabarru°ät it is prohibited in Islamic law to ask for its return. 16 In other words, the amount 
channelled to this account is exclusively for providing financial assistance and is 
14 Abu Bakar, Abu Bakar, "Family Takaful Plan: Concept, Operation, Underwriting", in: Takaful (Islamic 
Insurance) Concept and Operational System from the Practitioner's Perspective, p. 28. 
15 Yusof, Takaful: Sistem Insuran Islam, p. 31. 
16 Yusof, p. 31. 
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specifically utilized to pay the takdful benefits to the heirs of any fellow participant who 
may die before the maturity of the taknful plan. '7 
From the above explanation, it is clear that the takdful operation works on the principles 
of both al-mutiärabah and al-tabarru`üt. In an al-mutiärabah contract, the participant 
(the sähib al-mal) provides capital (ra'su al-mal) in the form of takäful instalments or 
takaful contributions (premiums) and the investor (al-mutiärib), which in this case is the 
taknful operator, invests the capital in commercial businesses that are run according to the 
principles approved by the Sharicah. The profit or surplus gained from this investment is 
shared according to the agreed ratio between the participants and the takäful operator. It 
is worth noting here that the main objective of takaful is to help fellow participants who 
have suffered from any loss. It is for this reason that the payment of profit from 
investments is made only after objective assistance to fellow participants has been 
made. 19 
6.1.3. Conventional Life Insurance from the Perspective of Islamic Law 
An insurance contract is defined as a contract for the payment of a sum of money for 
some corresponding benefit to become due on the happening of an uncertain event of a 
character adverse to the interest of the person affecting the insurance. 20 It is also defined 
as an agreement between two persons (the insurer and the assured) that in consideration 
of a relatively small payment (a premium) paid by the assured, the insurer will, on a 
17 Yusof, p. 31. 
19 Ibid, p. 9. 
20 Afzalurrahman, Banking and Insurance, London: The Muslim School Trust, 1979, p. 122. 
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certain event happening during the given time, pay to the assured either an agreed sum, or 
the amount of the loss caused to the assured by the event. 21 
This is regarded by the majority of Muslim jurists as a contract of exchange rather than a 
contract of donation or tabarru`ät. It is submitted that such an interpretation is in parallel 
with the underlying principles laid down in English common law regarding the formation 
of a contract of insurance. Under English common law, there are four requirements to be 
met in order to establish a contract of insurance, namely an offer and an acceptance, the 
subject matter and the element of consideration. 
22 The premium paid by the insured is in 
consideration of the subject matter that is the risk to be run by the insurer. 
23 With regard 
to life insurance, it is a specific kind of policy providing for the payment of a specified 
amount on the insured's death either to his estate or to a designated beneficiary. 
24 
According to the majority of Muslim jurists, there are three elements that, from the 
Islamic point of view, invalidate the conventional insurance contract, including the life 
insurance contract, and these are: riba (interest), gambling and uncertainty. 
It is claimed that the element of ribä is present when the insurance company pays the 
claim far in excess of the amount paid in premiums by the insured. This is based on the 
21 Jowitt, Earl and Walsh, Clifford, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1959, 
vol. 2, p. 985. 
22 Poh Chu Chai, Law of Insurance, Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 1986, p. 51-55. 
23 Ibid, p. 55. 
24 Geranmayeh, Ahmad, "Life Insurance in Islam", the Ist International Islamic Insurance/ Takaful 
Summit, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November, 1996, p. 1. 
26 Hariati, Sharifah, Islamic Insurance (Takaful) in Contemporary Malaysia with Special Reference to 
Takaful Act, 1984, unpublished dissertation of Master of Comparative Law, International Islamic 
University Malaysia, 2000, p. 51. This claim is based on the notion that every incremental payment is 
interest. 
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assumption that every incremental payment is tantamount to ribä26 Likewise in life 
insurance, the beneficiaries of the assured will gain more than the assured has paid to the 
insurer in the event of his or her death, and therefore such additional gain is considered as 
rib C1.27 
Some Muslim jurists believe that there is an element of maysir or gambling to the 
insurance contract, including life insurance, where one party (the insurer) agrees to pay 
the other (the insured) a pre-determined amount of money on the happening of an 
indefinite event in consideration of a sum of money (a premium) which the latter agrees 
to pay to the former. Thus, the insured is exposed to risk on the basis of chance, which 
makes it similar to maysir. 28 This kind of game of chance29 happens once the insured 
enters into a contract for life insurance and pays the agreed premiums, his beneficiaries 
are simultaneously hoping for the chance to gain a large amount of money after the 
demise of the assured. Hoping for such a chance is prohibited by the injunction against 
maysir. 30 
Some Muslim jurists argue that there is the element of gharar or uncertainty in the 
insurance contract relating to what the insured buys with his premium, as when one buys 
something uncertain. When the insured buys a special plan of insurance and at the end of 
the contract there is no claim, it leads to the conclusion that the money paid in premiums 
27 Rashid, S. K., "Insurance in Islamic law", Kulliyyah of Laws, HUM, Malaysia. (n. d. and unpublished), p. 
8, cited in Billah, Mohd. Masum, Life Insurance: An Islamic View, A. L. Q., 8: 4 (1993), p. 315. 
2 Khan, Muhammad Akram, Economics of the Quran: A Study of Surah al-Maidah and Surah al-Naht, 
Lahore: Library Information and Management Academy, Lahore, 1994, p. 30. 
29 Muslehuddin, Muhammad, Insurance and Islamic Law, 4`h edition, Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 
1982, p. 143. 
30 Billah, Mohd. Masum, "Life Insurance: An Islamic View", p. 316. 
32 Geranmayeb, Life Insurance in Islam, p. 3. 
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did not provide any benefit. 32 The contract is therefore based on uncertainty and 
probability as well as the date of the risk happening also being uncertain. 
According to Siddiqi regarding the presence of the ribä element, such a contention is 
baseless on the grounds that the Sharfah does not consider absolutely every increment to 
be interest. Money paid as interest is not in the nature of a loan, the payment of a claim 
does not amount to returning the loan with an increased amount that may be considered 
as interest, rather the premium payment is a kind of co-operative contribution towards the 
availability of a useful social service. 33 
It can be argued that such excess payment does not necessarily amount to ribä because 
the recipient of the payment is either the insured himself or a third party. The payment is 
solely made by the insured and the third party pays nothing. The third party receives the 
amount only when the insured dies prior to the maturity of the policy, and furthermore 
the payment is solely based on the concept of financial assistance. Therefore, it can not 
be considered as an exchange of ribawi items because it does not involve that kind of 
exchange as such. The insurance company is bound to pay the claim because it is a 
promise legally inserted and agreed upon in the contract. 
Rebutting the claim regarding the existence of gambling, Siddiqi as before responded by 
stating that the concept of life insurance revolves around the transaction of depositing a 
certain amount of money with a particular company with the intention of helping the 
33 Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah, Insurance in an Islamic Economy, Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1985, 
p. 38. 
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depositor's family with future risk after the demise of the depositor. 34 Thus, the element 
of gambling does not exist. It would seem that when the idea underlying the contract is 
financial assistance for a third party, the issue of gambling does not arise. If the insured is 
from the outset looking forward to gaining a huge amount of money by entering the 
contract on the occurrence of certain events, the blame is upon him not the transaction. 
With respect to the element of gharar, Siddique as before argued that the rights and 
obligations of the insuring company and the insured are well known and certain, although 
the financial implications depend on events that are subject to uncertainty. Added to this, 
he stated that some contemporary Islamic thinkers have pointed out that the Sunnah 
prohibits transactions only where gharar is present to an excessive degree. 
36 Arguably, 
the issue of gharar or uncertainty does not arise here because the insurance contract is 
one of donation rather than sale. As a result, the uncertainty that does exist in the contract 
does not affect its validity because the uncertainty is relatively minor. 37 
6.1.4. Is there a Substantial Difference between Takaful and Conventional 
Insurance that Results in Differences in the Court Rulings? 
It is not the aim of this research to discuss in detail the legitimacy of conventional life 
insurance from an Islamic perspective. It is sufficient to cite the various opinions of 
Muslim scholars, along with their arguments regarding the question of legitimacy. From 
34 Siddique, p. 35. 
36 Ibid, p. 43. 
37 Abd. Rahman, Zainal Azam, "Modern Takaful, Commercial and Mutual Insurance (A Short Analysis)", 
JUUIKIM, 4: 1 (2000), p. 62. 
39 Billah, Mohd. Maasum, "Islamic Insurance: Its Origins and Development", A. L. Q., 13 (1998), p. 410. 
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the Islamic rulings or fatwäs released by Muslim scholars, it appears that no conclusive 
decision has yet been made regarding this issue in the eyes of Islamic law. 39 Even though 
it is the view of the majority of Muslim scholars that the conventional insurance contract, 
including the life insurance contract, is contrary to Islamic law, the contentions put 
forward by the minority on its validity seem equally convincing and hence should not 
simply be dismissed. 
The question of illegitimacy is still debatable. It seems that conventional insurance, 
including life insurance, may be Islamically legitimate. It is significant to note that the 
insurance contract is a new transaction that is quite alien to the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad. However, it should not be dismissed simply because of its non-existence in 
the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Furthermore, it should not be confined to the 
requirements applicable to the commonly known transactions, which have existed since 
the time of the Prophet Muhammad. 
In Malaysia, on 15`h June 1972, the National Fatwd Council of Malaysia decided on the 
illegitimacy of the conventional life insurance contract based on the reason that as a 
transaction it is not free from the elements of uncertainty, gambling and interest or ribü. 40 
This fatwä appears to serve as a carbon copy of the fatwa previously issued by Muslim 
jurists internationally and seems to offer nothing new to the debate. There is none of the 
detailed elaboration or reasoning on which such a fatwä is usually based. 
40 http: //www. takafulnasional. com. my/default. fm. See also Billah, Mohd Maasum, "Islamic Insurance: Its 
Origin and Development", pp. 410- 415. 
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It appears that the alleged presence of the three forbidden elements is primarily due to a 
common understanding of the nature of the transaction underlying the conventional 
insurance contract, which, it is argued by its opponents, is a contract of exchange rather 
than a contract of donation. Hence, all the general requirements of a contract of 
exchange, such as a sale contract, as laid down by the Muslim jurists must be fully met. 
The contract is labelled as a sale contract rather than a donation or tabarru`ät contract. 
However, there appears to be no substantial dissimilarity between takäful and 
conventional insurance. The only difference pertains to their labelling; the former is a 
labarru`ät contract, whereas the latter is a sale contract. 42 The focus should, therefore, be 
on the essence of the contract rather than the label. 
In this regard, it is quite obvious that the purposes of conventional insurance and, 
therefore, the essence of the contract is the concept of mutual help among the participants 
or the insured. Hence, regardless of its being called a contract of sale, the primary 
objective that moulds the contract, which is the intention of sharing risk and providing 
financial help, should be emphasized. It should therefore be specified as a contract of 
donation or tabarru`ät, rather than a contract of exchange. 
As regards takäful operations, the participant is similarly given an amount of money that 
exceeds the amount he or she has paid in premiums. However, even though at the outset 
of their participation every participant has an expectation of their entitlement to these 
42 Yusof, Takaful; Sistem Insuran Islam, p. 32. 
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benefits, because it is called a donation the exceeding amount is not equivalent to ribä. 
The tak4ful participant could also be said to participate in gambling as he or she is 
hopeful of receiving this excessive amount only upon the occurrence of death or some 
other loss and this potential gain is certainly based on chance. The element of uncertainty 
similarly exists. However due to the fact that it is a tabarru`ät contract this is permissible, 
unlike uncertainty in sale or exchange contracts. 
The differences between conventional and Islamic insurance are therefore primarily due 
to the nature of their contracts. The conventional insurance contract is, according to many 
Muslim scholars a contract of sale between the seller and the purchaser. 43 The seller is the 
company selling the insurance policy and the purchaser is the one who buys the policy 
and in return for his purchase is entitled to the benefits provided by the company. 44 
Islamic insurance or takäful is on the other hand based on the principles of al-takdful and 
al-Muräbahah. 45 It should be noted, therefore, that the primary reason behind the refusal 
of the majority of Muslim jurists to accept the validity of conventional insurance 
arguably rests on the basic nature of its contract. In tak4ful, unlike in conventional 
insurance, the participant is said to participate in the arrangement instead of buying the 
policy and for that reason the contracts executed in a takaful operation are not contracts 
of sale. 46 
43 Nor, Hardinur Mohd, Introduction to General Takaful Business, in: Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Concept 
and Operational Systems From the Practitioner's Perspective, BIRT, p. 46. 
44 Insurance Info, The Policy Contract, [online], n. d., available from: 
http: //www. insuranccinfo. com. my/index. pht)? ch [accessed 9th July 2003]. 
45 Nor, Hardinur Mohd, Introduction to General Takaful Business, p. 46. 
46 Yusof, Takaful: Sistem Insuran Islam, p. 32. 
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Arguably these facts point strongly to the legitimacy of the conventional insurance 
contract. However, an important thing to take into consideration is the fact that the 
premiums paid by the insured are possibly invested in businesses that contradict Islamic 
principles. It is only at this stage, as stated by Siddique as before that the factor of interest 
enters into the insurance scheme47 and hence makes the money not fully clean of Karam 
elements. However, this does not affect the validity of the contract. 
6.1.5. The Heritability of the Proceeds 
This discussion is focused solely on the Family tak4ful and conventional life insurance 
because both types of policy are singularly related to death. In this regard, the question is 
raised as to whether the money paid by the insurance company or the takäful operator on 
the death of the participant before the policy matures constitutes the participant's estate 
or not. 
It is the opinion of prominent Muslim jurist Mu$tafa Allmad Zargä' that the issue of the 
money payable under conventional insurance is still open for discussion and debate. 
8 
This means that there is as yet no conclusive decision from the Muslim scholars 
regarding the position of the money and whether it is heritable or not. He says: 
"If it is stipulated as a condition by the participant that the money payable 
is for his heirs, that money is therefore heritable and distributable 
according to the fara'ifl law. However, there exists room for discussion 
and opinions in relation to the nature of the money whether it constitutes 
tarikah of the dead insured (which is subjected to the payment of debts to 
creditors) or it is not related at all to tarikah and this implies the possibility 
47 Siddique, p. 37. 
48 Al-Zarga', Mu$lafa A4mad, Nizam al-Ta'miin, Beirut: Muassasah al-Risalah, 1994, p. 143. 
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to insert conditions relating to the payment in favour of persons other than 
heirs on the consideration of it being a donation from the insured. "49 
It is clear from the above statement that the position of the proceeds of conventional life 
insurance is debatable. It is not a unanimous agreement among the Muslim scholars that 
such proceeds must be distributed according to the Islamic Law of Inheritance. The 
similar position should be applicable to the proceeds of Family Takäful. It appears that 
the proceeds could arguably be considered as not part of the tarikah of the deceased and 
accordingly, could be distributed according to the agreement between the participants and 
the insurer. 
6.1.5.1. The Proceeds and the Nominee 
In Malaysia, the fatwäs issued by the Islamic Religious Council appear to be inconsistent. 
There have been fatwäs issued on the illegitimacy of conventional life insurance but at 
the same time, there is afatwa stating that money paid by conventional insurance must be 
distributed among the insured's legal heirs. On 15`h June 1972, the National Fatwä 
Council issued afatwa invalidating the conventional life insurance contract. However, on 
20`h September 1973, the same council issued a fatwä that clearly states that it is the 
responsibility of the nominee appointed by the insured to distribute the money according 
so to the farä'icl law. 
49 Ibid. 
50 [1974] 1 MLJ x. 
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However, the Malaysian High Court in the case of Re Bahadun bin Haji Hassan did not 
follow the later fatwä. s' In this case, the Court decided that it was a complete gift from 
the insured to the nominee when he nominated the latter in his life insurance policy. The 
principle of binding precedent was strictly applied and the Court followed the principle 
laid down in Re Man Bin Minhat, S2 even though the case was decided prior to the 
issuance of the fatwä. In this case, the High Court decided that when a person takes out a 
life insurance policy amounting to RM40,000 and nominates his wife as the receiver of 
the benefit, the wife is fully entitled to the insurance money when the insured person dies. 
Analysing the judgments in the above cases, it appears that the judges understood that the 
insurance money belongs to the insured. Rather than it being divisible according to the 
farä'ici law because it constitutes part of the insured's estate. The judges decided that the 
money should pass in its entirety to the nominee on the basis that it is a complete gift or 
hibah made by the insured to the nominee prior to his or her death. From these facts it 
can be seen that there is indeed no difference in essence between the 1973 fatwa and the 
judges' understanding. According to the 1973 fatwä, the nominee must distribute the 
money to the insured's heirs and this means that the money is part of the insured's estate. 
In other words, the fatwä and the judges are of the common opinion that the insurance 
money belongs to the insured. 
In May 1996, an announcement was made by the former Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Department, YB Datuk Dr Abdul Hamid Othman, that the farä'1 i principles had been 
51 [1974] 1 MLJ 4. 
52 [1965] 2 MLJ 1. 
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incorporated in the Insurance Bill, which had been previously tabled in the Dewan 
Rakyat. 53 Section 167(1) of the Malaysian Insurance Act 199654 therefore provides that 
when a Muslim nominee receives the policy moneys upon the death of the policyholder, 
he or she receives it as an executor and the money payable constitutes part of the estate of 
the policyholder which is subjected to the payment of any debts. Furthermore, section 
167(2) provides that the nominee is under a responsibility to distribute the policy moneys 
in accordance with Islamic law. Here, it is not clear whether the `Islamic law' stated in 
section 167(2) is the Islamic law of succession as no further statutory explanation is 
given. However, taking into account the statement of the former Minister as well as the 
position that the money payable is part of the estate of the deceased policyholder as stated 
in section 167(1), it is reasonable to assume that the term refers to the Islamic law of 
succession. 
With regard to the Family takdful policy, the earlier discussion on the concept of takdful 
is sufficient to provide a complete understanding of the takäful transaction. It seems there 
is a consensus among Muslim jurists on the legitimacy of this type of transaction from 
the perspective of Islamic law. No single opinion can be found opposing the validity of 
the money paid by the takäful operator to participants suffering loss. However, the 
question regarding the heritability of the money remains the same as for the money 
payable under conventional life insurance. The important factor here is that the money 
payable under the takäful policy is slightly different from the money payable under 
53 See The Sunday Star, 26th May 1996. 
`4 The Insurance Act, 1996. (Act 553) 
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conventional life insurance due to the difference in the nature of the transactions in terms 
of their operation. 
As previously mentioned, with the Family takdful there are two accounts, namely the 
Participant Account and the Special Participant Account. The premium paid by the 
participant is paid into both accounts based on a ratio agreed by the takäful operator and 
the participant. The Participant Account is considered to be the deposit account of the 
participant whereas the Special Participant Account is for the sole purpose of making 
donations. When a participant dies, there is therefore no question regarding the 
heritability of the money in the Participant Account as it is part of the deceased's estate. 
However, with regard to the money payable by the takäful operator taken from the 
Special Participant Account, it appears that it is similar to the money payable by the 
conventional insurance company and hence is open for discussion. 
It is standard practice in Malaysia that when a participant of an Islamic insurance policy 
dies, the participant's legal heirs inherit the money paid by the lakdful operator. In other 
words, the payment of the money by the takäful operator to the nominee appointed by the 
deceased participant is subsequently distributed among the participant's legal heirs in 
accordance with the farä'ici law. This arrangement takes place even though there appears 
to have been no Islamic legal ruling or fatwä issued by any fatwä council in Malaysia 
either at national or state level regarding the position of the money payable as 
compensation by the takäful operator on the occurrence of the death of a participant. 
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The distribution of the proceeds among the legal heirs of the deceased participant has 
seemingly become standard practice in Malaysia despite no clear injunction in the Qur'an 
and the Prophetic Traditions. Section 65(1) of the Malaysian Takaful Act, 1984 stipulates 
that the payment of takäful benefits is made to the proper claimant. Section 65(4) 
explains that the `proper claimant' is a person who claims to be entitled to the sum in 
question as executor of the deceased or who claims to be entitled to that sum under the 
relevant law. Unlike the proceeds of conventional life insurance, which is clearly 
regarded as `tarikah' by section 167(2) of the Insurance Act, 1996, the above statutory 
provision provides an unclear position regarding the status of Family takäful benefits, and 
whether they are heritable or not. Arguably, the practice is relatively the same as for the 
proceeds of the life insurance policy. As an example, in the present Family Takäful 
application form of the Takaful National Sdn. Bhd., there is a provision regarding the 
obligation of the nominee appointed by the participant. The relevant provision reads: 
"2. The Applicant hereby declares that both the First Nominee and the 
Second Nominee have been instructed to, and, to the best of the 
Applicant's knowledge shall, distribute the Benefits to the Applicant's 
legal beneficiaries under the applicable Syariah rulings. " 
It is submitted that the compulsory insertion of this clause, which strictly imposes the 
obligation upon the nominee to distribute the money among the heirs is not based on 
sound argument. It appears that the status of the money whether heritable or not is still 
arguable. With the insertion of this clause, every participant is necessarily forced to 
ascertain the receivers of the money and as a result, it becomes clear that the money is 
considered part of the `tarikah' of the dead participant. 
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The discussion on the heritability of takaful and insurance money revolves around four 
arguments, namely the legitimacy of the proceeds from an Islamic perspective, the 
deceased's efforts, the payment of diyyah or blood-wit, damän or monetary compensation 
and the objectives of the takäful and conventional insurance policies. 
a) The Legitimacy of the Proceeds from the Perspective of Islamic Law 
The question of legitimacy has been discussed in detail while examining the concepts of 
takäful and conventional insurance. This question of legitimacy is significant because if 
the proceeds are not legitimate, no question of heritability will arise, as illegitimate or 
unlawful wealth is not subject to inheritance from the perspective of Islamic law. From 
the arguments presented in the above discussion, it is submitted that the proceeds of the 
life tak4ful policy and the conventional life insurance policy are legitimate and lawful. 
This being the case, the proceeds are subject to inheritance law. 
b) Is it the Financial Right of the Policyholder? 
It could be contended that without the participation of the policyholder, the insurance 
company or the takäful operator would never pay the money. 55 On this basis, the effort of 
the participant by joining the policy and paying the monthly premium suffices to 
constitute the proceeds as tarikah. In other words, it is the contract entered into by the 
policyholder either for family takaful or life insurance, which generates the benefits. This 
contention is based on the fact that one's effort becomes a justification for ownership. As 
55 Dato' Hasbullah, interview. 
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a result, the money is divisible among the heirs of the policyholder according to the law 
of farä'ici. 
The payment of taknful and insurance benefits upon the death of the policyholder before 
the maturity of a plan seemingly belongs to the deceased policyholder's legal heirs on the 
grounds that it is the product of the deceased's effort and hence is part of his tarikah. 
Even though the money comes into existence only after the participant's demise, it is the 
effort of the participant by entering into the contract, which realizes the financial 
assistance in favour of his legal heirs upon his death. This is relatively analogous to the 
case of the fish netted by the deceased or the animal caught in the trap fixed by the 
deceased, which occurs after his death. 56 The fish or the animals are part of the 
deceased's tarikah because it is the deceased's effort that has caused the ownership. 
Having said that, it should be noted that there are differences between the cases of 
animals or fish trapped after the deceased's death and the concept of financial assistance 
in the family taknful and life insurance business. The animal or fish trapped or netted is 
the immediate product of the deceased's effort. This is a kind of activity that directly 
generates wealth in favour of the deceased. 
The proceeds of family takäful and life insurance can not be treated as being exactly the 
same as the above examples. Takäful and insurance contracts realize the obligation upon 
the company to pay. They do not create wealth in the insured's ownership, but rather they 
56 Al-Syarbini, p. 3. 
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create an obligation to ease the burden suffered due to the losses of fellow participants. 
57 
The participant's contribution is his or her donation for the good of others, not for himself 
and is therefore different from the case of a trap, which is deliberately fixed by the 
deceased for his own gain. 58 The proceeds payable belong to the participants, not the 
takäful operator. 59 
Therefore, even though it is the deceased's effort, the money is more appropriately to be 
regarded as an obligation upon the takdful operator or the insurance company to pay, as 
financial assistance to the insured's family in case of death. This monetary obligation is 
directly based on the agreement or promises stated in the contract. In other words, the 
takaful operator or insurance company agrees to pay the proceeds, and the matter of to 
whom they are paid should be freely and totally left to the agreement between the 
policyholder and the company. 
If the participation in the takäful and insurance activity renders the participant the right to 
the proceeds as his financial right, as claimed by some Muslim scholars, 60 it would mean 
S' Yusof, Mohd. Fazli, Takaful; Sistem Insurans Islam, p. 7. 
58 Bakar, Mohamad Daud, interview on 11'' September 2003. He is the Presidcnt/CEO of International 
Institute of Islamic Finance (IIIF) Inc. (BVI) and Amanie Business Solutions Sdn. Bhd. Prior to this he was 
the Deputy Rector of Student Affairs and Development and an Associate Professor at the International 
Islamic University Malaysia. He is the authority in Islamic Legal Theory and Islamic Finance in Malaysia. 
He is currently a member of the Central Syari'ah Advisory Council of the Central Bank of Malaysia and 
Securities Commission of Malaysia. He is also a member of Syari'ah board of Accounting and Auditing 
Organiz tion for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) (Bahrain), Intonational Islamic Financial Market 
(IIFM) (Bahrain), and Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (New York). Sec International Institute of Islamic 
Finance, Inc., Events [online], available from: http: //www. iiif-inc. com/iiif/cvc 04. php [accessed 31" 
October 2005]. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. According to Mohamad Daud Bakar, there are some Muslim scholars who claim that the right to the 
proceeds is a financial right of the policyholder. In his article, he argued that the family takaful benefits 
constitute the participant's estate on the ground that sections 65(1) and (4) of the Takaful Act, 1984 state 
that the proper claimant would claim the money on his capacity as an executor and not as the beneficiary. 
See Bakar, Mohd Daud, "Kedudukan Hibah Di Dalam Perundangan Islam dan Sivil (Rujukan Khas Untuk 
Takaful Keluarga)", the closed seminar on Hibah: It's Model and Application in Takaful Perspective, on 
12`h March 2003 at Parkroyal, Kuala Lumpur. 
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that by merely joining the insurance or takoful plan, the participant is engaging in a 
business which entitles him or her to financial benefits in terms of wealth creation in his 
or her or the family's favour. This would also mean that simply by joining the scheme, 
the participant is entering into a contract that would in return provide an amount of 
money exceeding the amount contributed. 
If this argument is accepted, it is worth noting that it would amount to a ribmvi 
transaction and undoubtedly be unlawful. This in turn would make the whole takaful or 
conventional insurance contract invalid according to Islamic law. Being a ribmvi 
transaction, there would be no issue regarding the succession of the money payable 
because the money received by the participant or his beneficiaries clearly constitutes 
`haram' and therefore not subject to inheritance, apart from the premiums the participant 
has paid. At the same time, it would be equivalent to a gambling activity in the sense that 
the policyholder enters into the contract with the hope of gaining more than he or she 
contributes based on chance. 
c) The Analogy to the Payment of Diyyah or 11aman 
It is assumed that the payment of money in favour of the dead insured's or participant's 
legal heirs as compensation is analogous with the payment of diyyah in the case of 
murder in Islamic law. The diyyah (blood-wit) or monetary compensation imposed 
against the murderer is paid in favour of the legal heirs of the victim. 
62 
62 Al-Quran al-Nisä' (4): 92 which reads "Never should a believer kill a believer, but (if it so happens) by 
mistake, (compensation is due); if one (so) kills a believer, it is ordained that he should free a beleieving 
slave, and pay compensation to the deceased's family, unless they remit it freely. " 
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It should be noted that the payment of diyyah to the heirs of the victim in the case of an 
intentional killing for example, is based on an Qur'änic injunction and is apparently 
different from the payment of benefits under the Family takäful or conventional life 
insurance policy. The entitlement of legal heirs to the diyyah is based on their 
relationship with the victim, whereas the objective of the takaful or insurance policy 
when paying benefits is to provide financial help and assistance for the purpose of easing 
the burden of the insured's dependants. In other words, if the money payable by the 
takäful policy is distributed among the legal heirs following the farä'id law, the basic 
purpose and objective of takäful might be defeated because the money could possibly be 
distributed in favour of heirs who are not really affected financially by the insured's or 
participant's demise. 
It should be observed that a legal heir is not necessarily dependent on the policyholder. 
The dependants of the deceased are normally those who depended financially for their 
lives and maintenance on the deceased. This may include adopted sons and daughters 
who might be in real need of the deceased's financial support for things such as 
education. It may also include relatives who are not heirs but, due to his or her 
generosity, the deceased voluntarily supported them especially in terms of education. 
These are examples of people who are de jure excluded from inheritance according to the 
farä'id law. If the payment is distributed according to the farä'id law, these people would 
receive nothing whereas they are the people who are most affected by the demise of the 
policyholder. In other words, excluding these dependants from receiving any benefit from 
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the payment, and including those who are not affected financially by the death would 
contradict the purpose of the takaful or insurance activity. 
According to Tanzil al-Rahman, the monetary compensation conferred by the 
government in favour of the family of a dead employee, a person who dies in an accident 
due to the negligent conduct of a motorist or a one who dies in a riot, should be 
distributed following the faräi'd law as applicable to the blood-wit under the Islamic law 
of diyyah. 63 He states that even though the compensation money payable in the above- 
mentioned cases does not belong to the deceased and does not constitute the deceased's 
`tarikah', it is distributed among the deceased heirs as prescribed in the Qur'an. 64 
There appears to be no Qur'anic injunction or Prophetic Tradition stating that monetary 
compensation must be distributed according to the farä'i4 law. 65 In the case of 
compensation paid by a government or employer to the employee's family upon his or 
her death, it is in the nature of financial help rather than a legal obligation. If all kinds of 
compensations regardless of their underlying nature are divisible according to the farü'ia 
law, it might prevent a government or employer from paying such compensation due to 
the fact that the money would not necessarily reach the actual affected people. It is not an 
exaggeration to note in this context that the same idea should apply to the takdful or 
63 Rahman, Tanzil-ur, p. 407. 
64 Ibid. 
65 There was a fatwa issued by the National Fatwa Council of Malaysia on 19th September 2000 that 
monetary compensation does not constitute a part of the deceased's estate. A similar fatwa was issued by 
the Terengganu Fatwä Council stating that monetary compensation does not constitute the estate of the 
deceased. See www. islam. gov. my in the category of Wang Pampasan and also Wang Ganjaran 
Perkhidmatan. 
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insurance benefit in the sense that it is a kind of financial help and hence limiting its 
distribution to the heirs of the deceased would defeat the purpose of the activity. 
d) The Objectives of the Takaful and Conventional Life Insurance Policy 
The primary objective of the takäful and life insurance policy is to provide financial 
assistance to the participant's or insured's family. If the payment is payable strictly only 
to the heirs of the participants or insured, it implies that it is the property of the deceased. 
If this is so, the money is subject to the fulfilment of certain rights that must be carried 
out before distribution to the heirs, such as the payment of burial expenses and the 
deceased's debts. This would mean that the compensation is not being used to ease the 
burden of the family but rather it seems that other fellow participants are under an 
obligation to settle the debts of the dead participants. In this regard, the creditors would 
have prior rights over the participant's dependants. The dependants would only receive 
the benefits after the creditors' claims have been satisfied. 
Furthermore, by considering it an estate for inheritance purposes, the takäful and 
insurance activity becomes a source of income. This is contradictory to the purpose of 
takäful and insurance: mutual cooperation to ease a burden. Moreover, rendering it a 
source of income may encourage a participant to deliberately undertake activities that 
could endanger his or her life in order to realise the income. This is in fact an attitude that 
clearly contradicts the aim of insurance. A life can not be exchanged for money. 
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6.1.6. Conclusion 
Considering the above arguments, it is submitted that the money payable by the takäful 
operator and the insurance company in the case of the death of a participant or insured 
should not be distributed among his legal heirs. The analogy between such payments and 
the payment of diyyah in the case of a trapped animal or fish, and the payment of 
monetary compensation based on the doctrine of glamän seems incorrect. Inserting a 
clause legally and strictly imposing a duty on the appointed nominee to distribute the 
money among the legal heirs of the dead participant seems to contradict the objective of 
both the takäful and insurance activity. Inserting such a clause as currently practiced in 
Malaysia is not based on valid arguments. 
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6.2. THE GOVERNMENT RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
6.2.1. Introduction 
The Government of Malaysia provides a retirement benefits scheme for pensionable 
officers in government service who have retired in accordance with Malaysian pension 
laws. These benefits are granted only in favour of government employees who have 
gained permanent employment status. In order to qualify for this status, a government 
employee must have been confirmed in his employment and must have completed not 
less than 3 years of reckonable service. 68 
This research is an attempt to analyse the related issues of the scheme in order to answer 
the question regarding its heritability in the case of Malaysia. The current position is 
rather confusing because of the differences in opinion among Muslim scholars regarding 
whether or not the scheme is heritable upon death. Some jurists are of the view that the 
Malaysian Government's current implementation of this scheme by imposing strict rules 
regarding the entitlement of specific persons to the benefits after the death of a 
pensionable officer does not meet the Syari ah principles, whereas according to others it 
does. This is a contemporary issue, and an answer can not be found by simply referring to 
the Qur'an, the Prophetic Traditions and the classical writings of Muslim scholars. Thus, 
this research will analyse in depth the nature of the retirement benefits scheme, as well as 
the legal contract of service between the Government and the officer. The issue of 
heritability can only be addressed after gaining a comprehensive understanding of what 
68 http: //%vww. jpa. Rov. my/ipai/sisteinL/penccn/default. htm [accessed 20th January 2004]. 
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the scheme is. The difference in opinion of Muslim scholars on this issue are studied and 
it will be seen that, unfortunately, these opinions are not based on convincing facts, and, 
furthermore, are not informative enough to allow Muslims an in depth understanding of 
the verdicts. 
6.2.2 Differences of Opinion among Muslim Scholars Regarding the Heritability of 
Government Pension Benefits 
There are various opinions among Muslim scholars regarding the question as to whether 
or not retirement benefits, in particular the pension, are heritable by the legal heirs upon 
the pensioner's death. Looking into these opinions, the main issue that creates 
disagreement is to do with whether the scheme is the right of a pensionable officer or not. 
In other words, the determination of the heritability of the scheme depends primarily on 
whether it is the pensioner's right or not. 
According to Tanzil al-Rahman, the pension is a right of the deceased officer, and hence 
it is part of his or her estate. 69 He argues that the pension is in fact an additional benefit of 
the employee that arises from the terms of service. As it is included in the terms of 
service, it is therefore held to be a justifiable right of the employee upon the completion 
of the period of service as stipulated under the service regulations. He added that without 
any valid reason, an employee should not be deprived of such a right. 70 However, his 
opinion is based on his analogy to the monthly salary following his reference to the 
69 Rahman, Tanzil-al, p. 400. 
70 Ibid. 
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decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of A. W. Issac. 7' In this case, the 
Court held that the salary paid by the Government to a government servant is the right of 
the latter. 72 Based on this, he asserts that the only difference between the right to a salary 
and the right to a pension is merely that the right to a salary is an existing right, whereas 
the right to a pension as a gratuity is a contingent, deferred and conditional right which, 
on arising out of the contingency or fulfilment of the condition comes into existence and 
becomes enforceable in law against the employer. 73 
It should be noted that Muda points to the opinions of Zaid Muhammad and Abdullah 
Abu Bakr, two prominent Muslim scholars at the Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, the 
International Islamic University of Malaysia. According to Zaid Mohammad, a pension 
paid by the Government in favour of the pensionable officer is part of the estate of that 
officer after he or she dies. 74 In other words, after the pensionable officer dies, the 
pension must be paid in accordance with the farä'id law. The argument here is that such 
an entitlement is deliberately allocated by the Government and hence, it is the 
pensionable officer who owns the original title to the pension and not the spouse or 
children. Abdullah Abu Bakar shares the same view and focuses on the question of 
ownership. He further suggests that the distribution of the pension should be made in 
accordance with the farä'4i law at the time it is paid. 75 
71 PLD 1948 P. C. 150, cited in Tanzil-ur-Rahman, p. 400. 
n Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Muda, Zulkifli, Hak-Hak Akibat Pertukaran Agama Dan Maihab, unpublished Ph. D thesis, University 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1999, p. 426-427. 
75 Muda, pp. 426-427. 
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Tanzil al-Rahman writes that, according to Mawlana Mufti Muhammad Sabir in his book 
Mishkät al-Siräj, the pension is not the right of a pensioner but a reward and therefore it 
is not the estate of the deceased. In contrast, Zulkifli Muda in his thesis disagrees with the 
opinions of Zaid Mohamad and Abdullah Abu Bakr. To him, the pension is not an estate 
of the deceased on the grounds that it is a kind of reward from the Government. 
76 is 
argument is that the calculation used for ascertaining the amount of the pension is made 
at the time it is received and not at the beginning of the retirement. Furthermore, it is a 
kind of financial assistance from the Government to the pensionable officer and his or her 
family. 77 
A fatwä issued by the Terengganu Fatwa Council stated that a government officer's 
pension entitlement is not heritable. This fatwa is based on the notion that the scheme is 
similar to a reward and compensation arrangement. However, unfortunately, the fatwä 
does not discuss the issue comprehensively. It fails to cite arguments and reasoning to 
support the ruling. Furthermore, this fatwä is clearly confined merely to pensions and 
does not cover other kinds of benefits under such schemes. 
6.2.3. The Significance of Government Retirement Benefits 
It is well understood that when a person retires, they lose a significant source of earnings, 
which not only affects them but also the family. When an employee retires from a job 
that has been their only source of income, they and their family are left in a very 
vulnerable situation. As a government servant, an officer is offered two types of 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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retirements, known as the compulsory retirement and the optional retirement 
78 It is a 
matter of fact that a government officer has to retire from his job once the age of 
compulsory retirement is attained, which is fifty five, or whenever required to do so by 
law79 and hence, has no choice except to lose the source of income on which he or she 
and the family have depended on. 
The introduction of government retirement benefits for its officers is therefore quite 
useful. It seems that this scheme allows the financial burden of retired officers to be 
released. It is among the objectives of the pension schemes introduced by the 
government to provide financial security for its retired officers and their dependants. 
80 
Besides providing this financial facility upon retirement, the benefits are also intended as 
a reward from the Government to the retired officers in terms of recognition of their 
loyalty and dedication during their service. 81 It is also regarded as compensation from the 
Government to officers who are forced by law to retire or who die due to injuries or 
sickness in the course of performing their official duties. 
82 
78 http: //www. ipa. tiov. mY/ipai. sistem/pencen/default. htm 
79 Besides the attainment of the compulsory age of retirement, the other grounds for compulsory retirement 
are medical, the abolition of the office held by the officer, reorganization of the department for the purpose 
of facilitating improvement in the organization, the termination of the officer's employment in the public 
interest, the officer has voluntarily acquired citizenship of another country (effective for officers appointed 
on or after 16 May 1986) and that the officer has provided false information for the purpose of 
his 
appointment to the public service or the service of a statutory or local authority (effective for officers 
appointed on or after 12 April 1991. See Ibid. 
8 Other objectives of the pension scheme are as a reward from the Government in recognition of the 
officer's loyal and dedicated service, as an inducement to officers to remain in the Government's service 
and to provide compensation to officers who are forced to retire or die due to injuries or sickness in the 
course of performing their official duties. See ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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The permanent Government officers and their dependants are constitutionally granted 
retirement benefits. Their rights to these benefits are well protected and enshrined in 
article 74 of the Federal Constitution as well as in paragraph 6(d) of List 1 of the Ninth 
Schedule of the Federal Constitution, which among other things states that pensions and 
compensation for loss of office; gratuities and conditions of service are federal matters. 
Article 147(1) further reads: 
"The law applicable to any pension, gratuity or other like allowance (in 
this article referred to as an "award") granted to a member of any of the 
public services, or to his widow, children, dependant or personal 
representatives, shall be that in force on the relevant day or any later law 
not less favourable to the person to whom the award is made. " 
The Government introduced the scheme to protect retired government officers and their 
dependants upon retirement in terms of financial facilities. By virtue of the 
abovementioned constitutional statutory provisions, the Federal Government enacted 
several Acts and statutory regulations to govern matters relating to retirement benefits. 
These are the Pensions Act, 1980 (Act 227), the Pensions Re-Computation Act, 1980 
(Act 228), the Pensions Adjustment Act, 1980 (Act 238), the Statutory and Local 
Authorities Pensions Act, 1980 (Act 239), the Pensions Trust Fund Act, 1991 (Act 454) 
and the Pensions Regulations, 1980. 
The government retirement benefits are covered by the public sector pension scheme. 
This scheme covers such benefits for officers in the Public Service, employees of 
Statutory and Local Authorities, Members of Parliament and the Administration, Political 
Secretaries, Judges and the Armed Forces. The scheme is administered by the Pension 
Division of the Public Service Department, which is entrusted with the responsibility for 
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administering retirement benefits efficiently and effectively in accordance with the 
regulations currently in force, to ensure that eligible pensioners enjoy the benefits of 
retirement promptly. 
6.2.4. Types of Retirement Benefits 
It is important to note that the retirement benefits83 are mainly for the benefit not only of 
the retired officers but also their dependants. In this regard, there are benefits allocated in 
favour of the officer and benefits that are specifically for dependants. The service pension 
and the service gratuity are solely for the pensionable officer. The service pension is 
granted to the officer who retires in accordance with the provisions in the pensions laws 
whereas, the service gratuity is a lump sum payment granted upon retirement. The former 
is paid every month after retirement and the latter is paid once upon retirement. 
The pensionable officer is also entitled to a disability pension, an alimentary allowance 
and a cash award in lieu of accumulated leave. The disability pension is granted to an 
officer who is required to retire as a result of sustaining an injury in the course of 
performing an official duty or because of a travel accident or from contracting a disease 
to which he was exposed to by the nature of his duty. This benefit is in addition to the 
service pension. However, it is only granted if the injury sustained or disease contracted 
is not directly attributable to the officer's negligence or misconduct. The alimentary 
allowance is a monthly payment and may be granted when a pensioner is adjudged a 
bankrupt or convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment or death, whereupon his 
pension ceases with immediate effect. The cash award in lieu of accumulated leave is for 
83 http: //www. ipa. og v. my/ipai. sistenVpencen/default. htm 
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officers in the Public Service and is given in exchange for leave not taken on account of 
exigencies of service whereby the officer is permitted to accumulate up to half of his 
vacation leave eligibility subject to a maximum of 15 days in any one year. 
A derivative pension, a derivative gratuity and a dependant's pension are especially 
allocated to the dependants of the pensionable officer. A derivative pension is granted to 
the widow, widower or child of a permanent and confirmed officer who dies in service or 
during retirement. On the other hand, a derivative gratuity is a lump sum payment granted 
to the widow, widower, child or dependant parent of the deceased or the legal personal 
representative of the deceased officer if the officer dies in service. A dependant's pension 
is granted to the dependants (widow/widower, child or dependant parent, whichever 
applicable) of the officer who dies as a result of sustaining injuries in the course of 
performing his official duty or in a travel accident or from contracting a disease to which 
he is exposed to by the nature of his duty or dies within 7 years of sustaining the injury or 
contracting the disease. This dependant's pension is in addition to the derivative pension 
payable to the widow, widower or child. 
All these benefits payable to the dependants of the pensionable officer are made only 
after his or her death. In other words, these payments seem merely to replace the benefits 
that are received by the pensionable officer during retirement. After the pensionable 
officer dies either during service or after retirement, the dependants, including any 
adopted children and pensionable parents, are paid all these benefits. 
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6.2.5. Do the Retirement Benefits Constitute an Absolute Right of a Pensionable 
Officer? 
It is to be noted that the objectives of the government retirement benefits, they come into 
existence as a result of an initiative taken by the Government. By offering such benefits, 
the Government can attract officers to stay in the public sector considering the fact that 
such benefits will protect them and their families in terms of financial resources after 
retirement. It is also a way for the Government to demonstrate its appreciation of the 
loyalty and dedication shown by pensionable officers during their service. In this regard, 
these benefits are not considered as an entitlement of the pensionable officers. They are 
merely acts of generosity on the part of the Government in conferring rewards or 
assistance to their former staff after they retire. This is supported by the statutory 
provision of section 3(1) of the Pensions Act 1980: 
"(1) No officer shall have an absolute right to compensation for past 
service or to any pension, gratuity or other benefit under this Act. " 
Section 3(1) of the Statutory And Local Authorities Pensions Act 1980 also states 
to similar effect: 
"No employee shall have an absolute right to compensation for past 
service or to any pension, gratuity or other benefits under this Act. " 
In Haji Wan Othman & Ors v Government of the Federation of Malaya, 84 the Court was 
asked to declare the entitlement of several government pensioners to the full money value 
of the full pension for the remaining period of their lives after ten years of retirement. 
84[1965]2MLJ31 
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The Court decided that the pension scheme is not an absolute right of a government 
officer and as the pensioners had been paid the gratuity in lieu of their pension they had 
forfeited their eligibility for the full pension. The Court therefore refused to make a 
declaration in the pensioners' favour. 
There are some circumstances that prevent pensionable officers from receiving the 
benefits. If it were an absolute right of the pensionable officers, there should be nothing 
that could bar them from receiving these benefits. However, as it is a mere creation of the 
Government, there are limitations that may hinder the pensionable from enjoying these 
benefits. Such a hindrance is stated in section 3(2) of the Pensions Act 1980 that reads: 
"Where the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that an officer has been 
guilty of negligence, irregularity or misconduct, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong may reduce or withhold a pension, gratuity or other benefit for 
which the officer would have been eligible but for the provision of this 
section. i85 
It is therefore understood that because these benefits are a mere product of the 
Government to fairly treat its former employees, the Government is free to insert any 
rules and regulations pertaining to the entitlement. On the other hand, if it were an 
absolute right of the pensionable officers, the Government certainly would have no right 
to add any conditions restricting or preventing the officers from exercising their rights. 
Furthermore, the amounts received from these benefits are decided unilaterally by the 
Government and based on a mathematical calculation exclusively and solely prepared by 
85 The similar effect is stated in section 3(2) of the Statutory And Local Authorities Pensions Act 1980 
which reads: "Where it is established to the satisfaction of the Minister by an appropriate authority that an 
employee has been guilty of negligence, irregularity or misconduct, the Minister may reduce or withhold 
the pension, gratuity or other benefit for which such employee would be eligible but for this section. " 
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the Government. The pensionable officer receives the benefit without contributing any 
money; his contribution is merely his long, loyal and dedicated service. 
With regard to pension adjustments, a restriction is imposed whereby these are only 
granted to pensioners who are resident in Malaysia. 86 Again, this supports the contention 
that it is not an absolute right of the pensioner. This regulation rules out the entitlement to 
the pension adjustment of a pensioner who is not resident in Malaysia. In Dato' Ahmad 
Bin Yunus v Kerajaan Malaysia, 87 the plaintiff, a retired government servant, sought a 
declaration that he, for the purpose of ss 1(2) and 2 of the Pensions Adjustment Act 1980, 
was a `resident of Malaysia' and therefore entitled to all adjustments made and /or to be 
made in favour of pensioners resident in Malaysia under the Act. The defendant argued 
that the plaintiff had ceased to be a resident of Malaysia and hence was not entitled to the 
pension adjustment. The Court however held that since the plaintiff had initially stayed in 
the United Kingdom only in order to protect the Malaysian Government's interest, he 
should not be in any way penalized for obtaining the permanent residence status in the 
United Kingdom. The Court further ruled that to deprive him of his pension adjustment 
benefits would be unfair and unjust. 
Similar restrictions can be found when one observes any of these benefits. For example, 
in the case of a derivative pension, which is payable to the widow, widower or children, 
if the widow or widower remarries, or the child attains the age of 21 years, the derivative 
pension ceases to be payable. The same applies to a child who is pursuing education in an 
86 h"p: ///www. jpa. gov. my/ipai/sistem/pencen/default. htm 
87 [2002] 1 MLJ 288 
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institution of higher learning leading to a first degree, the derivative pension ceases to be 
payable upon their completion of the course, if they cease to receive such education or if 
they marry. In the case of a disability pension, an officer who has already been awarded 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1952 is not eligible for a 
disability pension. 
6.2.6. Do the Retirement Benefits Arise from the Terms of the Contract of Service? 
To further analyze the nature of the retirement benefits, it is best to consider the 
agreement between the Government i. e. the employer, with the employee that determines 
the rights and benefits as well as the duties of both parties. The significant issue to be 
discussed here is whether the contract of service between both parties gives rise to the 
retirement benefits in favour of the employee. In this regard, if the contract obliges the 
employer to provide all these benefits, it would seem that the benefits are the rights of the 
employee and if not, the statutory provisions mentioned previously are supported and 
they are not the absolute right of the employee. 
In Islamic law, the contract of service is a type of contract of hire or ijärah. 88 The four 
Sunni schools of law, in their respective definitions of the contract of hire unanimously 
agree that it is a contract exclusively based upon usufruct or manfa`ah. 89 The Mejelle 
defines Uj rah as the sale of a known benefit in return for its known equivalent. 90 In other 
words, it is a type of sale contract in which the subject matter is the usufruct or 
88 Mahmood, Nik Ahmad Kamal Nik, Kontrak Pekerjaan: Saw Analisa Perbandingan, Al-Ahkam, Jilid 7, 
Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 2000, p. 97. 
89 Al-Zuhayli, vol. 4, pp. 730-73 1. 
90 The Mejelle, article, 404. 
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manfa`ah. 91 Unlike the corpus of the thing that exists at the beginning of the contract, the 
usufruct, which becomes the subject matter of the contract of hire, comes into existence 
only after the completion of the contract. 92 With regard to the contract of service, this is a 
contract whereby one party contracts to provide the usufruct in terms of providing a 
service to the other party. 93 In other words, it is a contract of hiring a party for 
employment purposes. 94 
The contract of hire does exist in Islamic law and is based on the Qur'änic verse al-Taläq 
(65): 6. This verse expresses the necessity of a father to give wages to the mother who 
offers to breast-feed his child. A similar idea is found in verses al-Qqaý (28): 26 and 27 
regarding the appointment of a person as a shepherd where in return, the promise of the 
daughter's hand in marriage was made in favour of the shepherd. There are also several 
hadiths that explain the necessity of giving wages to workers for their services, which 
support the existence of the contract of hire in Islamic law as prescribed in the Qur'än. 
Abü Hurayrah stated that the Prophet Muhammad ordered the giving of wages to the 
worker before the worker's sweat becomes dry. In another hadith, the Prophet 
Muhammad mentioned the significance of stipulating in the contract of service the 
amount of wages to be paid for the service rendered. 95 
91 Al-Zuhayli, p. 730. 
92 Ibid, p. 736. 
93 Teng Kam Wah, Who is an employee?, [1997] 2MLJ ci. 
94 The Mejelle, article 421. 
95 Al-Zuhayli, pp. 730-731 
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For a contract of service to be valid, there are four essentials that must be fulfilled 
according to the majority of Muslim scholars: the Mälikis, Syäfiis and Hanbalis. The 
four essentials are that there must be two parties to the contract as well as an offer and an 
acceptance and the wage and usufruct. 96 The Hanafis on the other hand consider only the 
hire pronouncement and the wage as the essentials of the hire contract. 97 Regardless of 
this difference, the most significant element to be discussed is the right of the employee 
to receive a wage for services rendered. The wage in favour of the employee is 
unanimously agreed upon by the four Sunni schools of law as an essential of the contract 
of service; without the element of a wage the contract of service does not exist. 
In this regard, the entitlement to a wage arises out of the service offered by the employer. 
It is stated in article 424 of the Mejelle that the right of the common employee to pay 
arises as a result of the work being done. This means that once the employee resigns, he 
is no longer entitled to a wage. However, if it is a condition stipulated in the contract and 
agreed upon by both parties that there is a continuity of the entitlement to the wage after 
the expiration of the contract, the employee is still entitled to the wage. 
It is important to note that the only absolute right of an employee that arises from his 
contract of service is the wage. It is submitted that other employee entitlements to 
payment and benefits are completely dependent upon the conditions agreed upon by both 
parties. The contract of service is equivalent to any other commercial contract such as a 
contract of sale. In this contract, there is an exchange of things that constitute both the 
96 Ibid, pp. 731. 
97 Ibid. 
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subject matter and the consideration of the contract. The service rendered by the 
employee is the subject matter of the contract and the wage paid by the employer to the 
employee is the consideration. As with the contract of sale, the seller is entitled to the 
proceeds of the sale and the buyer is entitled to the goods delivered. Besides this, any 
conditions inserted in the contract for the benefit of either party and mutually agreed 
upon by them are lawfully binding upon them as stipulated-99 
In Haji Wan Othman & Ors v. Government of the Federation of Malaya, 1 °° the Court 
stated that the right to the pension scheme does not arise from the contract of service: 
"In determining this question it is in my opinion sufficient only to examine 
the nature of Government pensions. There is no doubt that it is in 
Government's interest to pay pensions because they ensure devoted 
service and the retention of the service of experienced and skilled officers, 
but pensions are not payable by Government because of a contract with its 
employees; they are payable by virtue of the Pensions Ordinance, 1951, 
and its predecessor from which it departs little if at all. The Ordinance 
does not say that when a public servant has worked so many years at such 
and such a salary he shall be entitled to receive so many pension a month 
from Government. " 
6.2.7. The Difference between the Government Retirement Benefits Scheme and 
the Employee Provident Fund (EPF) 
The Employee Provident Fund is a government statutory body that provides financial 
security for its members, especially after retirement, through a compulsory savings 
scheme. Under section 6A (1) of the Pensions Act, officers are given the option of 
99 Al-Zuhayli, p. 736. The mutual agreement of both parties to the contract is a condition necessary to make 
the contract valid. This is based on the Qur'Anic injunction which prescribes the mutual agreement of the 
parties to the contract in al-Nisä' (4): 29. 
0°[1965]2MLJ31 
222 
choosing either the government pension scheme or the Employees Provident Fund 
Scheme: 
"An officer appointed on or after the commencement of this section shall, 
before being confirmed in his appointment, be entitled to opt for the 
Employees Provident Fund Scheme. " 
This scheme was introduced on 1s` October 1951 under the Employee Provident Fund Act 
195 1.101 The Act has been amended several times and the current Act is the Employee 
Provident Fund Act 1991. Unlike the Public Service Pension scheme, which is a pension 
scheme governed by the Government, the EPF is a kind of savings scheme. Being a 
savings-based scheme, the EPF allows the contributors to withdraw their EPF savings at 
age 55 and enjoy a comfortable life without worrying about not having a regular income 
upon retirement. 102 As supplementary benefits, members are also allowed to utilize part 
of their savings for house ownership, children's education and healthcare. 
The employer and the employee contribute to the EPF member's account every month. 
These contributions are based on the remittance of a percentage of the employee's 
monthly salary; currently employers contribute 12 per cent of the employee's salary 
while the employee contributes 11 per cent. 103 This combined contribution is then 
deposited in various banks where it is invested to accumulate interest or dividends. By 
101 http: //www. kwsp. gov. my/englishibody epf frequently asked gucstions. html [accessed 8th August 
2003] 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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the time a member retires, he has a considerable amount of savings, with compounded 
dividends, which he can withdraw to provide for his financial needs. 104 
There is an important difference between the pension scheme and the EPF. The 
retirement benefits that provide financial facilities for the pensionable officer come from 
a fund to which the Government is the sole contributor. There is no monetary 
contribution from the employee into the fund that is in turn used to pay these benefits. On 
the other hand, the EPF is a savings-based scheme and the members of the scheme are the 
absolute owners of the money in their account. The payment made by the employer to the 
employees' accounts can therefore be regarded as a gift inter vivos, which entitles the 
member to full ownership. In other words, no question is raised in terms of the 
heritability of the EPF member's account. The money belongs solely to the EPF member 
and therefore, when he or she dies the money in the EPF account should be distributed in 
accordance with the law of farä'id. 
6.2.8. Conclusion 
To sum up, based on the contentions discussed above, it is submitted that the Government 
retirement benefits are not heritable. The current practice adopted by the Government of 
granting such benefits to certain persons upon the death of the pensionable officer does 
not apparently contradict the principles of the Syari ah. The Government is therefore free 
to determine in whose favour the benefits may be granted. When deciding who the 
rightful recipients are the Government should certainly take into account appropriate 
104 Ibid. 
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criteria such as the level of dependency of the recipients upon the dead pensionable 
officer. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE JURISDICTION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE 
SYARIAH COURTS AS REGARDS THE ISLAMIC LAW OF 
SUCCESSON 
7.1. Introduction 
The State List in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution lists the matters 
pertaining to Islamic law, including the Islamic law of succession, that are within the 
power of the State Legislative Assembly and hence, it is the Syariah courts which should 
have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with these matters. However, looking into the way the 
administration of deceased Muslims' estates is undertaken at present, it is apparent that 
the opposite phenomenon is currently and legally practiced. 
This chapter undertakes to analyze and examine the current jurisdiction of the Syariah 
courts over matters pertaining to the Islamic law of succession in Malaysia. The relevant 
statutory provisions of the Federal Constitution, federal Acts, state enactments and the 
Malaysian case law are analyzed, examined and commented on. This study is necessary 
because it presents the judicial discussion on the statutory task carried out by the Syariah 
courts pertaining to Muslim succession. These courts are supposed to be the most 
appropriate forum for the administration and adjudication of such cases. As a personal 
law of Muslims, its position in the Federal Constitution and the interest of Muslims must 
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be taken into serious consideration in the current implementation and future legislative 
reforms of the law. 
7.2. State Legislative Powers and the Establishment of the Syariah Courts 
The federation system as applied in Malaysia characterizes the division of power between 
the Federal Government and the state governments. The power of governing the country 
is centralized under the Federal Government. The states' powers are confined to the 
individual territorial states and no state has jurisdiction beyond its own territory. ' The 
Federal Constitution is the supreme law in Malaysia. 2 It distinguishes the scope of 
legislative powers conferred upon the State Legislative Assembly from those of the 
Federal Legislative Assembly i. e. the Parliament. Article 74 (2) of the Federal 
Constitution provides: 
"Without prejudice to any power to make laws conferred on it by any 
other Article the Legislature of a State may make laws with respect to any 
of the matters enumerated in the State List (that is to say, the Second List 
set out in the Ninth Schedule) or the Concurrent List. " 
The State List of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution spells out in detail the 
matters that fall within the State Legislative Assembly's power to enact laws. The 
Syariah courts, which are regarded as religious courts3 were accordingly established by 
virtue of Item 1 of the State List. The State List provides that the constitution, 
organization and procedure of the Syariah courts are within the jurisdiction of the State 
' Hashim, Tun Mohamed Suffian, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: 
Government Printer, 1972, p. 10-17. 
2 Article 4 (1) states: " This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed after 
Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 3 According to Mahmud Zuhdi, the present Malaysian Syariah courts do not qualify as Syariah courts 
according to the Syariah law, but are religious courts as far as secular thought is concerned. See Zuhdi, 
Mahmud, Pengantar Undang- Undang Islam di Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1997, p. 
155. 
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Legislative Assembly with the exception of the Federal Territories. Matters pertaining to 
the administration of Islamic law are also within the State Legislature's jurisdiction. The 
State List (List II) of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution states that: 
"Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and 
Labuan, Islamic Law and the personal and family law of persons 
professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to 
succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, 
maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, partitions and non- 
charitable trusts; wakafs and the definition and regulation of charitable and 
religious trusts, the appointment of trustees and the incorporation of 
persons in respect of Islamic religious and charitable endowments, 
institutions, trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating wholly 
within the State; Malay customs; Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar 
Islamic religious revenue; mosques or any Islamic public places of 
worship, creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the 
religion of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to 
matters included in the Federal List; the constitution, organization and 
procedure of Syariah courts which shall have jurisdiction only over 
persons professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the 
matters included in this paragraph, but shall not have jurisdiction in 
respect of offences except in so far as conferred by federal law, the control 
of propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion 
of Islam; the determination of matters of Islamic law and the doctrine of 
Malay custom. " 
Malaysia is divided into thirteen states and the Federal Territory, which consists of Kuala 
Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan. As far as Islamic law is concerned, there are fourteen 
enactments containing provisions for its administration, each state having its own 
enactment. These enactments contain relatively similar provisions. The state of Selangor 
a) The Administration of Islamic Law Enactment, 1989 (Selangor), b) The Administration of Islamic Law 
Enactment 1955 (Terengganu) c) The Administration of the Religion of Islam and Malay Custom 
Enactment 1982 (Pahang) d) The Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1959 (Pulau Pinang) e) The 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1960 (Negeri Sembilan) 0 The Administration of Muslim Law 
Enactment 1965 (Perak) g) The Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 (Johore) h) The 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1977 (Sabah) i) The Administration of the Syariah Court 
Enactment 1982 (Kelantan) j) The Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1962 and Mahkamah Syariah 
Enactment 1983 (Kedah) k) The Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1959 (Malacca) 1) The Laws of 
the Sarawak Malay Court 1915 and the Majlis Islam Ordinance 1978 (Sarawak) m) The Administration of 
Muslim Law Enactment, 1963 (Perlis) and n) The Islamic Law (Federal Territory) Act, 1993. 
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was the first state to introduce such legislation with its Administration of Islamic Law 
Enactment of 1952. This was subsequently followed by other states. 5 The present 
constitution of the Syariah Court of Selangor is stated in section 37 of the Administration 
of Islamic Law Enactment 1989 (Selangor): 
"His Royal Highness the Sultan may, on the advice of the Majlis by 
notification in the Gazette, constitute Syariah Subordinate Courts, a 
Syariah High Court and Syariah Appeal Court for the State at such places 
as he considers fit. " 
In the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, the Syariah courts were 
established by section 40 of the Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993: 
(1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong, on the advice of the Minister, may by 
notification in the Gazette constitute Syariah Subordinate Courts for 
the Federal Territories at such places as he considers fit. 
(2) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong, on the advice of the Minister, may by 
notification in the Gazette constitute a Syariah High Court for the 
Federal Territories. 
(3) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong, on the advice of the Minister, may by 
notification in the Gazette constitute a Syariah Appeal Court for the 
Federal Territories. 
7.3. Jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts pertaining to Muslim's Succession 
It is significant to note that, as the Syariah courts are subject to the state governments, 
their jurisdiction is confined to the territorial state in which it is established. Furthermore, 
as they work as Islamic religious courts, they are not empowered to adjudicate disputes 
that involve non-Muslim parties and are also limited to the matters enumerated in the 
State List. 6 In other words, the jurisdiction of the Syariah court is confined to hearing 
s Yaacob, Abdul Monir, "Syariah Courts in Malaysia: Past, Present and Future", in: Ibrahim, Ahmad & 
Yaacob, Abdul Monir, eds., The Administration of Islamic Laws, Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1997, pp. 23-29. 
6 See item I of the State List of the Federal Constitution which provides: "... the constitution, organization 
and procedure of Syariah courts which shall have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of 
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cases concerning Muslims who reside in the state where it operates. Their primary 
functions are to enforce the Islamic religious observances and implement the Islamic laws 
relating to the matrimonial matters of Muslims. 7 The criminal and civil jurisdictions of 
the Syariah courts are stated in enactments or Acts of administration of Islamic law. An 
example is the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993. 
Section 46 of the Act provides that: 
(1) A Syariah High Court shall have jurisdiction throughout the Federal Territories 
and shall be presided over by a Syariah Judge. 
(2) A Syariah High Court shall: 
(a) in its criminal jurisdiction, try any offence committed by a Muslim and 
punishable under the Enactment or the Islamic Family Law (Federal 
Territories) Act 1984, or under any other written law prescribing offences 
against precepts of the religion of Islam from the time being in force, and 
may impose any punishment provided therefore; 
(b) in its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions and proceedings in 
which all the parties are Muslims and which relate to: 
(i) betrothal, marriage, ruju", divorce, nullity of marriage (fasakh), nusytez, 
or judicial separation (faraq) or other matters relating to the 
relationship between husband and wife; 
(ii) any disposition of, or claim to, property arising out of any of the 
matters set out in subparagraph (i); 
(iii) the maintenance of dependants, legitimacy, or guardianship or custody 
(jacianah) of infants; 
(iv) the division of, or claims to, harta sepencarian; 
(v) wills or death-bed gifts (marad al-mawt) of a deceased Muslim; 
(vi) gifts inter vivos, or settlements made without adequate consideration in 
money or money's worth, by a Muslim; 
(vii) waqf or nazr 
(viii) division and inheritance of testate or intestate property; 
(ix) the determination of the persons entitled to shares in the estate of a 
deceased Muslim or of the shares to which such persons are 
respectively entitled; or 
(x) other matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by any 
written law. 
Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph, but shall not have jurisdiction in 
respect of offences except in so far as conferred by federal law ... " See Ibrahim, Ahmad and Joned, Ahilemah, The Malaysian Legal System, p. 331. 
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As regards the Islamic law of succession, in light of the above statutory provisions, it is 
submitted that matters pertaining to Muslim succession either testate or intestate are 
undoubtedly within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. It is to be observed that the 
State Legislature enacts the laws pertaining to the matters enumerated in the State List 
and hence, the appropriate courts, which are empowered and competent to decide such 
issues, are the state courts i. e. the Syariah courts. In other words, the Federal Constitution 
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Syariah courts to adjudicate on matters 
concerning the deceased Muslim's estate by the inclusion of. "Islamic law and personal 
and family law of persons professing the religion of Islam relating to succession, testate 
and intestate", in the State List. In connection with this, it is submitted that in dealing 
with the matters of Muslim succession, the decisions of the Syariah courts are not subject 
to any limitation or review by any civil courts. This is pursuant to article 121(1A) of the 
Federal Constitution, which enumerates: 
"The courts referred to in Clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. i8 
7.4. The Conflict of Jurisdiction with the Civil High Court 
The establishment of the High Court is pursuant to article 121(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. Its criminal and civil jurisdictions are stated in the Courts of Judicature Act 
(CJA), 1964 and they constitute original jurisdiction, 9 appellate jurisdiction, 10 supervisory 
8 Article 121(1) states: There shall be two High Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and status namely- (a) 
one in the states of Malaya, which shall be known as the High Court in Malaya and shall have its principal 
registry in Kuala Lumpur; and (b) one in the States of Sabah and Sarawak, which shall be known as the 
High Court in Borneo and shall have its principal registry at such place in the States of Sabah and Sarawak 
as the Yang diPertuan Agung may determine; and such inferior courts as may be provided for by federal 
law; and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred 
by or under federal law. 
9 See sections 22 and 23 of the CJA. 
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jurisdiction, and jurisdiction to review and revise cases in respect of criminal and civil 
proceedings of subordinate courts. " By virtue of section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act, 1956, 
the written laws in force in Malaysia are the laws applied by the High Court and if there 
is no such law, the common law of England and the rules of equity as administered in 
England as at 7 `h April 1956 are applied. 12 
Despite the unambiguous enumeration in the Federal Constitution, conflict arises as to 
whether the Syariah courts are competent to determine disputes pertaining to Muslim 
succession or whether this falls under the civil courts' jurisdiction. This is due to the 
presence of similar wording in the Federal List of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution with regard to matters of succession. 13 Article 74 (1) of the Federal 
Constitution confers power to the Parliament to make laws in respect of matters listed in 
the Federal List and the Concurrent List. Paragraph (4) (e) of the Federal List states: 
"Subject to paragraph (ii), the following: 
(i) Contracts; partnership, agency and other special contracts; master and 
servant; inns and inn-keepers; actionable wrongs; property and its transfer 
and hypothecation, except land; bona vacantia; equity and trusts; 
marriage, divorce and legitimacy; married women's property and status; 
interpretation of federal law; negotiable instruments, statutory 
declarations, arbitration; mercantile law; registration of businesses and 
business names, age of majority; infants and minors; adoption; succession, 
testate and intestate; probate and letters of administration; bankruptcy and 
insolvency; oaths and affirmations; limitation; reciprocal enforcement of 
judgments and orders; the law of evidence; 
(ii) the matters mentioned in paragraph (i) do not include Islamic personal 
laws relating to marriage, divorce, guardianship, maintenance, adoption, 
legitimacy, family law, gifts or succession, testate and intestate; " 
10 See Ibid, sections 26 and 27. 
11 See section 32,35,37,31,32,33 and 35 of the CJA. 12 Pursuant to section 3(1) (a) and (b) respectively, the common law of England and the rules of equity 
applicable in England as at lu December 1951 for Sabah and as at 12'h December 1949 for Sarawak. ' The clause "succession, testate and intestate" is mentioned in both lists. 
232 
Relying on paragraph (i), which refers to "succession, testate and intestate, probate and 
letters of administration", the Parliament enacted laws regarding the probate and 
administration of estates inclusive of deceased Muslims. The primary statute is the 
Probate and Administration Act 1959 and is applicable throughout the country, 
irrespective of religion. This statute regulates the procedures pertaining to the 
administration of non-small estates, namely estates where the total value is more than 
RM600,000. Consequently, the administration of such an estate clearly falls under the 
jurisdiction of the High Court. 
Another federal statute, the Small Estates (Distribution) Act, 1955, is also applicable 
throughout the country, to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This Act is especially 
designated for the purpose of the administration and distribution of small estates, namely 
where the total value of the estate, comprising movable and immovable property, does 
not exceed RM600,000.14 The administration and distribution of these estates is within 
the jurisdiction of the Collector at the Land Office. 15 
By virtue of section 23(f) of the Court of Judicature Act, 1964, the High Court is 
empowered to grant probates of wills and testaments and letters of administration of the 
14 Section 3 (2) of the SEDA, 1955 provides that a small estate means an estate of a deceased person 
consisting wholly or partly of immovable property situated in any state and not exceeding six hundred 
thousand ringgit in value. 
'S Section 1 IA of the SEDA, 1955 states that the Collector shall, in relation to the hearing of a petition for 
distribution, have all the powers of a Magistrate's Court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction for the 
summoning and examination of witnesses.... 
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estates of deceased persons leaving property. 16 Apart from that, pursuant to section 4 (2) 
of the Small Estates (Distribution) Act, 1955, the Collector of the district where the 
greater part in value of the property is situated has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the 
distribution and administration of the whole estate wherever situated. The Collector also 
has exclusive jurisdiction to order distribution of the estate and if necessary, to grant 
letters of administration thereof. '7 In other words, looking at these statutory provisions, 
the Syariah courts, which stand as state courts have no such jurisdiction. 
7.5. The Function of the Syariah Courts as Currently Practiced Pertaining to 
Muslim Estates 
Section 50 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 
enumerates that: 
"If in the course of any proceedings relating to the administration or 
distribution of the estate of a deceased Muslim, any court or authority, 
other than the Syariah High Court or a Syariah Subordinate Court, is under 
the duty to determine the persons entitled to share in the estate, or the 
shares to which such persons are respectively entitled, the Syariah Court 
may, on the request of such court or authority, or on the application of any 
person claiming to be a beneficiary or his representative and on payment 
by him of the prescribed fee, certify the facts found by it and its opinion as 
to the persons who are entitled to share in the estate and as the shares to 
which they are respectively entitled. " 
With regard to the practical aspects of the Islamic Law of Succession in Malaysia, by 
virtue of the above provision and the similar provisions of other enactments concerning 
the administration of Islamic Law in the other states, the Syariah courts' statutory 
16 Section 23 of the CJA provides that the specific civil jurisdiction of the High Court includes: (f) 
jurisdiction to grant probates of wills and testaments and letters of administration of the estates of deceased 
persons leaving property within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and to alter or revoke such grants. 
7 Section 4 (2) of the SEDA, 1955 provides that the Collector of the district where the greater part in value 
of the property is situated shall have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the distribution and administration 
of the whole estate wherever situated...; and the Collector shall thereupon have exclusive jurisdiction to 
order distribution of the estate and, if necessary, to grant letters of administration thereof. 
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function pertaining to Muslim succession is confined to the determination of the legal 
heirs of the deceased and the issuance of the inheritance certificate. The Syariah courts 
are conferred with the functions of certifying the quantum of shares and determining in 
whose favour such quantum are distributed. 18 In other words, the statutory duties of the 
Syariah judges throughout the country in matters of Muslim succession are very limited. 
It is therefore submitted that the above provision actually contradicts the clause in the 
State List containing the words: "Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate". 
Reading through the provision of section 50, it appears that it does not define the duty of 
the Syariah courts in dealing with matters regarding the deceased Muslim's estate. It only 
provides that they may determine the entitled legal heirs and the quantum of shares each 
is entitled to, upon the request of the civil court and the Land Office, or of any person 
claiming to be a beneficiary or his representative. Since the word used in this provision is 
`may', it appears that the Syariah courts are not duty bound to issue opinions in response 
to such requests; they have the discretionary power to either respond or simply ignore a 
request. 
Moreover, the provision does not mention the effect of an issued certificate of farä'i4 and 
whether it is legally binding. This means that the civil court, the Land Office or any 
person claiming to be a beneficiary of the estate, is free to choose whether to follow the 
decision of the Syariah court as stated in the certificate or to merely ignore it. 
18 Ibrahim, Ahmad, "The Future of the Shariah and the Shariah Courts in Malaysia", in: Shuaib, Farid 
Sufian, et. al. Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia Text and Material, Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law 
Journal, 2001, p. 177 
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Furthermore, the wording is "upon the request of any court other than the Syariah High. 
Court or a Syariah Subordinate Court". This means that courts other than the Syariah 
courts, for instance a civil court, can also deal with matters of Muslim succession. In 
other words, this provision shows that the Syariah courts have no exclusive jurisdiction to 
deal with such matters. 
Another issue is whether or not it is statutorily compulsory for the civil courts and the 
Collectors at the Land Office to request the Syariah courts for the certificate of farä'id. 
There is no statutory provision to be found either in the Probate and Administration Act, 
1959 or the Small Estates (Distribution) Act, 1958, which enumerates the statutory duty 
of such institutions to refer the matter to the Syariah courts. 
According to the above explanation, it can be seen that in practice the Syariah courts 
function in a very limited sphere as far as the deceased Muslim's estate is concerned. 
They only have the power to ascertain the legal heirs of the deceased and certify their 
portions of the estate, and this task only arises upon request without which the Syariah 
courts do not have any statutory right to contribute. This brings into question the validity 
of this provision because it apparently contradicts the provisions of the Federal 
Constitution, which confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Syariah courts regarding matters 
of Muslim succession. 
However, it is important to clarify that the Syariah courts are conferred with original 
exclusive jurisdiction over several related matters, namely wa. iyyah, hibah, wagf, jointly 
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acquired property or harta sepencarian, the determination of the legitimacy of the heirs 
and the subsistence of a valid marriage contract between husband and wife. These matters 
are exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts and article 121 (IA) gives 
them protection from any kind of interference by any civil court. These matters, if raised 
by the parties interested in the estate of the deceased, must be adjudicated prior to the 
distribution of the estate to the entitled legal heirs. 19 
7.6. Interpretations of Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution 
The amendment to article 121 in 1988, with the inclusion of article 121(1A), had a 
significant and historical effect on the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts in Malaysia. The 
amendment may be said to have enhanced the status of the Syariah courts and they can no 
longer be regarded as inferior to the civil courts20 that can no longer amend the decisions 
of the Syariah courts. They are empowered by having exclusive jurisdiction, which 
prevents the civil courts from interfering. 
19 See In the Estate of Tunku Abdul Rahman where the Civil High Court stayed the questions of legitimacy 
of children and the validity of marriage to be referred to the Syariah Court. 
20 Ibrahim, Ahmad, "The Amendment to article 121 of the Federal Constitution: Its Effect on 
Administration of Islamic Law", ML. J., 2 [1989], p. xvii. The inferiority of the Syariah Courts prior to the 
amendment is evidently noticed in section 4 of the Court of Judicature Act, 1964 which provides "In the 
event of inconsistency or conflict between this Act and any other written law other than the Constitution in 
force at the commencement of this Act, the provisions of this Act shall prevail. " Further, section 45(6) of 
the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment of Selangor, 1952 provides "Nothing in this Enactment 
contained shall affect the jurisdiction of any civil court and in the event of any difference or conflict arising 
between the decision of a court of the Kathi Besar or a Kathi and the decision of a civil court acting within 
its jurisdiction, the decision of a civil court shall prevail". The similar provision is available in section 25(b) 
of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment of Terengganu, 1955 and section 40(3)(b) of the 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment of Malacca, 1959. In addition to that, the Muslim Courts 
(Criminal Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act 1984 provides that the criminal jurisdiction of the Syariah Court 
shall net be exercised in respect of any offence punishable with imprisonment fro a term exceeding three 
years, or any fine exceeding 5000 ringgit, or with any whipping exceeding six strokes or with any 
combination thereof. According to Ahmad Ibrahim, such jurisdiction is much less than that given to the 
first class magistrate who can normally deal with offences punishable with imprisonment up to five years 
or a fine up to 10,000 ringgit or whipping up to 12 strokes or any combination thereof. See also sections 85 
& 87 of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948. 
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There are two judicial interpretations with respect to the jurisdictions of the Syariah 
courts in relation to the matters enumerated in the State List, which, by virtue of article 
121(1 A), the civil courts cannot interfere with. The first is that, to ascertain whether or 
not the Syariah court has jurisdiction over the matter in dispute, an examination must be 
made of the state's enactments to see if there is an express provision regarding such 
matters. The mere presence of these matters in the State List does not necessarily confer 
jurisdiction upon the Syariah courts. This principle was laid down by Harun Hashim J in 
the case of Mohamad Habibullah bin Mahmood v Faridah bte Dato' Talib21 where he 
stated: 
"It is obvious that the intention of the Parliament by inserting article 
121 (IA) is to take away the jurisdiction of the High Courts in respect 
of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts; Dalip Kaur v 
Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor 
[1992] 1 ML J 7. I am therefore of the opinion that when there is a 
challenge to jurisdiction, as here, the correct approach is to firstly see 
whether the Syariah court has jurisdiction and not whether the state 
legislature has power to enact the law conferring jurisdiction on the 
Syariah court. The validity of a state law can be questioned in a 
separate proceeding under art 4 (3) of the Federal Constitution. " 
However, in the case of Md Hakim Lee v Majlis Agama Islam, Wilayah Persekutuan, 
Kuala Lumpur'22 Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J laid down a different principle in determining 
the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts in relation to article 121(1A). This principle 
emphasizes the mere availability of the matters in the State List. This means that the 
matters that are mentioned in the State List are definitely within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Syariah courts. Hence, the absence of these matters in the state's enactments does 
21 [1992] 2 MLJ 793, p. 800. 
22 [1998] 1 MLJ 681. 
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not necessarily preclude the Syariah courts from having the jurisdiction to adjudicate. He 
said: 
"To my mind, having considered art 74 and para 1 of the State List in 
the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts is much wider 
than those expressly conferred upon it by the respective state 
legislature. The Syariah courts shall have jurisdictions over persons 
professing the religion of Islam in respect of any of the matters included 
in para 1 thereof. It is not to be limited to those expressly enacted. The 
matters include Islamic law and the personal and family law of persons 
professing the religion of Islam. They include cognizance over offences 
by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that 
religion. The fact that the legislature is given the power to legislate on 
these matters but it does not as yet do so, will not detract from the fact 
that those matters are within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts 
within the contemplation of para l of the State List and which 
jurisdiction is ousted from the courts mentioned in art 121 (1) of the 
Constitution. If the state legislature has not yet legislated specifically on 
the matter, it is within its competency to do so in the future by virtue of 
the powers given under art 74 of the Federal Constitution. Therefore, 
when these matters are in issue, the jurisdiction is clothed in the Syariah 
courts and not in the courts mentioned in art 121 (1), notwithstanding 
the absence of express provisions in the state enactments at the time the 
issue arises. That is the intention of art 121 (1A) when it states in no 
uncertain term that the civil courts in art 121 (1), which include the 
High Courts, shall not have jurisdiction over the matter. The fact that 
the Syariah courts have not been expressly conferred with the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issue raised, by the state legislature, 
does not mean that the jurisdiction must be exercised by the courts in 
art 121 (1). The issue is not one whether a litigant can get his remedies 
but one of jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate - the threshold jurisdiction to be seized of the matter. , 23 
In the case of Abdul Shaik bin Md. Ibrahim v Hussein bin Ibrahim, 24 the Court held that 
the interpretation held by Abdul Kadir Sulaiman was contrary to the interpretation in 
Mohamad Habibullah's case. In the case of Soon Singh a/1 Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan 
23 [1998] 1MLJ 681, p. 685. 
24 [1999] 5 MLJ 618. 
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Kebajikan Islam Malaysia, 25 Mohamed Dzaidin SCJ delivered a judgment which seemed 
to settle the dispute. The learned judge said, inter alia: 
"... whilst we agree with the approach adopted by Abdul Hamid J 
following Habibullah, that when there is a challenge to jurisdiction the 
correct approach is to look at the States Enactments to see whether or 
not the Syariah Courts have been expressly conferred jurisdiction on a 
given matter... " 
After thorough consideration of the above case law it is submitted that the Islamic law 
relating to Muslim succession as expressly enumerated in the State List is evidently 
within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. There are express provisions in the State List 
and the state enactments, which mention the matters of distribution and inheritance of 
Muslims. 26 Therefore, any matters regarding the succession of Muslim estates, either 
testate or intestate are governed by the laws and regulations enacted by the State 
Legislature and any disputes pertaining to it are to be heard and determined exclusively 
by the Syariah courts. 27 
7.7. The Syariah Appeal Court's Opinion 
The issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts over matters of Muslim 
succession was discussed in detail in the famous case of Jumaaton and Anor v. Raja 
25 [1999] 1 MLJ 489. 
26 The State List of the Ninth Schedule states "... Islamic law and personal law and family law of persons 
professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate... ". 
Section 46 (2) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act, 1993 states: "A Syariah High 
Court shall (b) in its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions and proceedings in which all parties 
are Muslim and which relate to ... 
(viii) division and inheritance of testate or intestate property; (ix) the 
determination of the persons entitled to share in the estate of a deceased Muslim or of the shares to which 
such person are respectively entitled... " 
27 The Probate and Administration Act, 1959 and the Small Estate (Distribution) Act were enacted and 
passed by the Parliament. It appears therefore that these two Acts are against the relevant provisions of the 
Federal Constitution, the two interpretations and the state enactments as far as the administration of estate 
and the jurisdiction in such matters are concerned. 
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Hizaruddin. 28 This was an appeal case heard by the Syariah Appeal Court, regarding an 
application for a declaration that the shares, including the income derived therefrom, in a 
company that were held in the name of the defendant (a son of the deceased) formed part 
of the deceased's estate. 
Two of the heirs, Jumaaton Zaiton bt Haji Awang and Raja Delila bt. Raja Nong Chik, 
applied to the Syariah High Court of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur for a 
declaration against the defendant, Raja Hizaruddin b. Raja Nong Chik (a son of the 
deceased), that the 11,095,666 unit of shares (and the income derived therefrom) in 
Arensi Holdings (M) Bhd., which was registered in the defendant's name, was part of the 
estate of the deceased. They claimed that the property did not belong absolutely to him 
and must be distributed among the twelve legal heirs according to the farä'id system. 29 
The Syariah High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case under section 
46(2) of the Administration of Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act, 1993 (Act 
505). 30 
The appellants subsequently appealed to the Federal Territory Syariah Appeal Court. On 
appeal, the Appeal Court upheld the decisions of the Syariah High Court. The Syariah 
High Court had no jurisdiction on the basis that this was a matter of probate and the 
administration of the estate and therefore governed by the Probate and Administration 
28 [1998] 6 MLJ 557. 
29 [1998] 6 MLJ 557, p. 559. 
30 Ibid. 
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Act, 1959. Such a matter is within the Federal List of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution and applicable to Muslims. 31 
The Chief Judge of the Federal Territory Syariah Appeal Court who led the panels for the 
hearing stated that reference had been made to the relevant provisions of the Federal 
Constitution. According to him, even though the State List of the Federal Constitution 
provides for the "Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate"' and the 
"distribution of property", such matters do not include matters of probate and 
administration. 32 Instead, matters of probate and administration of estate are mentioned in 
item (e) paragraph (i) of the Federal List, which means that Parliament has the power to 
enact laws concerning "succession, testate and intestate, probate and letters of 
administration of estate. "33 
Furthermore, he referred to item (e) paragraph (ii), where it is stated that: "matters 
mentioned in paragraph (i) do not include Islamic personal law relating to ... succession 
testate and intestate. " These provisions, according to the judge, denote that, since laws 
pertaining to "probate and letters of administration" are within the Federal List and not 
the State List, the State Legislative Assembly and the Syariah courts have no power or 
jurisdiction over such matters. 34 
31 [1998] 6 MLJ 557, pp. 563- 565. 
32 Ibid, p. 561. 
33 [1998] 6 MLJ 561. 
34 Ibid. 
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Even though section 46 (vii) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) 
Act, 1993 clearly states that the division and inheritance of Muslim property, testate and 
intestate are within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts, the laws regarding probate and 
letters of administration, which are clearly contained in the federal statute, namely the 
Probate and Administration Act, 1959 prevent the Syariah courts from exercising such 
jurisdiction. 35 Even though the personal and family laws, including the Islamic law of 
succession, of persons professing the religion of Islam are included in the State List, the 
matters of probate and letters of administration are still held on the Federal List. 36 
7.8. The High Court's View 
The above decision was then referred to and adopted by the Civil High Court in the case 
of In the Estate Of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Ibni Almarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid v. 
Tunku Khadyah bte Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra &2 Ors. 37 The issues here were whether 
or not the High Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine a dispute arising out of the 
administration of the estate of a Muslim and whether or not it had jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the disputes pertaining to the validity of the marriage between the deceased 
and Chong, and the legitimacy of the third petitioner who was the child of the marriage. 
With respect to these issues of jurisdiction, the High Court held that matters pertaining to 
"probate and administration" do not fall within the civil jurisdiction of the Syariah courts 
's Ibid. 
36 Ibid, p. 563. 
37 [1999] 1 AMR30. 
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as confirmed by the Syariah Appeal Board of the Federal Territory Syariah Court in 
Jumaaton & Raja Delila v Raja Hizaruddin. 38 
Arguments similar to those in the Jumaaton case were put forward contending that 
matters pertaining to probate and letters of administration are within the jurisdiction of 
the Civil High Court by virtue of the Federal List in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution. 39 According to the learned judge in this case, the Probate and 
Administration Act, 1959 is an Act of general application to both Muslims and non- 
Muslims. Unlike other statutes which contain a clause limiting their application to non- 
Muslims, such as section 2(2) of the Wills Act, 1959, section 2 of the Distribution Act 
1958 and section 31 of the Adoption Act 1952, the Probate and Administration Act 
contains no such provision. 40 
The learned judge also relied on section 24 (f) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, 
which confers upon the High Court jurisdiction in respect of matters of "probate and 
administration. " He further supported his contention by stating the predominant position 
of the provisions in the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, vis-ä-vis other ordinary Acts of 
Parliament or written laws, other than the Federal Constitution as enumerated in section 4 
of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which provides that in the event of inconsistency or 
38 Ibid, p. 31. 
39 Ibid, p. 34. 
40 [1999] 1 AMR 30, p. 35. 
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conflict between the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and any other written law other than 
the Federal Constitution, the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 shall prevail. 41 
However, with regard to questions of validity of marriages and legitimacy of children, the 
Court held that such matters are within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. The hearing 
was therefore stayed and all parties were directed to refer to the Syariah Court for a final 
and conclusive determination regarding these two issues 42 
7.9. The Analysis of the Judgments in the above Cases 
7.9.1. The Determination of Estate 
Observing the decision of the Syariah Appeal Court in the Jumaaton case, it appears that 
the basis of the judgment was that the matter in dispute was one of probate and 
administration of estate. The Court's view was that the determination of the shares in 
dispute, whether they constituted an asset of the deceased or not, was part of the process 
of probate and the administration of the estate. It appears that the Court did not consider 
this as an issue pertaining to a question of Islamic law. 
It is important to note that the application by the appellants to the Court was for a 
declaration that the shares in dispute constituted part of the deceased's estate according to 
the Islamic law of succession. They argued that the shares were merely registered under 
the defendant's name and his position thereon was as a trustee. Such registration did not 
render the respondent the absolute owner of the shares. They required the Court to 
41 Ibid, p. 34. 
42 Ibid, p. 37. 
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ascertain whether, according to Islamic law, the ownership of the shares had passed to the 
defendant by such mere registration, or alternatively would such a transaction constitute a 
bequest by the deceased in favour of the defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that even 
though the transfer of the shares had taken place, the deceased remained in control of the 
company. 43 On that basis, they claimed that the shares were merely trusted property and 
the defendant was a mere trustee. This means that the shares constituted part of the 
deceased's estate to which they should be entitled as prescribed in the Islamic law of 
succession. 
It is submitted that this issue clearly pertains to a question of Islamic law. The 
determination of the estate of the deceased is regarded as part and parcel of inheritance 
law. According to Islamic law, the term estate is known as "al-tarikah or al-tirkah" 
which constitutes the third essence of succession, without which succession would never 
take place. It technically denotes the property, the right and the usufruct legally acquired 
and left behind by the deceased upon his death. 44 Therefore, to determine the status of the 
shares from the perspective of Islamic law is undoubtedly an issue of Islamic law. 
It is therefore clear that such a matter is within the ambit of the Syariah courts' 
competency. This is supported by virtue of the State List of the Federal Constitution, 
which among other things enumerates that "the determination of matters of Islamic 
43 The Sun, Thursday, July 9,1998, p. 8. 
44 Khan, Islamic law of Inheritance, p. 29. See also Doi, I., Abdur Rahman, p. 273. 
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law"45 is within the power and jurisdiction of the State Legislature and the Syariah 
courts. 
46 
7.9.2. The Meaning of Probate and Administration of Estates 
Section 2 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 defines "probate" as a grant under 
the seal of the court authorizing the executor or executors therein named to administer the 
testator's estate. The "probate action" is defined in the same section as meaning a cause 
or matter in which a petition for probate or administration is contested by any person, and 
includes an application to alter or revoke any grant of representation. Furthermore, this 
section also defines "administration", with reference to the estate of a deceased person, as 
letters of administration issued by the court whether general, limited or with a will 
annexed or otherwise authorizing the person or persons therein named to administer the 
deceased person's estate in accordance with the law. 
Caroline Sawyer defines "administration of estates" as the process whereby the personal 
representatives collect in the assets of the estate and then meet the debts and liabilities 
and pay out the legacies and devices before distributing the residue, managing the estate 
as necessary in the meantime. 7 
as See the State List "... the determination of matters of Islamic law and the doctrine of Malay custom. " 
46 See the case of In the Estate of Tunku Abdul Rahman, p. 37. In this case, the court had referred the 
disputes on the question of Islamic law i. e. the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of children. 
47 Sawyer, Caroline, Principles of Succession, Wills & Probate, 2"d edition, London: Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 1998, pg. 329. 
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Considering the above facts, it could be substantially argued that the issue in dispute in 
the Jumaaton case did not fall within those definitions. Hence, it is submitted that the 
determination of assets whether they constitute part of the estate or not from the 
perspective of Islamic law, is not necessarily within the meaning of "probate and 
administration". This process is best considered as a question of Islamic law and the 
Syariah courts are therefore arguably the only courts with the competence to decide such 
issues. 
7.9.3. Broad Meaning of the Islamic Law of Succession 
It can be argued that the Syariah Court had overlooked the fact that the wording: "Islamic 
law relating to succession, testate and intestate" as enunciated in the State List 
encompasses all aspects of the Islamic law of succession including the administration of 
Muslim estates. Therefore, even though the dispute before the Syariah Court, was 
comprehended by the Court as a matter of probate and the administration of the estate, it 
still had jurisdiction. 
It is a well-established principle that the Islamic law of succession comprises the whole 
process of the administration of a deceased Muslim's estate. 48 There is no division 
between the Islamic law of succession and the administration of estates. The Islamic law 
of succession should not be confined to the division, distribution and determination of 
legal heirs and their quantum of shares in the estate. The question of whether a property 
constitutes the deceased Muslims' estate or not and the administration of the estate are 
48 Imam, Mohamad, "Probate And Administration Of A Muslim's Estate In Malaysia- Legislative 
Competence And Syariah Civil Court Jurisdiction", p. 132. 
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part and parcel of the Islamic law of succession. These questions should certainly be 
heard only by the Syariah courts as provided for in the State List of the Federal 
Constitution and the state enactments. 
This is further supported by item (viii) of the state enactments. Here it is clearly stated 
that the division and inheritance of testate or intestate property is one of the matters 
within the Syariah courts' jurisdiction. This section implies a broad meaning and denotes 
that any matter relating to Muslim inheritance, including issues pertaining to wasiyyah, 
are under the Syariah courts' jurisdiction. In other words, the clause arguably refers to the 
Islamic law of succession, which covers all matters pertaining to the succession of the 
deceased Muslim's estate. This provision clearly corresponds to the Federal List and the 
State List. Therefore, reliance on article 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution suffices to 
confer the Syariah courts with exclusive jurisdiction and further, prevents the High Court 
from interfering. 
7.9.4. Muslim's Personal Law 
It is important to note that matters pertaining to succession to a deceased Muslim's estate 
fall under Islamic law and the personal and family law of a person professing the religion 
of Islam. The law of Muslim succession revolves around the Muslim family circle and is 
strongly connected with personal rights and obligations as well as matrimonial issues. 49 
Therefore, on the basis that succession is a matter of Muslim personal law and part of 
Islamic law, the Federal Constitution in its State List of the Ninth Schedule apparently 
49 Zuhdi, Pengantar Undang-Undang Islam di Malaysia, p. 128. According to him, there arc some authors 
who included matters relating to property in the personal law sphere. 
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guarantees it. Such matters come under the power of the State Legislative Assembly and 
hence, are within the Syariah courts' jurisdiction and no interference from the civil courts 
is permitted. The Federal Constitution, as stated in the State List, clearly expresses that it 
is within the state legislative powers to enact laws concerning the personal and family 
law of Muslims. 
Furthermore, in paragraph 4(e) (ii) of the Federal List, it is indisputably asserted that the 
matters in paragraph 4 (e) (i), which include succession, testate and intestate, probate and 
letters of administration do not include the Islamic personal laws relating to marriage, 
divorce, guardianship, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, family law, gifts or succession, 
testate and intestate. This could be taken to mean that succession to a deceased Muslim's 
estate is a personal law like marriage, divorce, guardianship and so in which the civil 
court is strictly prohibited from interfering, as expressed in article 121(1 A). In other 
words, succession should be treated just as the other Muslim personal laws. It is in fact 
true that the words "probate and administration" in the Federal List are not mentioned 
literally or specifically within the State List, but the words "distribution of estate" are and 
clearly comprise probate and the administration of estates. 
7.9.5. The Conflict between Article 121(1A) and Other Statutory Provisions of 
Federal Acts 
It is extremely important to highlight the effect of article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution, which evidently confers upon the Syariah courts the exclusive jurisdiction 
in respect of any matter within their jurisdiction. By virtue of this provision, the civil 
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court is constitutionally prohibited from interfering with the decisions of the Syariah 
courts concerning all matters within the jurisdiction of the latter. 50 The purpose of 
enumerating this provision is to strengthen the position and jurisdiction of the Syariah 
courts by taking away the jurisdiction of the High Courts in respect of any matter within 
the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. 51 
However, it appears that by putting section 4 and section 24 of the Courts of Judicature 
Act together with the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959, and to 
furthermore read them with item 4 (e) (i) of the Federal List of the Ninth Schedule as the 
High Court reasoned in In the Estate of Tunku Abdul Rahman the purpose of inserting 
article 121 1(A) is certainly defeated. 52 Hence, it is submitted that the above-mentioned 
statutory provisions seemingly contradict article 121 (IA) of the Federal Constitution. As 
a result, these provisions should have no legal effect on the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Syariah courts over Muslim succession. 
Also in this case, the learned judge's point on the non-availability of clauses that 
preclude the applicability of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 to Muslims, such 
as those in the Wills Act, 1958 and the Distribution Act, 1959, appears to be 
inappropriate. It is important to note that the availability of such clauses in these Acts has 
the effect that matters pertaining to bequests or wa. iyyah and the distribution of Muslim 
estates are to be strictly governed by Islamic law. However, in the case of the 
so Ibrahim, Ahmad, The Amendment to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution: Its Effect on Administration 
ff Islamic Lawi, p. xx. 
Buang, Salleh, Historic Judgment on Article 121(IA) of the Federal Constitution, case comment on 
Mohd Habibullah v Faridah Dato ' Talib, Malaysian Law News, February 1993, p. 11. 
52 Imam, p. 130. 
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administration of estates, which clearly includes the matter of bequests and the 
distribution of estates, Islamic law is statutorily neglected because of the non-availability 
of such a clause in the Probate and Administration Act, 1959. This implies inconsistency 
between these federal statutes. 
It is therefore submitted that such provisions should have no legal effect on the process of 
the administration of a deceased Muslim's estate, particularly in relation to the Syariah 
courts' jurisdiction. As far as such a clause is concerned, the interests of Muslim parties 
in having their personal matters of succession determined by Islamic law, which 
constitutes their personal law, would not be realized because at the end of the process, the 
applicable law is not the Islamic law. Accordingly, the Syariah courts would not decide 
the case. 
7.10. Are the Syariah Courts Ready to Take the Jurisdictional Responsibility? 
It is imperative to say that discussions on the issue of which court is competent to hear 
and determine cases pertaining to the Islamic law of succession rely upon the 
understanding and interpretations of the relevant provisions in the Federal Constitution as 
well as other federal acts and state enactments. From the perspectives of the Syariah and 
civil courts as discussed above, there seems to be a strict interpretation of the statutory 
provisions, including the Federal Constitution, without looking into the present scenario 
of rapid legislative changes. The current facts apparently show a trend whereby attempts 
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are being made to gradually introduce a new legal system in Malaysia, which would be 
definitely based on the local customs, requirements, needs and necessities. 53 
On the other hand, the arguments that favour the Syariah courts' competency, even 
though validated by and strongly based on the statutory provisions, seem to introduce the 
idea of successfully upgrading and strengthening the position and status of the Syariah 
courts in Malaysia, which are reflected by such legislative changes. In other words, the 
discussions regarding the jurisdiction over matters pertaining to Muslim succession have 
not highlighted the issue from a practical point of view. 
It should be noted that the Syariah courts are both state and religious courts. Their 
jurisdictions are limited to their territorial states and they have no jurisdiction if any of 
the parties in dispute is non-Muslim. Therefore a difficulty would arise if a case were 
filed in the state of Terengganu and part of the estate was situated in another state, such 
as Kedah. If the beneficiaries are to be required to file a separate application in each of 
the states where the estate is situated, this certainly would create another problem which 
is probably worse in term of costs, expenses and time. It is important to mention here that 
there are fourteen states and Federal Territories in Malaysia, which each have their own 
Syariah court. 
Furthermore, presently there is no statutory provision stating that the decision of a 
Syariah court from one state should be accepted and legally effective in other states in 
s' Bari, Abdul Aziz, "Perlaksanaan Islam melalui Kerangka Perlembagaan Malaysia- Masalah dan 
Potensinya", IKIM Law Journal, 3: 2 (1999), p. 95. 
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Malaysia. Furthermore, the decision of the Syariah Appeal Court in one state is not 
binding on the lower Syariah courts of other states. Therefore, these issues would cause 
legal problems for the parties to the dispute. Moreover, the Syariah courts' jurisdiction is 
limited to Muslim parties only. The Syariah courts are not competent to determine 
disputes involving non-Muslims. Problems would certainly arise where a dispute 
concerned the ownership of property where the interested parties were Muslim 
beneficiaries and non-Muslim creditors. 
Section 50 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territory) would be a useful 
reference point for further discussions. It is submitted that there is currently no uniformity 
in terms of the administration and management of cases, fees, procedures, fines, forms, 
the certificate of farä'id forms and documents that must be attached together in filing the 
application for the certificate. 54 The Syariah courts rely on the facts provided by the 
applicant who is not even under oath, and subsequently calculates the share to which each 
beneficiary is entitled. Relying only on the facts put forward by the applicant, the 
process simply ends with the issuance of such a certificate. 55 
It is significant to note that the Syariah Courts have no jurisdiction to grant specific relief, 
which is normally applied for by the parties in dispute. The power to issue declarations, 
vesting orders, injunctions and specific relief is within the ambit of the High Court's 
sa Abd Rahman, Dato' Sheikh Ghazali, "Prosedur Dan Amalan Semasa Terhadap Pembahagian Harta 
Pusaka di Negeri-negeri", Bengkel Pengagihan Pusaka KWSP Mengikut Hukum Faraid, 19th & 20`s 
February 2003, Institute Latihan Keselamatan Sosial KWSP (ESSET), organized by KWSP with co- 
operation of Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia (JKSM), p. 48. Dato' Sheikh Ghazali Abd Rahman is 
the Head, Hakim Syarie, Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia. 
ss Mohamad, Dato' Abdul Hamid bin Haji, "Administration of Property in Malaysia: A Civil And Syariah 
Law Perspective", ML. J., 3 [2002], p. iii. 
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jurisdiction. This is specifically provided for in a federal Act, namely the Specific Relief 
Act, 1950. This problem was discussed in Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang v. Isa Abdul 
Rahman & Another. 56 The case concerned the issue of waqf, which is undoubtedly within 
the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. However, the Supreme Court held that the 
respondent in this case had applied for a perpetual injunction under section 51(2) of the 
Specific Relief Act, 1950. Accordingly the Court held that the Civil High Court is the 
only competent forum to grant such an injunction. 57 
It is submitted that the Syariah Appeal Court in the Jumaaton case seemed to be realistic 
in reaching its decision. The three members of the panel of the Syariah Appeal Court, 
namely Sheikh Ghazali, the Syariah Chief Judge, the late Tan Sri Professor Ahmad 
Ibrahim and the late Tan Sri Harun bin Hashim were among the figures appointed by the 
Government to the Technical Committee of Civil laws and Islamic laws. This committee 
was set up solely for the purpose of improving and upgrading the status and position of 
the Syariah courts in Malaysia. 58 The case in question was undoubtedly an opportunity 
for them to devise a new interpretation of the provisions of the Federal Constitution in 
order to realize the idea of Malaysia having its own common law. Professor Mohamad 
Imam, a professor of law at the National University of Malaysia, commented on the 
decision in that case: 
56 [1992] 2 MLJ 244. 
S' Apart from that, the inadequate number of Syariah court judges is also a problem. According to Mohd. 
Nairn Mokhtar, a Subordinate Court Judge, Department of Islamic Judiciary, the number of cases filed is 
not proportionate to the number of judges. For example, under his jurisdiction, he is the only judge who can 
hear cases from the districts of Petaling Jaya, Shah Alam, Subang, Puchong, Sungai Buloh and Seri 
Kembangan of Selangor. See Mokhtar, Hj. Mohd. Naim, "Administration of Family Law in the Syariah 
Court", M. L. J., 3 [2001], p. lxxxi. 
58 Yaacob, Abdul Monir, "Undang-Undang Pentadbiran Agama Islam Pengkanunan, Reformasi Dan 
Penyelarasan", IKIM Law Journal, 2: 2 (1998), pp. 71-79. 
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"The Syariah Appeal Court of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur did 
not avail itself of the opportunity, for reasons of its own, in the Jumaaton 
case to correct one of the aberrations of the Malaysian Legal System as to 
the Syariah Courts' jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the Civil Courts, to 
enforce and administer the entire Islamic law of succession. It resigned 
itself to merely affirming the status quo but a plea for presumably, 
statutory intervention to give such a jurisdiction to the Syariah Courts. "59 
7.11. Conclusion 
The decision of the Syariah Appeal Court in the Jumaaton case seems to conflict with the 
provisions of the Federal Constitution, especially article 121 (lA). The intention of the 
Government in amending article 121 by inserting article 121 (1A) was to strengthen the 
position of the Syariah courts, especially with respect to Muslim personal law. This could 
be achieved by preventing the civil courts from interfering with the Syariah courts' 
decisions. However, the Syariah Court of Appeal did not adequately take this into 
account. In relation to the decision in Jumaaton, Professor Mohamad Imam commented: 
"This decision, unless reconsidered by the same Court, will in all 
probability be followed as a persuasive precedent by the Syariah Courts in 
the other states. This decision has also the effect of reassuring the 
correctness of the Civil Courts' practice relating to this area of Islamic 
law, and leaving a very faint hope of its correction at their hands. For the 
necessary correction, one can only look to the Federal Court to act under 
Article 12 in an appropriate case and reverse the Jumaaton interpretation 
of item 4 (e) (ii) of the Federal List and item (i) of the State List as to the 
meaning and scope of the matter: `Islamic personal law relating to 
succession, testate and intestate, ' i. e. whether or not it includes the process 
of `probate and administration' of the estate of a deceased Muslim. "60 
It is clear therefore that the decision in the Jumaaton case establishes that whenever any 
dispute arises in connection with the administration and distribution of a deceased 
Muslim's estate, the competent court to hear and determine the case is the civil High 
59 Imam, p. 134. 
60 Ibid. 
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Court. The relevant provisions in the State List of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution which enumerates matters pertaining to Islamic law relating to succession, 
testate and intestate, and section 46 (2) (viii) of the Administration of Islamic Law 
(Federal Territories) Act, 1993 therefore have no legal effect. 
The Federal Constitution, which stands as the supreme law, contains provisions that seem 
to cause confusion among the Malaysians. In addition, the inclusion of section 50 in the 
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act, 1993 confines the Syariah 
courts to merely issuing certificates of farä'i¢ upon request by the civil courts, the Land 
Office or any interested parties, and hence is in conflict with the Federal Constitution, 
and this contributes further to the confusion. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Even though the farä'id system is prescribed in detail in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, this 
does not necessarily mean that no further Utihäd, or reasoning, can be performed. It is 
quite obvious that many of the court decisions have been based on Ytihäd, as can be seen 
the cases of musyärakah, Cumäriyyatayn, `awl and radd. This is due to the absence of 
clear proofs or dalil galiy in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
The issue regarding the concept of tarikah, or estates, also needs to be explored in depth 
and hence Ytihäd is really needed. There are no Qur'an or Sunnah proofs that define and 
elaborate in detail the concept of tarikah. The only available proof is provided by the two 
versions of the hadith regarding the heritability of mal, haq and manfa`ah, and these have 
caused disagreement among the leading Muslim scholars. In other words, it is not quite 
correct to suggest that it is absolutely prohibited to perform ijtihäd on matters regarding 
the farä'id system. This contention is supported by the discussions that have been held on 
the necessarily related topics, such as the concept of mä1 in Islamic law and the rights that 
are attached to estates. The discussions on these have shed a light on the divergence of 
opinions between the Muslim scholars and clearly reveal their efforts of Ytihäd. 
From the analysis of the concept of tarikah from the perspective of Islamic law, it is quite 
clear that its components of mä1, haq and manfa`ah. This is the opinion of the majority of 
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Muslim scholars including the Syäfiis, which have become the dominant school in 
Malaysia. Apart from the issue regarding the components of estates, the issue of 
ownership is similarly significant in ascertaining whether wealth constitutes the tarikah 
of the deceased or not. In Islamic law, there are two kinds of ownership, namely absolute 
and non-absolute, both of which are capable of rendering tangible and intangible assets 
heritable. Moreover, the ownership must meet the requirement of Syari ah compliance; 
otherwise the asset is non-heritable. The presence of an asset at the time of death is not a 
requirement to constitute it as heritable. 
Looking into the relevant statutory provisions applicable in Malaysia, it is evident that the 
definition of estate is not different from the definition of tarikah. This is due to the fact 
that the statutory definition is very broad. Furthermore, the concept of mal in Islamic law 
includes everything that is regarded as a person's wealth. However, in applying the 
definition, the Malaysian courts and the Land Office appear to ignore the requirement of 
Syari ah compliance. It is important to remember that it is Islamic law that is applicable 
to Muslims in Malaysia, particularly in matters of succession, and hence the relevant 
authority must make serious attempts to apply the law in a way that satisfies the needs 
and interests of the parties concerned. 
Regarding the settlement of rights and liabilities attaching to estates, it is possible to 
conclude that the laws applicable in Malaysia do almost accord with the principles of 
Islamic law. The Malaysian courts recognize the four rights, according to Islamic law, 
namely the funeral expenses, the payment of debts and liabilities and the execution of 
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wasiyyah prior to the distribution among the legal heirs. Even though the statutes that 
govern the administration of the deceased Muslim's estate are based on English law, the 
principles involved do not conflict with Islamic law. However, some differences have 
occurred in cases concerning the priorities of creditors in the case of insolvent estates, 
and the issue of when the rights of the legal heirs arise. 
It can be observed that in reaching their decisions, the judges do not base their findings 
on proper Islamic research methodology. They merely rely on secondary books, which 
are confined to the opinions of the Syäfiis. Taking into account the changes taking place 
in the world today, there is certainly a need for the opinions of other schools of laws, 
such as the Mdlikis, Hanafis and the Hanbalis, to be considered to ensure the proper 
implementation of Islamic law. In the field of Muslim succession, especially with regard 
to the concept of tarikah, or estate, it is necessary to develop the application of Islamic 
jurisprudence, particularly in Malaysia, on the basis that the current trends in sectors such 
as banking and takäful, do not limit the scope of Fiqh to the Syäfiis school of law. 
The significance of Syari ah compliance is clearly illustrated by Hibah Harta, an Islamic 
estate-planning instrument. The excellent idea behind the introduction of this instrument 
is clouded by the fact that it does not fully comply with Islamic principles. Having a 
proper plan to distribute property is permissible as long as it does not contradict the 
Islamic legal principles. In this regard, in the light of the present study, it is clear that this 
instrument does not fulfill this requirement and even to an extent, contradicts the 
principles of the farä'i4 law. Complying with the Syari ah, and furthermore the farä'i4 
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law, is vital because a failure to meet Syari ah requirements results in the infringement of 
the rights of others. The verdict, or fatwa, issued by the Fatwä Council of Wilayah 
Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur appears very general and hence not decisive. After analyzing 
in depth the hibah harta and studying the work of Hj. Othman on which it is based, and 
making a comparison with the conditions as laid down in the fatwä, it appears that this 
instrument needs further refinement before being promoted to the public. This is 
supported by the fact that the MufIT's Office itself, which has declared the validity of the 
instrument, issued a reminding letter to the Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee Berhad asking 
them not to mention the fatwä while promoting the instrument. 
Family takäful and conventional life insurance are newly invented financial instruments 
that did not exist during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and hence no definite 
Qur'anic injunction or Prophetic tradition is found concerning them. They are therefore a 
matter open to ijtihäd and reasoning that must take into account, among other things, the 
magäsid or aims of the Syari ah as well as the nature and concept of the business. 
The payment of monetary compensation by the takäful and insurance company is similar 
and analogous to a practice carried out in Malay Muslim society. Whenever there is a 
death, every adult in the community donates a certain amount of money to the deceased's 
family. The pertinent issue here is that the accumulated money is not distributed among 
the deceased's legal heirs but is given to the close family members, including any 
adopted children. 
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It is therefore clear that the money payable from the takaful and conventional insurance 
does not necessarily pass to the legal heirs under the Islamic law of succession. 
Moreover, it is not valid for wasiyyah and hibah as well. ' This is on the basis that the 
money is not the property of the deceased but payment by other fellow participants with 
the common objective of assisting the dead participant's family. The inclusion of the 
element of nomination has no effect on this suggestion because the nominee remains the 
trustee for administrative purposes and acts as a representative in making the claim and 
distributing the money among the appointed beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, with regard to government retirement benefits, it should be noted that 
confining the recipients to the legal heirs of the pensionable officer as prescribed under 
the farä'icl law would defeat the objectives of such schemes as underlined by the 
Government. It should also be noted that under the farä'igl law, some individuals, such as 
adopted sons or daughters, who may have been financially dependant upon the 
pensionable officer during his lifetime are excluded from inheritance. Besides this, there 
is the possibility that the money would be granted to those who are not really financially 
affected by the death. 
1 In the Resolution of Workshop "Hibah: Its Model and Application in Takaful Perspective" held on 12'h 
March 2003 at the Park Royal Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, it is stated that it is valid to make Takaful Benefit as a 
hibah even though it is not in existence at the time the contract is performed. This opinion is claimed to be 
Mohd Daud's. This workshop was organized as a closed session by the Islamic Banking and Finance 
Institute of Malaysia, after the Takaful Nasional Sdn Berhad had to face a grave problem arising from a 
case in which a participant had appointed his fiancee as the beneficiary of the benefit if he died following 
the hibah policy introduced by the company. However, upon his death, the fiancee made the claim and at 
the same time, the legal heirs of the deceased participant also made a claim contending they were entitled to 
the benefit as legal heirs under the farä'ia law. The Takäful operator had to settle the case by paying a huge 
amount of money to both parties, which cost them more than one million ringgits. Dr. Ismail Abu Hassan, a 
lecturer at the Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University of Malaysia, who 
attended the seminar, provided this information. Two officers of the Takaful Nasional Sdn Bcrhad, Mohd 
Arsi Omar and Mohd Maiz, confirmed this information during an interview held on 12'h September 2003. 
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The basic principles of the Islamic law of succession are prescribed in detail in the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. However, as mentioned above, in cases where no clear Qur'anic 
or Sunnah injunctions are found, Muslim scholars resorted to Ytihäd in an effort to solve 
problems arising after the death of the Prophet. These three sources have become 
reference points and provide examples to the later Muslim scholars in their endeavors to 
come up with solutions for newly encountered problems. In Malaysia, with the advent 
and implementation of Islam, prior to the coming of the British, the principles of the 
Islamic law of succession were applied alongside the adat laws. The British continued 
with this practice after their failure to introduce English common law regarding the 
distribution of Muslim estates. There are many cases decided by English judges, which 
show that the Islamic principles of Muslim succession were judicially recognized. 
It is however unfortunate to see that Muslims in Malaysia, since independence until the 
present day, do not have a single statute regarding the distribution of their estates. Even 
though Muslim successions, testate and intestate are included in the State List and the 
Federal List of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, no single statute has been passed 
either by the Parliament or the State Legislative Assembly. As a result, Muslims have to 
refer to the treatises written by Muslim scholars in the past, normally in Arabic, in order 
to know the rights of legal heirs to the estates and other related issues. 
The legal issues regarding the jurisdictional conflict between the civil courts and the 
Syariah courts further complicate this problem. It is therefore important to mention that in 
dealing with the issues of Muslim succession, the most important point that should 
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always be addressed is in relation to the rights that arise due to the death of the deceased. 
Clearly, the courts' main function is to deal with the matters in dispute fairly and justly 
by applying the very best method to avoid any kind of action, which could possibly bring 
injustice to the parties concerned. In other words, in succession cases, the interest of the 
parties involved is the most significant priority that should be looked upon by the courts. 
Having said that, it is in the interest of the deceased Muslim as well as all the parties 
involved, such as the beneficiaries, that their rights as prescribed by their religion are 
fully protected and fulfilled. The most important aim of every Muslim is to have their 
rights realized and recognized by the legal institution, i. e. the Syariah courts, that is 
capable of deciding, in terms of its specialist knowledge, issues pertaining to the Islamic 
law principles as laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. 
It is therefore submitted that the Federal Constitution is not a major hindrance thwarting 
the right of the Muslims to have their personal law issues decided by their religious 
courts. Action could be taken to bring the Muslims' dream of having their cases of 
succession decided by the Syariah courts realized. Besides the necessary amendments 
that could be made to several provisions of the relevant acts and enactments, the Syariah 
courts should improve their efficiency in making themselves really ready to take up the 
jurisdiction from the civil courts. 
The establishment of an Islamic division in the civil courts to deal with matters pertaining 
to Islamic law could be a good possible solution. Moreover, the civil court judges' 
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interpretations on matters pertaining to Islamic law could be highlighted because the 
application of the provisions in the Federal Constitutions as well as the acts and 
enactments are very much dependant on them. There is a tendency nowadays among the 
judges themselves to give positive interpretations regarding the status of Islam and 
Islamic law in the Federal Constitution in a way that looks to be an effort to recognize 
Islamic law as a primary source of law in the Malaysian legal system. 2 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The constitutional issue as discussed in the Jumaaton case could be relevant to the 
decision given by the learned judge, Raja Azlan Shah in Datuk Menteri Othman bin 
Baginda v. Datuk Omi Syed Alwi3 when suggesting modes of interpreting the provisions 
of the Federal Constitution: 
"In interpreting a constitution, two points must be borne in mind. First, 
judicial precedent plays a lesser part than is normal in matters of ordinary 
statutory interpretation. Secondly, a Constitution, being a living piece of 
legislation, its provision must be construed broadly and not in a pedantic 
way- with less rigidity and more generosity than other Acts. A constitution 
is sui generic, calling for its own principles of interpretation, suitable to its 
character, but without necessarily accepting the ordinary rules and 
presumption of statutory interpretation. " 
In the light of the above statement, the mere presence of the clause "Islamic law relating 
to succession, testate and intestate" in the State List of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution would seem sufficient to confer such jurisdiction upon the Syariah courts. 
Furthermore, article 121 of the Federal Constitution was amended by inserting article 121 
2 Refer to cases of Che Omar bin Che Soh v PP [1998] 2 MU 55, Minister of Home Affairs vJamaluddin 
bin Othman [1998] 1 MU 369 and Hajah Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission (1992] 1 MU 
513. 
3 (1981) 1 MU 29. 
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(1A) for the purpose of upgrading and strengthening the position of the Syariah courts in 
Malaysia. 
The present phenomenon clearly shows the intention of Parliament to place the personal 
laws of Muslims exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. 4 In this respect, 
the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate, is undoubtedly one of the 
Muslim personal laws and hence, the interpretation of the Federal List and the State List 
should accord with the intention behind the insertion of article 121 (1 A). Therefore, the 
presence of the relevant clause in the State List together with section 46 (vii) of the 
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act, 1993 should be adequate to 
eliminate any doubts regarding the question of which court is competent to adjudicate on 
cases concerning Muslim successions 
The application of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 should therefore be limited 
to the succession to non-Muslim estates, and the issuance of grants by the High Court 
should be limited to non-Muslim succession. Any succession pertaining to deceased 
Muslims should be administered and adjudicated separately by the Syariah courts. 
In relation to this, any seemingly conflicting provisions in the Federal Constitution 
should be amended to make matters clear. Amendments to the Administration of Islamic 
Law Act are necessary. Section 46 should be amended to spell out clearly the Syariah 
courts' jurisdiction on such matters. Section 50 should also be amended to confer upon 
° Abu Bakar, Abdullah, Ulasan Kes: Juma'aton Dan Raja Delila Lwn Raja Hizaruddin, pp. 70-71. 
5 Buang, Salleh, Utusan Malaysia, 21/7/1998. 
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the Syariah courts the power to issue farä'id certificates without any request from the 
civil court or the Land Office and to give the certificate a binding legal effect, and 
furthermore to exclude any other body from any interference with the Syariah courts' 
jurisdiction. 
A statute must also be introduced governing Muslim succession, which covers all the 
aspects of the law of succession, including the administration and distribution of the 
estate to the beneficiaries. The current provisions in the Probate and Administration Act, 
1959 and the Distribution Act, 1953 should be utilized as a sample and provide 
guidelines when drafting the new law, with adjustments being made to any provisions 
that are contrary to Islamic law. This statute should take into account the opinions of 
other schools of law and not be confined to the Syäfiis. The primary source of reference 
should be the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and not the opinions of scholars. The opinions of 
scholars should stand as secondary reference points to aid the comprehension of the 
primary sources. 
Another aspect that should be highlighted is the question of why the High Court insists 
on adjudicating on matters of Muslim succession. The relevant articles of the Federal 
Constitution clearly spell out that matters of Islamic Law should be under the jurisdiction 
of the Syariah courts. Moreover, article 121(1A) shows the intention of the Federal 
Legislature to protect and strengthen the status and jurisdiction of the Syariah courts by 
removing the power of the High Court to invalidate the decisions of the Syariah courts. 
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To overcome the problem, a suggested solution is to set up another division within the 
High Court to deal with matters of Islamic law, especially those of succession. In this 
scenario a Syari ah judge, or Qäß, would sit side by side with the civil court judge to 
determine any issue pertaining to the Islamic law of succession. The civil court judge 
would deal with matters other than Islamic law, while the Syari ah judge would deal with 
Islamic law rulings. It is therefore proposed that no amendments be made with regard to 
the relevant provisions of the Federal Constitution, Federal Acts or the states enactments 
except for the purpose of establishing such a division. However, this should be seen as 
the initial step toward transmitting exclusive jurisdiction to the Syariah courts, this being 
the intention behind the insertion of article 121 (1A). 
It is relevant to mention here that the Syari ah judges, registrars, assistant registrars and 
other court staff should have access to sufficient courses and training, especially with 
regard to the administration of estates, to provide them with adequate knowledge and 
experience pertaining to such matters. 6 This preparation should be seriously addressed 
and undertaken because otherwise it is very doubtful whether the Syariah courts could 
successfully carry out the necessary process as the rules and regulations pertaining to 
estate administration would be absolutely new and unfamiliar to them. Therefore, such a 
transfer of jurisdiction from the civil High Court to the Syariah High Court should be 
carefully carried out bearing in mind that the confusion caused by such potential 
problems would further undermine the credibility of the Syariah courts' administration in 
the eyes of the Malaysian public, including the Muslims. The efforts to improve the status 
6 Dato' Abdul Hamid bin Haji Mohamad, Administration ofproperty in Malaysia: A Civil Law and Syariah 
Law Perspective, a paper presented at the Seminar on Islamic Property Management on 7th & 8th 
November, 2001, p. 7. 
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of the Syariah courts should not be discredited by unnecessary hardship being placed on 
the parties, which in turn would cause the people to mistrust the efficiency of the officers 
of the Syariah courts. 
In the case of the Hibah Harta instrument, arguably the `umrä and rugbä conditions have 
nothing to do with the primary intention of introducing the instrument, which is to 
prevent the donee from manipulating or misusing the gifted property, i. e. selling or 
mortgaging it, or expelling the donor from the gifted home. The primary intention could 
probably be achieved by restricting the donee from any such dealings with the property, 
which could defeat the intention of the donor in making the hibah. An appropriate 
solution could possibly be found if the opinion of the Hanbalis is taken into account, 
whereby absolute freedom is given to the contracting parties to insert any condition into 
the contract as long as it does not contradict the Syari ah. 
7 
In this regard, it is suggested that the donor could insert a condition for his/her own 
benefit, such as the right for him/her or any other specified person to remain in the gifted 
house. This is similar to the condition allowing the donor to receive the proceeds of the 
gifted property. However, additional conditions that exclude the legal heirs from 
inheritance are absolutely null and void because they are against the sound (radi hs as 
To the Hanbalis, particularly Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, any conditions that benefit any of the 
parties to the contract are valid as long as no prohibition is found in Islamic law and they 
do not contradict 
the proofs of the Syari ah. This principle is applicable to all kinds of contract 
including contracts of 
exchange and contracts of donation. If such an agreed condition is not fulfilled, the contract 
is capable of 
being revoked by another contracting party. See al-Zuiayli, vol. 4, p. 197- 210. 
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well as the farä'id system. This is the unanimous opinion of the four Sunni schools of 
law. 8 
It must be clear that the acceptance of the property by the Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee 
Berhad on behalf of the donee is through its valid appointment as the donee's 
representative and this must be proven by the appointment being documented. Only when 
the appointment and the functions of the representative are clearly set out is the product 
valid. This may allow the registration of the product in the name of the trustee, instead of 
the donee. It is therefore suggested that the appointment of the Bumiputra-Commerce 
Trustee Berhad as the donee's representative is made and properly documented prior to 
the execution of the offer and acceptance. 
It is also suggested that the National Fatwä Council should validate this instrument rather 
than a state fatwä council. This would ensure that all the state fatwa councils would 
recognize the validity of the instrument, thus enabling the Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee 
Berhad to promote it throughout the country without facing challenges in the courts. 
With regard to the benefits under the takäful and conventional life insurance policies, it is 
suggested that the payment of the money is made in favour of the persons or beneficiaries 
who are freely selected by the participant and are stipulated clearly in the contract 
mutually agreed to by the parties. The inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries is left for 
the participant to freely and totally decide and is agreed upon by the takäful operator or 
8 See ibid, p. 197- 210. 
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insurer. In the case where the participant does not specify the beneficiaries, the payment 
of the money is decided based on the objectives of the transaction 
The payment of benefits from takäful and insurance activities arises from the agreement 
between the participants and the company. To whom the money should be distributed is 
not within the scope of the contract. It is based on a separate agreement between the 
parties involved. As it is a contract of tabarru°ät, it is up to the donor to decide in whose 
favour the money should be given. It should be noted that the distribution of the money 
among the legal heirs is not an effect of a takaful or insurance contract. This is 
completely different to a contract of exchange in the sense that the transfer of ownership 
of the subject matter is the effect of such a contract as clearly prescribed by the Syari ah. 9 
In relation to this, it is suggested that the takäful and conventional insurance activities as 
well as government retirement benefits are regarded as modes of Islamic estate planning. 
The disposition of property upon one's death should not be confined to distribution under 
the farä'id system. It should be based on a variety of property disposal mechanisms, 
including the hibah, wagf and wa$iyyah laws. Muslims could also resort to any other 
modes of estate planning provided that such modes are Syari ah compliant, including the 
harta sepencarian. 
Having said this, the takaful and insurance activities and government retirement benefits 
are arguably best regarded as modes of estate planning and hence, the beneficiaries of 
these benefits could be expanded. From the discussion on these three, it is quite clear that 
9 Al-Zuhayli, vol 4, p. 233. 
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they do not fully meet the characteristics necessary to make them heritable under the 
farä'14 law. In particular, there is the issue of ownership, which is largely based on the 
discussion of the concept and aims of the three modes. In other words, in determining 
whether a wealth is heritable or not, the concept and aims of the particular instrument 
should be taken into account. 
Diversifying property disposal upon death and not confining it to the fara'id system does 
not contradict the Qur'anic and hadith injunctions. The Qur'an itself even encourages the 
Muslim to allocate wealth to the people who are not entitled under the farä'Id system. 
Chapter al-Nisä' (4): 8 states: "But if at the time of division other relatives, or orphans, or 
poor, are present, feed them out of the (property), and speak to them words of kindness 
and justice". From this verse, we can deduce that the importance of varying the recipients 
of the estate, for instance to include adopted children, by way of donation was being 
addressed. However, although in this verse even though the way to help those who are 
not legally entitled is stated as being by way of donation, other methods of achieving the 
same purpose should not be dismissed. As long as other methods do not contradict the 
Syari ah principles and do not infringe the rights of the legally entitled heirs, they should 
be welcomed and utilized to achieve the maximum benefits. 
The Prophet Muhammad even disallowed one of his companions, Sa'ad ibn Abi Wagqä., 
who wished to bequeath two-thirds of his wealth and leave the remaining for his only 
heir, a daughter. The Prophet allowed him to only bequeath a maximum of one-third of 
his estate, emphasizing the importance of financially securing his heir's future after his 
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death. The Prophet laid down a vital principle by saying: "If you leave you heirs rich, it is 
better than leaving them indigent, dependant on people". 10 From this hadith we can 
deduce the significance of taking care of the future of those we dearly love. In Islamic 
estate planning, a combination of various modes of property disposal is therefore a 
method that Muslims can utilize in order to financially secure the lives of others. 
With regard to fatmvä in Malaysia, it is suggested that any fatwä issued by either the 
National Fatwä Council or a statefatwa council should contain a detailed discussion on 
the issues in question. Each fatwä should be based on clear Islamic research methodology 
including the arguments upon which the fatwä is based. In addition, faiawd should be 
publicized in the sense that the public should have easy access to them. This would 
enable the public to comprehend the fatwä and study it in depth, rather than blindly 
accepting it without understanding the reasons and arguments behind it. 
As to the feasibility of these recommendations, these recommendations are feasible 
considering the facts that the Islamic Law of Succession was applied prior to the coming 
of the British, with the mixture of adat laws. The British judges had applied it as seen in 
the court cases and had also decided that Islamic law was the law of the land of the Malay 
States. " There is also tendency in the civil court's interpretation to gradually introduce a 
new legal system in Malaysia. 12 The case of Meor Atiqurrahman bin Ishaq & Others v. 
10 See Ibn Rusyd, translated by Nyazee, vol. 2, p. 407. 
11 See case Ramah v. Laton (1972) 6 FMSLR 128. Thorne J stated: The question in debate was not, in the 
view which I take, a question of foreign law at all, but the question was, in the events that had happened, 
what were the rights of the plaintiff according to the law of this land in the estate of her deceased husband. 
The local law is a matter of which the Court must take judicial notice. The Court must propound the 
aw...... 
12 See above, p. 245. 
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Fatimah bte Sihi and Others13 illustrated how the Court considered the effect of article 
3(1) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. 14 The Court decided that based on article 3, it 
is the Government's responsibility to protect and promote Islam as best as it could. This 
demonstrates that the legal system is moving in this direction. 
As to the official position of the government, the present Malaysian Government had 
taken several attempts to streamline the codification of Islamic law. The Islamic and 
Civil Law Technical Committee was established on 6`h May 1988. According to Yaacob, 
in its first meeting, the committee viewed that the priority is to look into the laws 
applicable in the Syariah courts and to enact sufficient laws for the courts. 15 This is in 
line with the Government intention to upgrade the status of the Syariah courts in 
Malaysia by inserting article 121(IA) of the Federal Constitution whereby preventing the 
civil courts from interference with the decisions of the Syariah courts. The Government 
had also formed a committee under the chairmanship of the late Tan Sri Syed Nasir 
Ismail to look into the unsatisfactory position of the Syariah courts and its judges and 
officers and to suggest measures to be taken to raise their status and position. 16 The 
Government has also established Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia (Syariah 
Judiciary Department of Malaysia), in 1998 in order to address some of the problems that 
are affecting the administration of Syariah courts such as the proposal to restructure the 
Syariah courts throughout Malaysia and the appointment of a Chief Syariah Judge of 
13 [2005] 5 MLJ 375 
14 Article 3(1): Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and 
harmony in any part of the Federation. 
t5 Yaacob, Abdul Monir, `Undang-undang Pentadbiran Agama Islam: Pengkanunan, Reformasi dan 
Penyelarasan' (1998) 2 IKIM Law Journal 37, pp. 67-74. 
16 Ibrahim, "The Future of the Shariah and the Shariah Courts in Malaysia", JMCL, 20, (1993), pp. 44-46. 
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Malaysia. This department is put directly under the Prime Minister's Department. '? Thus, 
the proposals made by this study fall within the aspirations of the Malaysian Government 
and the legal system in terms of enhancing the provisions made by the Syariah courts and 
overcoming the jurisdictional conflicts between these courts and the civil courts. 
17 Shuaib, Fand Sufian, et. al. Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia Text and Material, pp. 208.209. 
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GLOSSARY 
Amänah: Trust 
`Amara: To live long 
cAgd: Contract. 
`Äriyyah Financial contract/ loan. 
Ashäb al furüd Qur'änic heirs. 
`Atiyyah: Bestowal/gift. 
Bayt al-mäl: The public treasury in an Islamic state. 
Dayn: Debt. 
Damän: Guarantee. 
Dhawu al-arhäm: Outer family/ distant relatives. 
Diyyah: Blood money/ compensation. 
Al-diyyah al-wäjibah: Obligatory blood money/ compensation. 
Farä'id: Shares allotted to heirs as specified in the 
Holy Qur'an. 
Faraq: Judicial separation. 
Farada: To allocate/ to enjoin. 
Fasakh: Nullity of marriage 
Fäsid: Invalid/ defective. 
Fatwä (pl. fatäwa): Islamic legal opinion. 
Fiqh: The understanding/ the legal science 
founded mainly on rules and principles 
developed by human reasoning (fjtihlld) 
and the body of knowledge so derived. 
Gharar: Contractual or legal risk/ uncertainty. 
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Al-gharrmvayn/al-gharibatayn/ 
`umäriyyatayn: 
Hadänah: 
Hadith: 
Hadiyyah: 
Halal: 
Haräm: 
Harta Sepencarian: 
Hag: 
Hibah: 
The case of a deceased who leaves behind a 
wife and his parents, or a husband and her 
parents. This case was decided by `Umar 
al-Khattäb, the second Caliph of Islam. 
Guardianship/ custody 
All that is narrated from the Prophet 
Muhammad, his acts, his sayings and 
whatever he has tacitly approved. 
Presence. 
Permitted 
Prohibited 
Jointly acquired property between a 
husband and his wife 
Right. 
Gift. 
Hibah Harta/Hibah Trust/Amanah Hibah: An Islamic estate-planning instrument of 
the Bumiputera-Commerce Trustee Berhad. 
Al-huqüq al-muta`alligah bi al-tarikah The rights, which are attached to the 
heritage. 
`Iddah: 
Ijärah: 
Ijma`: 
Ijtihäd: 
`Ilm: 
The waiting period following dissolution of 
marriage by death or divorce 
Contract of Lease/ hire/ tenancy 
Unanimous agreement of the jurists of the 
Muslim community at any period following 
the demise of the Prophet Muhammad on a 
SyarTah matter/ consensus of opinion 
Reasoning/ the effort a scholar makes in 
order to deduce legal ruling from the 
various sources of law 
Knowledge/ science 
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Ikhtiläf: 
Jähiliyyah: 
Kafalah: 
Kafýrah: 
Kalälah: 
Al-Khalafiyyah: 
Luzüm: 
Mal: 
Manfa`ah: 
Marad al-mawt: 
Milkiyyah: 
Maysir: 
Magä. Fid: 
Mudärabah: 
Mudärib: 
Mufti (p l. muftis): 
A1-Mugäsamah: 
Muräbahah: 
Musyärakah/ musytarakah/ hajariyyah: 
Nadhr: 
Juristic disagreement 
Ignorance 
Contract of Guarantee 
Expiation 
The absence of parents, grandparents, 
children and children's children. 
Replacement/ succession 
Binding 
Property 
Usufruct 
Terminal illness. 
Ownership 
Gambling 
Plural of magsad, objectives. 
Profit and loss sharing. 
Investor 
Official expounder of Islamic law 
The equal distribution between the 
grandfather and the siblings that are in 
potential competition over an estate. 
A sale of goods at a price covering the 
purchase price plus a margin of profit 
agreed upon by both parties concerned. 
The case of a person who dies leaving heirs 
constitute of husband/wife, mother, uterine 
brother and germane brother. 
Vow 
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k, I 
Nusyüz: Disobedience/ violation of marital duties 
Qädi Syari ah judge 
Qiyäs: Analogy 
Qur'an: The Holy Book 
Ra'su al-mä1: Capital 
Ribä: Usury 
Ribawi: Related to rib,! 
Risywah: Corruption 
Rugbä: Awaiting another party's death 
$'adagah: Alms/ charity 
$ähib al-ma!: Provider of capital 
$ahih: Valid/ authentic 
Shari ah: Literally means the path denoting the way 
of life ordained by Allah 
Shart (pl. shuri t): Condition 
$ghah: The mode of offer and acceptance 
$'ulh: Reconciliation/ settlement 
Tabarru`ät: Sincere donation 
Takäful: Mutual cooperation 
Taqdir: Ascertainment 
Tarikah/ tirkah: Property left by the deceased/ heritage 
`Umrä: Gift for life 
`Urf: Customary practices, which are not in 
conflict with the Qur'dn or the Sunnah. 
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Wakälah: Contract of agency 
Wagf: Gift left in perpetuity/ endowment 
Wärith: Legal heir 
Wasaq: Weight 
Wasiyyah: Bequest/ will/ testamentary disposition 
Wisdyah: Guardianship/ trusteeship 
Zakäh: Almsgiving 
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APPENDIX 
Sample of Trust Deed of the Hibah Harta Instrument of the Bumiputra-Commerce 
Trustee Berhad. 
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SAMPLE 
BETWEEN 
("THE DONOR") 
AND 
BUMIPUTRA-COMMERCE TRUSTEE BERHAD 
("THE TRUSTEE") 
AND 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
("THE DONEE") 
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ 
TRUST DEED 
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@9@9 
BUMIPUTRA COMMERCE TRUSTEE BERFIAD (167913-Mi) 
D-0-6 MEGAN PHILEO PROMENADE 
189 JALAN TUN RAZAK 
50400 KUALA LUMPUR 
SAMPLE 
THIS TRUST DEED is made on this day of 20 
BETWEEN: - 
(1) The party whose name(s), description(s) and address are stated in Section 1 
of the Schedule A hereto (hereinafter referred to as " ") of the one 
part 
and 
(2) BUMIPUTRA-COMMERCE TRUSTEE BERHAD (Co. No. 167913- 
M), a company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 
and having its registered address at 2/ Floor Bumiputra-Commerce Bank 
Berhad No. 6 Jalan Tun Perak 50050 Kuala Lumpur and place of business 
at D-0-6 Megan Phileo Promenade, 189 Jalan Tun Razak, 50400 Kuala 
Lumpur (hereinafter called "The Trustee") of the second part. 
and 
(3) The party whose name(s), description(s) and address are stated in Schedule 
B hereto (hereinafter referred to as "t'), of the third part. 
WHEREAS: - 
A. By a sighah made by the Donor and accepted by the Donee, and in witness 
whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands the day and year first 
above written. 
B. Tl_, i?, t tto Ipt4 listed under the Schedule C hereto ,- 
ft 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Asset" and reference to the Trust Asset 
shall be construed as reference to all or any one or more of them) 
C. The Dd iifr;! nd. ýhý+D'ö e 'äte d siröüs': to appoint the'Tnist , to. adta inister 
the Trust Asset during the Donor's and Donee's lifetime and tQ, ýibutt- 
the Trust Asset to the Donee upon the Denor's derma or er tbc, 'jhq 
Asse t: °ý back;; to t> Donor ä cdo ding., to,: the. terms-,, and -. conditions stated 
He"r'eiý! 
D. The mode -. '. of"'distributfonr of the Trust Asset is subject to the terms 
stipulated under Section 2 of Schedule A. 
:.. 
SA. IN IP1. E. 
E. The Trustee has agreed to act as trustee of these presents and to hold the 
Trust Asset created thereby on trust for the parties herein in accordance 
with the provisions stated herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual 
covenants herein contained, the, Donor agrees to execute such further instruments 
as shall be necessary to vest the Trustee with full title to the property, and the 
Trustee agrees to hold the Trust Asset, IN TRUST, NEV'ER'1'11EL[ESS, t*ur the 
following uses and purposes and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set 
forth: 
PART 1- POWER OF'I'RUS'I'E1? 
1.1 In addition to any powers granted under applicable law or otherwise. and 
not in limitation of such powers, but subject to any rights and powers which 
may be reserved expressly by the Donor in this Deed as stated in Schedule 
F, the Trustee is authorized to exercise the following powers :- 
a. Monies, if any requiring to be invested under this Deed (including, 
accumulations of income] may, at the discretion of the Trustee he 
applied or invested in the purchase of or at interest upon security of such 
stocks, fund shares securities or other investments or property insofar as 
the said investments concerned are not made in contravention with 
Shariah whatsoever nature and whosever situate and whether involving 
liability or not upon such personal credit with or without security as the 
Trustee shall have the same full and unrestricted powers of investiv" 
and varying investment in all respect as if they were absolutely and 
beneficially entitled thereto. 
b. To hold and retain any and all Trust Asset and to dispose of such Asset 
according to the terms and conditions contained herein. 
c. To comprise, adjust, arbitrate, sue, defend, abandon, or otherwise deal 
with and settle claims, in favor of or against the 'T'rust Asset as the 
Trustee shall deem best and the Trustee's decision shall be conclusive. 
d. To cause the Trust Asset to be registered or vested in the name or names 
of the Donee upon the demise of the Donor'and the Trustee shall not he 
liable for any loss which may be occasioned by the exercise of this 
power. 
e. To transfer and register the Trust Asset direct to t1 k Donor's ºr Dome's 
next-of-kin and beneficiaries in accordance with S}. _aw, without 
1) 
SAMPLE 
the necessity of applying for grant of Letters of Administration in the 
event that either o is deemed to get the Trust 
Asset before the Trustee is able to transfer and register the 
Trust Asset in his or her name. HOWEVER, where there is a grant of 
representation to the estate of either of them the Trustee may at ots own 
discretion transfer the said Trust Asset to their legal personal 
representative. 
1.2 Notwithstanding of the above, the Trustee may also exercise all rights 
stated in Schedule E of this Deed. 
PART II 
DONOR'S AND DONEE'S REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTIES 
2.1 The E? öiES? rhereby represents and warrants to the Trustee that: - 
i) They have full power, authority and legal right to enter into this Deed; 
ii) Neither the signing and delivery of this Deed and/or any other documents 
to which they are a party nor the performance of any of the transactions 
contemplated herein or therein does or will not contravene or constitute a 
default under any provision contained in any agreement, instrument, law, 
judgment, order, license, permit or consent by which they are bound or 
affected; 
iii) They are not in breach or contravention of or in default under any law or 
regulation, order, authority, agreement, undertaking, instrument, 
arrangement, obligation or duty applicable to, or which is binding upon or 
affect, them or the Trust Asset, the consequences of which breach, 
contravention or default, could materially and adversely affect the their 
assets, liabilities, or condition (financial or otherwise) or their ability to 
perform their obligation hereunder; no event of default or prospective 
event of default has occurred which, with the giving of notice and/or the 
lapse of time and/or the fulfilment of any other condition, would constitute 
a default under any such other agreement, undertaking or instrument; and 
no event or omission has occurred which entitles, or which with the giving 
of notice and/or the lapse of time and/or the fulfilment of any other 
condition could entitle, any creditor or creditors of them to declare any of 
the their indebtedness due and payable prior to its specified maturity; 
(iv) They are not bankrupt or have committed any act of bankruptcy or has 
entered into any arrangement or composition with their creditors; 
(v) No litigation, arbitration or administrative proceedings before or of any 
court, tribunal or regulatory authority is presently pending or, to the 
knowledge of them, threatened against them or the Trust Asset. 
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PART III - TRUSTEE REMUNERATION 
3.1 The Trustee shall be entitled to charge such fee, as it deems fit and proper 
in connection with this Deed. The Donor and the Donee hereby undertake 
and agree to pay such tees üoi,,, ated in Schedule D 
3.2 In addition to the above clause, if the Trustee, in its sole discretion, 
proceeds to exercise the rights under Clause 1.1(d), the estate 
administration fee shall be 1.0% (One percent) of the total value of the 
Trust Asset. at that particular time. 
3.3 In the event, the Trust Asset transferred back to the Donir(other tha due to 
revocation made by the Donor, the administration tee shall-be-0-. f% (zero 
point one percent) of the value of the total Trust Asset, of the Donee's 
respective portion, at that particular time or if more than one (1) Donee, 
0.1% (zero point one percent) of their respective portion. However if the 
Trust Asset transferred back to the Donor due to revocation made by the 
Donor, the administration fee shall be the same as Item B of Schedule D. 
PART IV - TERMINATION 
4.1 Neither party shall have the right to terminate this Deed except as provided 
under ;. pertaining to 
Hibah. 
4.2 Reversion of the Trust Asset to the Donor or termination by way of 
distribution and transfer to the Donee by the Trustee is considered 
sufficiently and legally discharge the Trustee's duties and the Trustee shall 
not be held liable or responsible to any party under this Deed thereafter 
PART V- MISCELLANEOUS 
5.1 The Donor and Donee hereby declare that in the interpretation of this 
Deed the expression "the Trustee" shall (where the context permits) 
mean the trustees for the time being hereof whether original or 
substituted and if there shall be no such trustees shall (where the 
context permits) include the persons empowered by statute to exercise 
or perform any power or trusts hereby or by statute conferred upon the 
trustees hereof and willing or bound to exercise or perform the same. 
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5.2 Time wherever mentioned in this Deed shall be of the essence. 
5.3 This Deed shall be binding on the successors in the title and the assigns of 
the parties. 
I 
5.5 The Donor and Donee shall pay any stamp, documentary and other similar 
duties and taxes to which this Deed or any related documents may be 
subject or give rise and shall fully indemnify the Trustee from and against 
any expense, damage, loss or liability which any of them may incur as a 
result of any delay or omission of the Donor and Donee to pay any such 
duties. 
5.6 a) Any notice or communication under or in connection with this Deed 
may be in writing and shall be delivered personally, or by post, telex, 
cable or facsimile, to the party's address as stated in the preamble of this 
Deed and Schedule A and B herein or at such other address as the 
recipient may have notified to the other party hereto in writing. Proof of 
posting or dispatch of any notice or communication to the Borrower 
shall be deemed to be proof of receipt: 
ii) if it is personally delivered, at the time of delivery; 
iii) in the case of a letter, on the second business day after posting: 
iv) in the case of a telex or cable, on the business day immediately after 
transmission; or 
v) in the case of a facsimile, on the business day immediately after 
transmission PROVIDED that the sender has received an answer 
back confirmation. 
b) No change in the address for service of the Donor and Donee howsoever 
brought about shall be effective on the Trustee unless actual notice of 
such change has been given to the Trustee. 
5.7 This Deed shall he construed, regulated and governed by and in accordance 
with the: laws- of{Malaysia. 
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5.8 The Donor and Donee shall fully indemnify the Trustee from and against 
any cost, expenses, losses, claims, damages or liability (as to the amount of 
which the certificate of the Trustee shall, in the absence of manifest error be 
conclusive) which the Trustee may incur or incurred in carrying out the 
Trustee duties in this Deed. 
5.9 The Donor and Donee shall on demand pay: 
a) To the Trustee all expenses (including legal fees on a solicitors and 
client basis, printing, publicity and out-of-pocket expenses) incurred 
in connection with the negotiation, preparation or completion of this 
Deed: and 
b) To the Trustee all expenses (including legal fees on a solicitor and 
client basis and out-of-pocket expenses) incurred in connection with 
any variation, consent or approval relating to this Deed or any 
related documents or in connection with the preservation or 
enforcement or attempted preservation or enforcement of any of 
their rights under this Deed or any related documents. 
PART VI - SEVERABILITY 
6. Severability. 
6.1 In the event that any of the terms, conditions, provisions, contained 
in this Deed shall be deemed invalid, unlawful or unenforceable to 
any extent such terms, conditions or provision shall be severed from 
the remaining terms, conditions and provisions which shall continue 
to be valid to the fullest extent permitted by law. 
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunto set their hands the day and 
year first above written. 
Signed by the Donor 
in the presence of: ............................................ 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
I/C NO: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Signed by the Donee in the 
presence of: 
Signed for and on behalf of 
Bumiputra-Commerce Trustee Berhad 
in the presence of: 
............................................ 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
I/C NO: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
............................................ 
SHAHIDAH BINTI HASHIM 
GENERAL MANAGER 
I/C NO : A$9 i 
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SCHEDULE A 
(which is to be taken part, read and construed as an essential part of this Deed) 
Section Item Particulars 
1. Name, description and address of the 1. Name : xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Donor I/C : xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (new) 
xxxxxxxxxxxxx (old) 
Address: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
2. Condition of Distribution 
3. Name, description and address of the -NIL- 
Guardian 
Note - 
E(- waiting for whoever demises first. If the Donor demises first, the 
Donee will get the Trust Asset and vicoNersa. 
SAMPLE 
SCHEDULE B 
(which is to be taken part, read and construed as an essential part of this Deed) 
PARTICULARS OF THE DONEE 
No Name Age I/C-Birth Cert. - 
Passport No. 
Address Relationship 
1. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
XXXX. 
SAMPLE 
SCHEDULE C 
(which is to be taken part, read and construed as an essential part of this Deed) 
PARTICULARS OF THE TRUST ASSET 
YO TYPE OF PARTICULARS VALUE NAME 
ASSETS (RM) 
1. Landed Geran: 14131 XXXYXXXXXCXKXCXXKXCCXXXX 
Property Lot No: 41203 
Mukim: Kuala Lumpur 
District: Kuala Lumpur 
State: Wilayah Persekutuan 
K. L 
Land Area: 197 sq. m. 
Annual Rent: RM 60-00 
2. Landed Unit 211, Block E, XXXXXXxxxxxxXXXXCXXXXX 
Property Phileo Damansara 1, 
No. 9 Jalan 16/11, 
Off Jalan Damansara, 
46350 Petaling Jaya, 
Selangor. 
3 Landed H. S (D) 78984 xxxxxxxxxxx xxx xx xxx 
Property P. T. 38743 
Mukim: Kuala Lumpur 
District: Kuala Lumpur 
State: Wilayah Persekutuan 
K. L 
Land Area: 483 sq. m. 
Annual Rent: RM 145-0() 
4. Landed H. S. (M) 3070 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX\\\ 
Property P. T. 12851 
Mukim: Kajang 
District: Hulu Langat 
State: Selangor 
Land Area: 360.7307 sq. m. 
Annual Rent: RM45-00 
5 Agricultural H. S. (D) 1217 XX\\XXX\\\\\\'M\\\\\ 
Land P. T. 2854 
Mukim: Dengkil 
District: Sepanf! 
P't)RTION 
ALL 
Al. l. 
ALL. 
. \L. 1. 
: \l. l. 
SAMPLE 
State: Selangor 
Land Area: 0.4047 hectare 
Annual Rent: RM8.70 
6 Landed H. S. (M) 34195 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1/2 
Property Lot: 11737S xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Mukim: lpoh (S) 
District: Kinta 
State: Perak 
Land Area: 1,297.9 sq. m. 
Annual Rent: RM559-00 
TOTAL IMMOVEABLE 
ASSET 
7 
Individual Kuala Lumpur Golf & xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Licence Country Club, Malaysia 
Membership No: A1088P 
8 Individual Kelab Golf Darul Ridwan xxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Licence Membership No: A099 
9 Individual Meru Golf and Country Club xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Licence 
10. Deposit Kuala Lumpur Golf & xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Country Club 
Membership No: A1088P 
It. Deposit Royal Lake Club xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Membership No: 9650 
12. Royal Perak Golf Club xxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Membership No: A166 
13 Kclab Golf Darul Ridwan xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Membership No: A99 
14 Kelab Golf Negara Subang xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ALL 
Membership No: 34542 
TOTAL MOVEABLE 
ASSET 
SAMPLE 
SCHEDULE D 
(which is to be taken part, read and construed as an essential part of this Deed) 
FEE BASED ON THE ESTIMATION VALUE OF THE TRUST ASSET - 
RM 250,000-00 
HIBAH FEE 
TOTAL = 
12 
SAMPLE 
SCHEDULE E 
(which is to be taken part, read and construed as an essential part of this Deed) 
A) In addition to the powers granted under Clause 2.1 of the Deed, the Trustee 
is authorised to exercise the following powers to the Trustee's sole and 
absolute discretion: (if any) 
-NIL- 
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SCHEDULE F 
(which is to be taken part, read and construed as an essential part of this Deed) 
Rights and powers, which reserved by the Donor, are as follows; (if any) 
1. The Donor with the consent of the Donee 
Trust Asset irrespective of whether the term of the leases 'ä excee tc 
period permitted by law or the probable period of any trust created hereby. 
2. The Donor and the Donee shall insure, at all times, the Trust Asset against 
loss or damage by fire or such other risk to the full value thereof or such 
other amount as the Donor consider desirable and pay the premiums for 
such insurance and the Donor shall hold any money received in respect of 
any such policy in trust of the Donee. 
3. The Donor and the Donee undertake to pay all assessment, quit rent, rates 
or licenses fee payable from time to time in respect of the Trust Asset as 
and when the same become due and payable, and to forward the receipt or 
any proof of such payment to the Trustee for record purposes. 
14 
0 
